1. Greater Regional Cooperation and a Stronger Central Asia Community

In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced that the process of forming a ‘New Central Asia’ has begun.^[1] Certainly in 2026, Central Asia is expected to become an increasingly cohesive and strategic geopolitical community. Long-standing border disputes in the region are being resolved, diplomatic and economic ties are being tightened, and steps are being taken towards meaningful integration and the establishment of formal regional institutions. During the course of 2025, the five Central Asian states participated as a unified region in a series of ’C5+1’ format meetings with the EU, China, Russia and the US. In November 2025, at the seventh high-level regional Consultative Meeting, Central Asian leaders discussed a potential redefinition of their group, an evolution from a loose ‘consultative mechanism’ into a more concrete ‘Central Asian Community’ with a permanent secretariat.^[2] The meeting also discussed the creation of a new regional security architecture, starting with a joint cataloguing of security risks and preventative measures, and proposals were made for regional centres on AI, water management and rare earth metals.^[3] Significantly, a decision was made to include Azerbaijan in the consultative group; this strategic move is expected to facilitate the development of the Middle Corridor and increase the group’s geopolitical linkages moving forward. 

2. A New Model for Peacebuilding?

The Fergana Valley, located in the heart of Central Asia at the point where Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan converge, has been a flash point for territorial conflict and aggression ever since the fall of the Soviet Union. Over the decades, armed skirmishes in the valley have led to the deaths of hundreds of people. In 2025, however, the stage for peace was set with the signing of the Khujand Declaration, a commitment by the presidents of the three nations to end their territorial disputes and transform Fergana into a zone of open borders, economic cooperation and cultural exchange.^[4] Khujand was followed in October by the landmark Fergana Peace Forum. Touted as an inclusive event, the forum brought together government officials and conflict resolution experts with diplomats, international organisations, the business community and a cross-section of civil society representatives and activists. At the Forum, the three concerned states proposed plans to solve the drivers of past violence, including specifically conflict over water resources and transport. The final communiqué speaks of conserving the Fergana Forum as a ‘permanent platform’ for dialogue moving forward, with a mandate to promote mutual trust and cooperation and the ultimate aim of ensuring sustainable development and economic prosperity.^[5] Exactly how the Forum will become such a platform has yet to be defined, making the evolution of this model of peacebuilding through ‘good-neighbourliness’ one to watch in 2026.

3. Human rights activists, independent journalists, bloggers & NGOs increasingly under attack by authorities throughout Central Asia

Civic space is shrinking in Central Asia, driven in large part by escalating restrictions on press freedom. The World Press Freedom Index, published by Reporters Without Borders, now classifies the entire Central Asian region as ‘very serious’, meaning that press freedom is nonexistent and journalists face particularly high dangers in carrying out their work.^[6] The recent decline of press freedom is most notable in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which were previously classified as ‘serious’.^[7]

Deepening this downward trend, police recently raided Orda, one of Kazakhstan’s leading independent media outlets, and charged its editor-in-chief, Gulnara Bazhkenova, with ‘repeated and deliberate distribution of knowingly false information,’ placing her under house arrest pending an investigation.^[8] Kazakh authorities have stepped up the use of false information charges against independent media in recent months.^[9] In Kyrgyzstan, the top three independent media agencies, Kloop, Temirov Live, and AitAit, were formally classified as “extremist organisations” and banned by a recent court ruling ahead of snap parliamentary elections.^[10] Since President Sadyr Japarov assumed office, independent media and journalists have faced escalating legal and political harassment, alongside a steady tightening of restrictions on press freedom.^[11] Kyrgyzstan, once the most democratic country in the region, is now experiencing an increasing suppression of opposition voices.^[12]

These developments mirror a broader regional trend across Central Asia, where governments are moving toward an even more restrictive path marked by the erosion of universal human rights principles, escalating attacks on freedom of expression, the intimidation of human rights defenders, and the growing treatment of dissent as a threat to state stability. The region is heading toward an increasingly dangerous period for fundamental freedoms.

4. The impacts of an ever-evolving geopolitical landscape on Central Asia’s multi-vector foreign policy: narrowing room for manoeuvre?

Since independence, the Central Asian states have been characterised as passive players in the context of revived geopolitical competition and tensions.^[13] Yet signs of change are increasingly visible. In 2025, the five Central Asian countries further consolidated their multi-vector approach, deepening ties mainly on three fronts: the EU, the US, and China.

At the first-ever EU-Central Asia Summit on 4 April 2025, the five Presidents of the Central Asian republics, together with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council, António Costa, elevated relations to a Strategic Partnership between the two regions, marking a new phase of cooperation.^[14] 

In June 2025, President Xi Jinping signed the treaty of ‘permanent good-neighbourliness and friendly cooperation’ with the five Central Asian leaders at the second China-Central Asia Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. During the Summit, President Xi Jinping also pledged 1.5 billion yuan ($208.86 million) in grant aid towards livelihood and development support. More practically, China’s trade with the five Central Asian countries reached a record 286.42 billion yuan in the first five months of 2025, growing by 10.4% year-on-year.^[15] This clearly signals China’s intent to consolidate its position and influence in the region.

Central Asia’s positioning vis-à-vis the US also saw a shift since President Trump’s election. This is clearly evidenced by the countries’ pivot from promoting their reform agenda to simply endorsing any US initiative, particularly those that reinforce their political interests. A clear illustration is the case of USAID, a previously valued partner and now openly criticised for interfering in domestic affairs. A reversed stance has also been taken on climate change, with Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev echoing Trump’s claim that global warming is a “massive con”, despite once urging global action. Business-centred dialogue has now replaced distancing from Russia or commitment to democratic reforms as the main tool to engage US attention.^[16] The Summit on 6 November 2025, marking a decade of cooperation in the C5+1 format, reaffirmed the mutual interest of the Central Asian states and the US in deepening cooperation, particularly as Washington remains the only power that the region’s neighbouring historical hegemons take seriously.^[17]

On the international stage, Central Asia’s thirst for increased agency is clearly visible. However, at the same time, the region avoids commitments that contradict Russian interests. This dynamic is clearly reflected in, for example, voting patterns at the UN General Assembly. Since 2022, the five countries have either abstained from voting or not voted at all on any Resolution concerning Ukraine. While Russia’s attempts to push the countries to support it in formal international fora have not succeeded, the region’s multi-alignment approach still stops short of formally challenging Russia.

Moreover, while Russia’s attention has been mostly absorbed by the war in Ukraine since 2022, recent discussions surrounding a potential peace deal may signal a shift in Moscow’s regional posture in the coming years. Signs of Russia’s desire to reassert its influence in the region can already be seen, as illustrated by Lavrov’s visit to Uzbekistan after the EU-Central Asia Summit. During his visit, he criticised the absence of a Russian inscription at the Motamsaro Ona (Grieving Mother) memorial in Samarkand, condemned what he defined as the EU’s ‘politicised cooperation’ and implicitly accused the EU of interfering with domestic affairs in the region.^[18]

In 2026, navigating shifting competing pressures may push the five states to further adapt their foreign-policy strategies and attempts at asserting themselves as Middle Powers, balancing old dependencies with new opportunities.

5. International Justice under Pressure

Central Asia’s approach towards international criminal law remains uneven. Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country to have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), while Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan remain signatories that have yet to ratify, and Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have not acceded. A similar tension can be observed in Central Asia’s engagement with international justice mechanisms. In 2025, several ICC State Parties either withdrew from the ICC or ignored their obligations to arrest individuals under arrest warrants, thereby weakening the Rome Statute and the international justice project. Notably, after failing to comply with the obligation to arrest Prime Minister Netanyahu, Hungary announced its withdrawal from the ICC.^[19]

In Central Asia, Tajikistan most recently hosted President Putin, who is subject to an ICC arrest warrant. However, as in Hungary, Tajikistan refused to arrest him, thus breaching its obligations under the Rome Statute. This raises the possibility that Tajikistan might follow Hungary and withdraw from the Court in 2026, a scenario reinforced by the broader regional context. Indeed, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the issuance of ICC arrest warrants against Russian leaders, Central Asian states have grown more reluctant to engage with the Court, in stark contrast to other states that have moved closer to the ICC. As Tajikistan may now face a judicial finding of non-compliance with a cooperation request pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, the ensuing reputational costs may play a role in the country’s future engagement with the Court.

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that another scenario is possible. In September 2024, President Putin visited Mongolia, which failed to arrest him. Because of this, Mongolia was referred by ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II to the Assembly of States Parties and was found to have breached the provisions of the Rome Statute.^[20] Despite the judgment, Mongolia has not expressed any intention to withdraw from the ICC. Rather, it is engaging with the agenda of international justice, as evidenced by its signing of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in Prosecuting Crimes under International Law. This example shows that non-compliance does not automatically lead to withdrawal and that various political, strategic, and economic factors play a role in shaping state behaviour.

6. A Connectivity Agenda Beyond Geopolitical Objectives

On 26–27 November, the EU and the Central Asian states reaffirmed their joint commitment to strengthening sustainable and resilient cross-regional connectivity at the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC) and Connectivity Investors Forum in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.^[21] The development of a transport and logistics network linking Europe and Central Asia via the South Caucasus provides a critical alternative to the Russian Northern Corridor, making the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor strategically important, especially from a supply-chain security perspective. At the EU–Central Asia Summit, the EU announced a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package, including €3 billion earmarked for transport, complementing the €10 billion pledged in 2024 specifically for the TCTC.^[22] However, the increasingly restrictive human-rights environment in Central Asia, coupled with mounting climate vulnerabilities, underscores the need for strong human rights and environmental due diligence standards across all EU-funded TCTC projects. This applies to labour conditions along new transport routes, governance and transparency in procurement, the environmental impact of expanded railways, roads, ports, and the protection of border communities situated along the Corridor. In 2026, a key question will be whether the EU will be able to ensure that TCTC is not merely a geopolitical endeavour, but rather a sustainable and rights-based model of connectivity, one that does not exacerbate existing challenges in the region but actively mitigates the risks of trafficking, smuggling and corruption that often accompany major transit corridors.

The connectivity landscape in the region is also shaped by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has significantly facilitated trade, transport links, and people-to-people contact in Central Asia. At the same time, this has contributed to China becoming a key trade partner in the region and illustrates that the Global Gateway Initiative will continue to operate in a competitive environment. A flagship example is the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, whose construction began in March 2025 following the resolution of long-standing border disputes among the Ferghana Valley countries, namely Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.^[23] This strategic BRI project holds considerable potential to increase transport capacity and reduce congestion and transit time,^[24] thereby strengthening China-Central Asia connectivity and Beijing’s role in shaping regional transport routes.

7. Significant Aid Cuts Have the Potential to Destabilise Progress

Globally, the OECD is projecting a 9-17% reduction in Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2025, with further cuts expected in the coming years.^[25] While the United States’ overhaul of its’ foreign aid system has been the most visible contributor to this decline, it is by no means the only OECD nation cutting ODA; other major bilateral donors that have announced significant aid cuts this year include the United Kingdom, Germany and France. The impact of these cuts on Central Asia, while not uniform, is profound. According to the Center for Global Development, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have lost 78% and 69% respectively of their USAID-backed programs, while in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, USAID programming has been discontinued in its entirety.^[26] Multi-million dollar programmes that have disappeared include those supporting basic services in education and healthcare, such as the critical ‘TB-Free’ initiative,^[27] but also projects promoting agriculture and economic diversification, environmental protection and civic engagement.  While these cuts have left the local authorities scrambling to compensate with limited domestic resources, Central Asian leaders are divided on how they perceive the sudden decline in ODA. Those who saw aid programs as infringements on their sovereignty welcome the change; those who viewed Western support as a counterbalance to regional powers are more concerned.^[28] Moving into 2026, the continued impact of any disruption to basic services will be borne by those who are already vulnerable. Cuts to maternal health services or nutrition assistance could lead to increased morbidity rates.^[29] The withdrawal of economic support leaves Central Asian nations vulnerable to economic stagnation in the coming year.^[30] Less external assistance for civic engagement is already reducing pressure for democratisation and good governance, rendering human rights advocates ever more vulnerable; in Kazakhstan, the authorities have begun investigations into past recipients of USAID funding, including LGBT advocacy organisations.^[31] Aid cuts are also contributing to the crisis of independent media in Central Asia, further constricting the circulation of  information and fuelling a dangerous dynamic of political instrumentalisation of the press.^[32] The impact of an enormous humanitarian aid reduction in Afghanistan on the wider Central Asia region also cannot be ignored. The absolute value of the USAID cut alone is estimated to be USD 223 million, or 1.16% of Afghanistan’s GNI.^[33]  The disappearance of humanitarian assistance has the potential to fuel migration and further unsettle a region that has historically exported terrorism.^[34] While Afghanistan’s deepening humanitarian crisis could spark additional intra-regional cooperation efforts, such as when Kazakhstan sent humanitarian assistance and medical teams to Afghanistan following a powerful earthquake in November 2025,^[35] it is more likely that heightened vulnerability in Afghanistan, especially if it leads to larger refugee numbers and increased cross-border attacks, could destabilise the fragile movement towards Central Asian cooperation.

8. An Increasingly Contested Security Space

Central Asia’s fragility, together with its strategic position at the heart of the Eurasian continent, makes the maintenance of stability in the region a high priority for many nations. As we move into 2026, this is manifested by an increasingly contested security space, with multiple contenders jostling to be the region’s principle security partner. Historically, Russia was of course the principle defence guarantor for Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are all members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), with shared defence and intelligence apparatus. Although Uzbe­kistan suspended its CSTO membership in 2012, it maintains close bilateral mili­tary ties with Moscow.^[36] While Russia remains the largest supplier of military materials to the region and retains an important military presence on the ground,^[37] since the onset of the Ukraine war, the Central Asian states have increasingly looked elsewhere for  security support. China, in particular, has expanded its influence in this domain, providing an alternative source of defence products, supporting border security activities near Afghanistan and broadening its counterterrorism efforts.^[38] Under the umbrella of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) – of which Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are full members while Turkmenistan holds observer status – Türkiye is also deepening its relationship with the Central Asian states and positioning itself as an important provider of military cooperation and defence products.^[39] Türkiye’s NATO membership, together with the Central Asian states’ continued close links to Russia/the CSTO, however, do limit these ambitions.^[40] While security was not a particular focus of the recent C5+1 meeting with the United States, the US has also been challenging Russia’s role as the principal supplier of defence and military equipment to the region. In recent years, Washington has supported partner security forces in Central Asia with  vehicles, communications equipment and training. Central Asian analysts also responded favourably to US President Donald Trump’s recent musings about reopening the Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan.^[41] Finally, while the EU does not aspire to be a hard security actor in Central Asia, the bloc has positioned itself as a soft security partner. This includes the organisation of high-level dialogue on common security challenges, as well as flagship programs aimed at sharing best practices in border management, counter terrorism and the rule of law.^[42]

9. Advancement of Gender Equality in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is rapidly advancing its efforts to promote gender equality. The World Bank recently recognised Uzbekistan as one of the top five improvers in gender equality in its most recent (2024) report, Women, Business and the Law.^[43] This annual report examines global advancements in gender equality by analysing 190 countries across key areas, including safety, freedom of movement, employment conditions, wages, marriage, parental rights, childcare, entrepreneurship, ownership of assets, and retirement.^[44] The country is continuing to advance forward. Earlier this year, the Senate approved the Comprehensive Action Program for Implementing the Gender Equality Strategy until 2030, which aims to provide women with equal opportunities and enhance their engagement in education, public roles, and economic activities.^[45] In addition, UN Women officially opened its doors in Uzbekistan this past May.^[46] This historic milestone reflects a commitment by the country to advance gender equality as a national priority. Since then, significant progress has been made. In November, UN Women and ACWA Power Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan’s largest investor in renewable energy, partnered up in a landmark agreement to promote women’s empowerment.^[47] This is the first-ever collaboration between a private Uzbek company and  a UN agency.^[48] Under their agreement, ACWA Power Uzbekistan will provide $50,000 to support the UN Women Economic Empowerment programme, which aims to enhance women’s involvement in education and the workforce by providing gender equality training, fostering leadership skills, and introducing a pilot Gender Equality Curriculum at Shirin College.^[49]

Despite these landmark legislative and policy initiatives, gender biases and entrenched societal attitudes remain strong.^[50] These barriers can limit the effective implementation of reforms, as community norms and the status quo often shape women’s opportunities more than formal legislation.^[51] Given these persistent social and cultural challenges, can Uzbekistan’s legal and institutional reforms truly translate into meaningful gender equality on the ground?

10. In Turkmenistan, Forced Labour in the Cotton Industry Remains Widespread Despite Reforms and International Scrutiny

In Turkmenistan, government authorities systematically force students, and public sector workers, including teachers and healthcare workers to work in cotton fields during harvest season (from late August until December) under the threat expulsion from school,  losing their jobs, or reducing their hours or pay.^[52] ​​Payments for hiring replacement workers put an extreme financial burden on state employees, with many having to allocate up to two-thirds of their salaries to cover the costs.^[53] Pickers deployed to the fields generally work for 15-20 days at a time, often far from home, requiring overnight stays in unsanitary living conditions.^[54] Cotton picking is intense manual labour. Fields sometimes reach 40 degrees Celsius (104 Fahrenheit) in August, with no shade and limited access to drinking water.^[55] By December, despite freezing temperatures, pickers are forced to continue picking in harsh conditions.^[56] Cotton is sprayed with pesticides, yet pickers are not provided with protective equipment, such as gloves and masks, nor are they informed about the chemicals used.^[57]

As part of the ‘Roadmap for Joint Activities for 2024-2025’ between Turkmenistan and the ILO, Turkmenistan increased the number of ILO representatives allowed to monitor the cotton harvest and introduced legislation classifying cotton picking as hazardous and prohibited for children under 18. Despite this progress, the ILO issued a report in May 2025 highlighting its findings during the 2024 harvest season, noting that public authorities and state institutions continued forcing public sector workers to either pick cotton or pay for replacement pickers. The report also shows government interference with the ILO’s monitoring process and the use of school-age children, including children younger than the age of 15. Authorities assert that participation in the cotton harvest is voluntary. However, local reports and testimonies demonstrate the opposite. In fact, during this year’s 2025 harvest, the Ministry of Health instructed medical institutions to send doctors, nurses, orderlies, and technical staff to the fields, each assigned a daily quota of 45 kilograms.^[58]

As Turkmenistan is increasing its presence and visibility in global forums, will the government negotiate a new roadmap with the ILO for 2026 and onwards and begin to achieve meaningful progress in eliminating state-imposed forced labour? Starting in December 2027, the European Union’s new Forced Labour Regulation law, which bans the sale of any products connected to forced labour in EU markets, will take effect. With the Law’s implementation drawing nearer, will major EU importers of Turkmen cotton, including  Italy, Poland, and Portugal begin to exert pressure on Turkmenistan to reform?

References:

¹ Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly: https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/80/uz_en.pdf

² Mavlon Bobokhonov, ‘Opinion: Central Asia Is Consolidating Its Role as a Full-Fledged Actor in Global Processes’ (20 November 2025). https://timesca.com/opinion-central-asia-is-consolidating-its-role-as-a-full-fledged-actor-in-global-processes/

³ Sarvinoz Raxmonkulova, ‘Central Asian leaders gathered in Uzbekistan’s capital for the Seventh Consultative Meeting, emphasizing stronger political dialogue, economic integration, and collective security’ (16 November 2025). https://www.euronews.com/2025/11/16/central-asian-leaders-deepen-regional-integration-as-azerbaijan-joins-consultative-format

⁴ Temur Umarov and Alibek Mukambayev, Carnegie Politika, ‘Central Asian States have Put Aside Their Territorial Disputes: Why Now?’ (8 April 2025). https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/04/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-border-deal?lang=en

⁵ Communiqué of the First Meeting of the Fergana Peace Forum: https://isrs.uz/en/yangiliklar/kommunike-pervogo-zasedania-ferganskogo-foruma-mira

⁶ Reporters Without Borders (RSF), ‘RSF World Press Freedom Index 2025: economic fragility a leading threat to press freedom’ (2 May 2025).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), ‘Kazakhstan police raid Orda, charge top editor over “false information”’ (2 December 2025).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Aigerim Turgunbaeva, ‘Kyrgyzstan bans top independent media as “extremist” in pre-election crackdown’ Reuters (28 October 2025).

¹¹ Thomson Reuters, ‘Kyrgyzstan court jails two journalists for undermining public order’ (17 September 2025).

¹² Thomson Reuters, ‘Kyrgyzstan authorities detain opposition figures ahead of snap election’ (22 November 2025).

¹³ Eric Rudenshiold, “Rethinking Great Power Competition: The Rise of Central Asia as Middle Powers” (The Diplomat, 2025).

¹⁴ European Commission, “The European Union and Central Asia establish a Strategic Partnership during groundbreaking summit”, press release, 4 April 2025.

¹⁵ Reuters, “China’s Xi signs treaty to elevate ties with Central Asia”, 17 June 2025.

¹⁶ Temur Umarov, “Why Is Central Asia Buying Trump’s Attention?” (Carnegie, 2025).

¹⁷ Temur Umarov, “How Serious Is the Rapprochement Between the United States and Central Asia?” (Carnegie, 2025).

¹⁸ Sadokat Jalolova, “Lavrov in Uzbekistan: Criticism, Controversy, and Clashing Narratives” (Times of Central Asia, 2025).

¹⁹ Barbara Tasch & Anna Holligan, “Hungary withdraws from International Criminal Court during Netanyahu visit” (BBC, 3 April 2025).

²⁰ ICC-01/22-90.

²¹ DG ENEST, “Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and Connectivity Investors Forum: the EU advances cross-regional connectivity in Tashkent” (27 November 2025).

²² Shyngys Zipatolla, “Rethinking EU Strategy in Central Asia” (German Council on Foreign Relations, 14 May 2025).

²³ Ali Dayar, “A New Link in Global Trade: The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway and Its Role in the Middle Corridor” (6 October 2025).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ OECD, ‘Cuts in official development assistance: OECD projections for 2025 and the near term’, 26 June 2025.

²⁶ Justin Sandefur and Charles Kenny, ‘USAID Cuts: New Estimates at the Country Level’, 26 March 2025.

²⁷ Masood Farivar, ‘How pause in US foreign aid is impacting South, Central Asia’, VOA News, 11 February 2025.

²⁸ The Times of Central Asia, ‘Shifting Priorities: The Demise of USAID and Media Funding in Central Asia’, viewed 12 December 2025.

²⁹ Miles Cooper, ‘Impact of USAID Suspension Reverberates Across Uzbekistan and Central Asia’, Asia News, 21 May 2025.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Aliya Haidar, ‘Kazakhstan Investigates Recipients of USAID Funding’, Times of Central Asia, 18 March 2025.

³² Reporters Without Borders, ‘Europe – Central Asia. The slow economic asphyxiation of the independent press’, viewed 12 December 2025.

³³ Justin Sandefur and Charles Kenny, ‘USAID Cuts: New Estimates at the Country Level’, 26 March 2025.

³⁴ International Crisis Group, ‘After the Aid Axe: Charting a Path to Self-reliance in Afghanistan’, 2 October 2025.

³⁵ Dana Omirgazy, ‘Kazakh Doctors Provide Lifesaving Support in Afghanistan Following Powerful Earthquake’, Astana Times, 21 November 2025.

³⁶ Collective Security Treaty Organisation, viewed 08 December 2025.

³⁷ Niels Drost, Giulia Cretti & Babette van Giersbergen, ‘Central Asia Emerging from the Shadows’, Clingendael (January 2025).

³⁸ Sanshiro Hosaka and Toomas Hanso, ‘Between Giants: Central Asia Balancing China, Russia, and the Rest’, 18 September 2025.

³⁹ Daria Isachenko, ‘Turkey’s Turns to Central Asia: Learning by Doing’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (25 November 2025).

⁴⁰ Ayjaz Wani, ‘Limits of Türkiye’s Rising Influence in Central Asia’, 03 December 2025.

⁴¹ Andrew D’Anieri, ‘Dispatch from Uzbekistan: Regional peace progress and economic growth reveal opportunities for US engagement’, Atlantic Council, 28 October 2025.

⁴² Sanshiro Hosaka and Toomas Hanso, ‘Between Giants: Central Asia Balancing China, Russia, and the Rest’, 18 September 2025.

⁴³ World Bank, ‘Uzbekistan Reaches the Ranks of Top Five Improvers in the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law 2024 Study’ (4 March 2024).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ UN Women, ‘UN Women opened the office in Uzbekistan, making a new era for gender equality’ (29 May 2025).

⁴⁶ UN Women, ‘UN Women opened the office in Uzbekistan, making a new era for gender equality’ (29 May 2025).

⁴⁷ Sadokat Jalolova, ‘UN Women and ACWA Power Partner to Advance Gender Equality in Uzbekistan’ (4 November 2025).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ UNDP, Policy Brief: Addressing Harmful Gender Stereotypes — Application of Behavioural Insights (2024).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, Turkmenistan Cotton: State‑Imposed Forced Labor in the 2024 Harvest and Links to Global Supply Chains (May 2025).

⁵³ Sadokat Jalolova, ‘Central Asia’s Cotton Harvest: Between Reform, Coercion, and Economic Strain’ (11 September 2025).

⁵⁴ Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, Turkmenistan Cotton: State‑Imposed Forced Labor in the 2024 Harvest and Links to Global Supply Chains (May 2025).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Sadokat Jalolova, ‘Central Asia’s Cotton Harvest: Between Reform, Coercion, and Economic Strain’ (11 September 2025).