© Photo by IRENA via Flickr
Revisiting Egypt’s COP27 presidency goals
The momentous COP27 meeting has finally ended with an agreement known as the Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan, which was finalised on 20 November 2022.[1] To this end, it is important to view how far the Egyptian presidency has managed to represent its goals within the final agreement. To recap, the presidency sought to address the issue of climate finance, by ensuring that no backsliding of previous commitments occur, as well as, creating new commitments to deal with contemporary challenges. The presidency has also sought to build more momentum regarding the issue of climate adaptation, given its role in upscaling climate resilience within climate-vulnerable contexts as well as addressing the current low levels of finance given to adaptation projects compared to mitigation projects. Lastly, the presidency sought to ensure high levels of collaboration between all relevant stakeholders, including multilateral financial institutions, developmental banks and the private sector, as well as giving more importance to topics that have not yet been dealt with significantly in previous editions of COP, such as food and water.
An African and “Third World” COP: How far has the Egyptian presidency been able to represent its goals
There have been many ground-breaking developments and decisions reached at the latest COP meeting which allow it to stand out in comparison to previous meetings. Most prominently, this COP was able to achieve, for the very first time, an agreement on establishing a loss and damage fund – a decision that reflected “an important step towards justice” according to UN Secretary-General António Guterres.[2] The ability to push forward the creation of this fund cannot be underestimated since first world countries[3] – mostly the United States and the European Union member states – have historically, since the 2007 Bali Action Plan,[4] displayed sustained objections to loss and damage funding. In this regard, the agreement marks an endeavour by the international community to upscale global collaboration and partnership with regard to tackling climate change.[5] According to experts, the fund was included in the final agreement largely due to the unified effort displayed by the G77[6] bloc.[7] Concurrently momentous, the Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan marks the first time a COP covered discussions focused on food and water in regards to its interlinked relationship with climate change, as well as the need to upscale and utilise nature-based solutions when addressing climate change through mitigation and adaptation action given people’s “right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.”[8] These unique elements reflect the nature of COP27 being an African COP – but largely also a “third world COP” – as vulnerable and marginalised communities, such as farmers and indigenous people, were given an empowering platform during the meeting. In fact, the Plan “recognises the important role of indigenous peoples, local communities, cities and civil society, including youth and children, in addressing and responding to climate change.”[9] This type of empowerment given to marginalised and indigenous communities was felt in the conference in such a way that Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva not only promised to protect the Amazon but also, reassured his respect towards the rights of indigenous people, stating that it would constitute “among his highest priorities when he takes office.”[10] Lastly, the presidency was able to include in the final text a stipulation regarding the need to reform multilateral development banks and international financial institutions in hopes of scaling up financing for the most vulnerable countries and achieving a more equitable apparatus.[11]
There are, of course, some goals which the presidency has partially or wholly been unable to achieve. As previously mentioned, one of the presidency’s goals was to ensure that there was no backsliding from previous commitments as well as establishing new commitments. One of the previous commitments that the presidency sought to push forward was the 2009 Copenhagen pledge, which consisted of a provision of $100 billion per year in climate finance.[12] Although the Plan did express “serious concern [regarding] the goal of developed country Parties to mobilise jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020, [it also] urge[d] developed country Parties to meet the goal.” The meeting however, failed to establish a new climate financing goal which would keep pace with the latest developments of climate change.[13] Instead, the meeting ended by deferring the decision of a new climate finance goal to the year 2024 through the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) which had been established at Glasgow.[14] Though the Plan specifies the actual required amount needed for climate finance – $4-6 trillion per year for a global transition to a low-carbon economy and $4 trillion for renewable energy investments per year to reach net-zero by 2050 – plans on how this amount can actually be leveraged and achieved is omitted from the text.[15] In fact, the Standing Committee on Finance has yet to investigate definitions and methods which would later help typify what counts as ‘climate finance.’[16] Unfortunately, this causes an even greater delay at a critical time needed for climate finance to reach the most vulnerable. Largely speaking, the Plan only expresses that there is a gap between the required finances needed to transition towards a low-carbon economy and the goals of the Paris Agreement. It also mentions the support provided at the moment and the amount estimated to be given to the developing world.[17] In reaching climate finance goals, the Plan only discusses the importance of diffusing sources of finance from multilateral development banks, international financial institutions, and the developed world.[18] Yet, what is clearly absent from the final agreement is that it did not include any specified climate finance targets to be achieved, but rather it deferred the stipulation of targets and only explained what would be needed. In this regard, the limited ability of the international community to push forward any concrete decisions on climate financing may be reflective of the impact of current geopolitical tensions which subsequently led to economic global stresses.
Another subsidiary yet interrelated goal which the Egyptian presidency has been unable to wholly reach is that of upscaling the provision of adaptation funds – specifically the goal of doubling adaptation funds which was announced in 2021.[19] Yet, once again, the Plan makes no specific targets on adaptation funding, nor did it mention the need to double adaptation finance; rather, it only merely discusses the existence of a gap in adaptation funding which needs to be fulfilled and “recognizes” the central role that the Adaptation Fund plays in the overall “climate finance architecture.”[20] Although the Adaptation Fund managed to achieve over $230 million in pledges and contributions at the conclusion of COP27 in Egypt, adaptation funding this year is considered lower than pledges made in COP26, which had reached over $350 million.[21] Once again, the muted response within the text regarding climate adaptation finance can only be linked in some way to the global economic repercussions which arose from the Russo-Ukrainian war – this ultimately made the international community unable to specify any finance targets for the time being. There has been, however, a work programme being developed to enhance adaptation response, as well as a preparation of a report regarding pledges made by the developed world to double adaptation funding to reach $40bn by the year 2025. Yet again, there are no concrete steps towards climate financing for adaptation but merely a report and a work programme being established, which leaves most countries concerned that financing for adaptation may very well remain low.[22]
Apparent Irony: Commitments without action plans
One of the most controversial aspects evident within COP27 – and conclusively also the Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan – is that there is some incoherence and apparent irony due to the existence of contradictory goals within the text. For instance, the Plan maintains the same goals of the Paris Agreement with regards to ensuring global temperature rise is within +1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; yet, it concurrently contradicts this notion by lacking strong language on the need to phase down all fossil fuels, which is needed to keep within the goal of +1.5 degrees Celsius according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Energy Agency (IEA).[23] Instead, the Plan reiterates the Glasgow Agreement by merely calling for “the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies” and emphasising the need to reduce emissions “through [an] increase in low-emission and renewable energy.”[24] In this regard, the text as it currently stands opens the doors for the usage of all kinds of fossil fuels such as natural gas and petroleum, just not coal. Not only does this lack any sense since the ability to reach the Paris Agreement goals require widespread reduction of the usage of all fossil fuels but also, it perpetuates the core problem which has led to the need for climate finance in the first place; that is, the burning of fossil fuels. Instead of addressing the issue head-on by seeking to reduce emissions overall, the Plan has perpetuated the problem by preventing the world from keeping up with the Paris Agreement goal. Keeping this contradictory element in the final text reflects not only the strategic interest of oil-producing and industrial countries such as China and Saudi Arabia but also, Egypt which has been able to quadruple its liquefied natural gas (LNG) and natural gas exports in the past eight years; not to mention that more than 600 fossil fuel industries were present in the conference, representing a 25% increase of such delegations from last year’s meeting.[25] In fact, some sources have claimed that Egypt had struck gas deals on the sidelines of the COP27 event.[26] Therefore, reflecting the power of strategic interest over the need to instigate real change in achieving climate goals.[27] It also showcases the limited ability by the international community to move towards critical goals within international agreements, since over 80 countries had supported the phasing out of all fossil fuels.[28] In this regard, as stated by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, COP27 did not emit progress by addressing the need to drastically reduce emissions.[29]
Another irony within the text is evident by the fact that the Plan allows for a carbon trading scheme, a move that some have accused of creating an opportunity for greenwashing[30] by both countries and corporations.[31] Also known as “mitigation contribution”, private companies can now purchase credits from a host country in their fulfilment of net-zero pledges, despite no accounting changes needing to take place. This allows space for the issue of double-counting which the Glasgow Pact had aimed to prevent.[32] Furthermore, countries can now deem their carbon trades with each other as “confidential information” – thus reducing elements of transparency which is needed to measure if there is a true progression towards goals of net-zero.[33] This again goes directly against the Paris Agreement and the overarching goal of reducing carbon emissions to limit warming to +1.5 degrees Celsius.
Loss and damage: Is it a movement towards real change or a false narrative of progression
As mentioned before, the largest and most momentous impact that COP27 has been able to achieve was reaching an agreement on establishing a loss and damage fund. Yet upon viewing more details on what the fund entails within the context of COP27, it becomes evident that the narrative of progression is not so clear-cut. First, despite the Plan stipulating clearly notions of climate justice and intergenerational equity, the loss and damage fund itself does not reflect the language of reparations, but rather a voluntary fund established to merely “help” the most vulnerable in their suffering of the impacts of climate change.[34] Therefore, the fund loses the main concrete ideology that has driven its creation in the first place through removing the element of “liability” by historic polluters.[35] Second, the management of the fund remains quite murky, with a transitional committee being set up to define the intricacies of how the fund is to operate, in which results would only be presented next year during UAE’s hosting of COP28. Currently, there are no metrics in place to define “vulnerability” to climate change i.e. who would receive the fund, when the fund is to operate, or who would provide for it.[36] Though the creation of the fund itself leaves a lot of countries happy with the progress achieved on such historic grounds, many are still left uneasy as clear assurances on their future have not yet been provided nor delineated. Since there is still a year to go until it becomes clear how the fund is expected to be managed, one can only imagine that a lot of debate will be ongoing within the committee itself, leaving the opportunity that the committee may decide in the end to operate the fund contrary to what is expected by the most vulnerable.
All in all, one can say that COP27 has raised important points, unprecedented to previous COP meetings, reflected mostly in the creation of a loss and damage fund and the references made in the document for food and water. Yet, the document failed to push forward a real change in the issue of climate change. This is evident by the weak language in the text which allows the continuation of fossil fuel usage, all except coal, and the ability to utilise carbon trading without transparency mechanisms to prevent double-counting. Furthermore, significant decisions such as creating the loss and damage fund remain uncertain as a real manifestation of how the fund will operate is set to be discussed in COP28, a whole year after COP27. In this regard, it is questionable whether the document effectively responds to the current challenges of climate change since many previous problems, among them climate funding, has been left unanswered.
Nadine Alaa Eldin Abdelrahman Ahmed joined the Mediterranean Programme of the Platform for Peace and Humanity as a Researcher in January 2022. In her role, Nadine has contributed to the Peace and Security Monitor publications by preparing both brief reports and research papers on various topics, including women’s rights, climate security, geopolitics, political economy and democracy.
[1] COP27 – The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan – ‘A down-payment on climate justice’ (2022) Chartered Accountants Ireland. Chartered Accountants Ireland. Available at: https://www.charteredaccountants.ie/News/cop27—the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-a-down-payment-on-climate-justice (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[2] Diemen, E.van (2022) The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan — what the world did and didn’t agree to at COP27, Daily Maverick. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-11-28-the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-what-the-world-did-and-didnt-agree-to-at-cop27/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[3] First World or First World Countries is defined as: the countries of the world that are well developed economically and industrially and that have a relatively high standard of living, this includes countries in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Japan among others. (https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/first-world).
[4] The Bali Action Plan or Bali Roadmap is defined as: a long-term plan adopted following COP27 for combating climate change, which includes a long-term objective for reducing emissions. (https://prepp.in/news/e-492-bali-action-plan-environment-notes).
[5] Explained: the COP27 Implementation Plan and how it sets the pace for COP28 (2022) Energy Connects. Available at: https://www.energyconnects.com/opinion/features/2022/november/explained-the-cop27-implementation-plan-and-how-it-sets-the-pace-for-cop28/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022); Kumar, P. (2022) ‘Loss And Damage’ AT COP 27, Rising Kashmir. Available at: http://risingkashmir.com/loss-and-damage-at-cop-27-5debf1d5-6e6a-4b0d-a959-c2383e4f52b8 (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[6] The G77 or the Group of 77 is defined as: a loose alliance of developing countries established on June 15, 1964. The primary goals of the G-77 are to maintain the independence and sovereignty of all developing countries, to defend the economic interests of member countries by insisting on equal standing with developed countries in the global marketplace, to establish a united front on issues of common concern, and to strengthen ties between member countries. (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Group-of-77).
[7] Kottasová, I., Nilsen, E. and Ramirez, R. (2022) COP27 summit agrees to help climate victims. But it does nothing to stop fossil fuels, CNN. Cable News Network. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/19/world/cop27-egypt-agreement-climate-intl/index.html (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[8] Diemen, E.van (2022) The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan — what the world did and didn’t agree to at COP27, Daily Maverick. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-11-28-the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-what-the-world-did-and-didnt-agree-to-at-cop27/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[9] Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (2022) UNFCC. UNFCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_L21_revised_adv.pdf (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[10] Diemen, E.van (2022) The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan — what the world did and didn’t agree to at COP27, Daily Maverick. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-11-28-the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-what-the-world-did-and-didnt-agree-to-at-cop27/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[11] Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (2022) UNFCC. UNFCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_L21_revised_adv.pdf (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[12] Farand, C., Lo, J. and Darby, M. (2022) What was decided at Cop27 climate talks in Sharm el-Sheikh?, Climate Home News. Climate Home. Available at: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/11/20/what-was-decided-at-cop27-climate-talks-in-sharm-el-sheikh/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[13] Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (2022) UNFCC. UNFCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_L21_revised_adv.pdf (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[14] Bateman, B. (2022) COP27: Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan agreed, but leaves more work for COP28, Clayton Utz. Available at: https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2022/november/cop27-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-agreed-but-leaves-more-work-for-cop28 (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[15] Deshpande, T. and Lopes, F. (2022) What The COP Of Implementation Failed To Achieve, Indiaspend. Indiaspend. Available at: https://www.indiaspend.com/cop27/what-the-cop-of-implementation-failed-to-achieve-842931 (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[16] Bateman, B. (2022) COP27: Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan agreed, but leaves more work for COP28, Clayton Utz. Available at: https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2022/november/cop27-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-agreed-but-leaves-more-work-for-cop28 (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[17] Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (2022) UNFCC. UNFCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_L21_revised_adv.pdf (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[18] Ibid.
[19] COP27: What you need to know about this year’s Big UN Climate Conference | what is COP27? UN News (2022) UN News. United Nations. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129947 (Accessed: December 12, 2022); Adaptation Fund Doubles the Amount of Funding Countries Can Access, Enhancing Access to Climate Finance Among Most Vulnerable (2021) Adaptation Fund. Available at: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/adaptation-fund-doubles-the-amount-of-funding-countries-can-access-enhancing-access-to-climate-finance-among-most-vulnerable/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[20] Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (2022) UNFCC. UNFCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_L21_revised_adv.pdf (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[21] Adaptation Fund receives over US$ 230 million mobilized in 2022 for the most climate-vulnerable at COP27 in Egypt (2022) Adaptation Fund. Available at: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/adaptation-fund-receives-over-us-230-million-mobilized-in-2022-for-the-most-climate-vulnerable-at-cop27-in-egypt/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022); Adaptation Fund Raises Record US$ 356 Million in New Pledges at COP26 for its Concrete Actions to Most Vulnerable (2021) Adaptation Fund. Available at: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/adaptation-fund-raises-record-us-356-million-in-new-pledges-at-cop26-for-its-concrete-actions-to-most-vulnerable/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[22] Sokolowski, A. (2022) The COP27 agreement is far from a plan for implementation, but non-state actors can help bridge the gaps, CDP. Available at: https://www.cdp.net/en/articles/governments/the-cop27-agreement-is-far-from-a-plan-for-implementation-but-non-state-actors-can-help-bridge-the-gaps (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
COP27 – The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan – ‘A down-payment on climate justice’ (2022) Chartered Accountants Ireland. Chartered Accountants Ireland. Available at: https://www.charteredaccountants.ie/News/cop27—the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-a-down-payment-on-climate-justice (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[23] Deshpande, T. and Lopes, F. (2022) What The COP Of Implementation Failed To Achieve, Indiaspend. Indiaspend. Available at: https://www.indiaspend.com/cop27/what-the-cop-of-implementation-failed-to-achieve-842931 (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[24] Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (2022) UNFCC. UNFCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_L21_revised_adv.pdf (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[25] Kottasová, I., Nilsen, E. and Ramirez, R. (2022) COP27 summit agrees to help climate victims. But it does nothing to stop fossil fuels, CNN. Cable News Network. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/19/world/cop27-egypt-agreement-climate-intl/index.html (Accessed: December 12, 2022); Martynowicz, T. (2022) The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan: Climate Justice, Backsliding and Co-optation, Glimpse from the Globe. Available at: https://www.glimpsefromtheglobe.com/cop27-series/the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-climate-justice-backsliding-and-co-optation/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022); Hamdy, H. (2022) Egypt’s gas export revenues up 13-fold in 8 years: Cabinet report – energy – business, Ahram Online. Available at: https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/16/476728/Business/Energy/Egypt%E2%80%99s-gas-export-revenues-up-fold-in–years-Cabi.aspx#:~:text=Egypt%27s%20natural%20gas%20and%20liquified,tons%20to%207.2%20million%20tons (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[26] Farand, C., Lo, J. and Darby, M. (2022) What was decided at Cop27 climate talks in Sharm el-Sheikh?, Climate Home News. Climate Home. Available at: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/11/20/what-was-decided-at-cop27-climate-talks-in-sharm-el-sheikh/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[27] Ibid.
[28] Diemen, E.van (2022) The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan — what the world did and didn’t agree to at COP27, Daily Maverick. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-11-28-the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-what-the-world-did-and-didnt-agree-to-at-cop27/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[29] COP27: From billions in Glasgow to trillions in Sharm el-Sheikh (2022) Global law firm | Norton Rose Fulbright. Available at: https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/65b442b8/cop27-from-billions-in-glasgow-to-trillions-in-sharm-elsheikh (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[30] Greenwash or Greenwashing is defined as: to make (something, such as a product, policy or practice) appear to be more environmentally friendly or less environmentally damaging than it really is (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/greenwash).
[31] COP27 – The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan – ‘A down-payment on climate justice’ (2022) Chartered Accountants Ireland. Chartered Accountants Ireland. Available at: https://www.charteredaccountants.ie/News/cop27—the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-a-down-payment-on-climate-justice (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[32] Farand, C. (2022) Greenwash alert as Cop27 draft allows double claiming of carbon credits, Climate Home News. Climate Home. Available at: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/11/18/greenwash-alert-as-cop27-draft-allows-double-claiming-of-carbon-credits/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022); Farand, C., Lo, J. and Darby, M. (2022) What was decided at Cop27 climate talks in Sharm el-Sheikh?, Climate Home News. Climate Home. Available at: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/11/20/what-was-decided-at-cop27-climate-talks-in-sharm-el-sheikh/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[33] COP27 – The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan – ‘A down-payment on climate justice’ (2022) Chartered Accountants Ireland. Chartered Accountants Ireland. Available at: https://www.charteredaccountants.ie/News/cop27—the-sharm-el-sheikh-implementation-plan-a-down-payment-on-climate-justice (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[34] Explained: the COP27 Implementation Plan and how it sets the pace for COP28 (2022) Energy Connects. Available at: https://www.energyconnects.com/opinion/features/2022/november/explained-the-cop27-implementation-plan-and-how-it-sets-the-pace-for-cop28/ (Accessed: December 12, 2022).
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.