Platform for Peace and Humanity

Georgia on the Brink: Election Day or Democracy on the Streets

Megi Benia

© Mariam Nikuradze

On 4 October, Georgia held local elections in unprecedented circumstances. For the first time in three decades, the elections proceeded without international observers, while opposition parties and much of society remained in open boycott. Major opposition leaders are imprisoned, around sixty individuals are regarded as political prisoners, and the vote unfolded in the absence of independent institutions or an impartial judiciary. Together, these conditions amount to what analysts increasingly describe as a state capture.

At the same time, on the 311th consecutive day of protest, tens of thousands gathered in Tbilisi to denounce systemic injustice and the erosion of democratic norms. The contrast between ballot boxes and barricades could hardly be starker. In a country once celebrated as the democratic exception in the region, political legitimacy has now shifted from the polling station to the public square.

A Vote Without Oversight

The Central Election Commission (CEC) opened polling stations at 8 am. Official data show that by 10 am turnout stood at 7.85%, by noon 17.15%, by 3 pm 28.22% and by 5 pm 33.46%. Turnout in the capital, Tbilisi, hovered near 22%, one of the lowest in the country. These numbers reveal not apathy but protest through abstention.

Unlike previous elections, no credible international monitors, neither the OSCE/ODIHR nor the EU’s election mission were present. Domestic observation was likewise constrained by government-aligned oversight bodies and the harassment of independent journalists. In such an environment, procedural regularity offers little assurance of genuine competition.

Simultaneously, opposition figures remain in detention or exile. Party offices were raided in the weeks preceding the vote, and many municipalities fielded only candidates from the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party. When the process excludes rivals, the outcome is predetermined.

By evening, Georgian Dream officials declared victory across every municipality. Preliminary results released by the CEC attributed 80.7% of votes nationwide to GD, leaving all remaining parties to divide just under 20%. In Tbilisi, incumbent Mayor Kakha Kaladze reportedly won 71.55%.

In a system where less than one-third of citizens vote, yet the incumbent party claims more than three-quarters of the ballots, the arithmetic strains credibility. Even allowing for boycotts, such disproportionate margins imply administrative fabrication or coerced reporting.

The Anatomy of an Engineered Election

To understand why these results appear manufactured, one must consider the structural context rather than isolated irregularities.

First, the absence of international and independent domestic monitors removes external validation. For three decades, Georgian elections relied on OSCE, EU, and U.S. monitoring missions to confer minimal legitimacy. Their exclusion in 2025 reflects the strategic insulation from scrutiny of the government.

Second, the concentration of power in the hands of Georgian Dream has effectively dismantled the separation of powers. The judiciary, the Prosecutor’s Office, and even the Public Broadcaster now operate as extensions of the ruling party. This institutional capture means that complaints, recounts, or appeals are adjudicated by the very authorities accused of manipulation.

Third, the suppression of dissent is overt. Roughly sixty political prisoners (matching the per capita rates of political imprisonment in Belarus and Russia) remain detained on charges ranging from “hooliganism” to “incitement,” while prominent opposition figures have faced repeated detention and intimidation. It is worth mentioning that Georgia ranks second among Council of Europe member states in terms of prison population per 100,000 inhabitants, with 256 inmates per 100,000 people. Interestingly, neighboring Armenia has a total prison population equivalent to that of Georgia’s largest facility, Gldani Prison. As of January 2025, Georgia’s prison population stood at 36,247 individuals. 

Fourth, independent media outlets report harassment, defamation suits, and financial audits designed to exhaust them. The information ecosystem surrounding the vote is heavily skewed. GD-affiliated outlets dominate national television coverage, while opposition voices rely primarily on online platforms subject to periodic blocking or DDoS attacks. In such an asymmetric media landscape, electoral choice becomes performative.

Taken together, these conditions render the electoral process procedurally intact but substantively void. The façade of legality obscures a deeper illegitimacy where a government is governing without genuine consent.

When Ballots Turn to Barricades

As the CEC announced preliminary results, tens of thousands of protesters converged on Rustaveli Avenue and Freedom Square in Tbilisi. On the 311th day of uninterrupted demonstration, the citizens chanted “No to fake elections!” and “Georgia is not for sale.” These scenes are not spontaneous outbursts; they are the culmination of nearly a year of civic mobilization against what Georgians increasingly call the “authoritarian drift.” Demonstrators represent a cross-section of society: students, NGOs, former civil servants, and disillusioned Georgian Dream voters. Their presence underscores a crucial paradox: while the regime monopolizes formal institutions, public legitimacy has migrated to the streets.

As the rally escalated, some protesters attempted to storm the presidential palace, prompting forceful pushbacks from riot police armed with tear gas, water cannons, and pepper spray. Chaos reigned near Orbeliani Square. In parallel, groups of demonstrators held a more peaceful vigil on Rustaveli Avenue. By nightfall, the state struck back. Five organizers, including opposition activists and opera singer Paata Burchuladze were arrested on charges of fomenting violence and attempting to overthrow state authority. The Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed the organizers had made “violent calls” during the event, and that the arrests responded to “group violence” and attempts to subvert constitutional order. In response, ruling-party figures wasted little time casting blame. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze declared that everyone who showed up at Liberty Square “came to the event of the coup,” linking the unrest to past protests he portrays as coup attempts. He intensified rhetoric about a conspiracy and aligned the crackdown with ongoing efforts to ban opposition parties via constitutional and judicial processes. 

Thus the 4 October election did not conclude with a tally. Instead, it became a battleground over legitimacy – an election day that quickly became “democracy on the streets.”

Implications Beyond Georgia

Georgia’s democratic reversal carries implications well beyond its borders. For the European Union, which granted Tbilisi candidate status in 2024 under the assumption of progress on judicial and electoral reform, the 4 October  elections pose an immediate test. To accept these results at face value would reward democratic backsliding; to reject them risks pushing Georgia further toward isolation and dependency on alternative patrons such as Russia or China.

For the United States, long a proponent of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, the events expose the limits of democracy promotion when local elites instrumentalize Western partnerships for domestic consolidation. The language of reform persists, but its content has evaporated.

Within the South Caucasus, Georgia’s internal authoritarian turn also alters the regional equilibrium. A government preoccupied with controlling its population rather than engaging constructively abroad weakens Western influence in a strategic corridor linking the Black Sea to the Caspian.

Conclusion

The 4 October local elections in Georgia unfolded under a cloud of state capture, repression, and public defiance. Official results granting the ruling Georgian Dream party over 80% of the vote amid historically low turnout bear every hallmark of orchestration. The true measure of democracy today lies not in the Central Election Commission’s spreadsheets but in the endurance of those who continue to gather on Rustaveli Avenue.

The elections were marred by a sweeping crackdown on dissent. Police used water cannons and pepper spray to disperse protesters attempting to storm the presidential palace in Tbilisi. Five opposition leaders, including opera singer Paata Burchuladze and members of the United National Movement, were detained and face charges of attempting to overthrow the government, carrying potential prison sentences of up to nine years 

Amnesty International documented a campaign of repression, including politically motivated prosecutions of opposition figures, the silence of independent media and civil society through restrictive laws and punitive measures, and the widespread arbitrary detention and ill-treatment of protesters.

Georgia’s future now depends on whether its allies, and its own citizens, choose to interpret these results as a mandate or as a warning. The ballot boxes may have been sealed, but the contest for Georgia’s democracy has only just begun.