© Photo by U.S. Pacific Fleet via Flickr
Austria: Court Sentences Two Former Syrian Security Officials to Eight Years in Prison
Greece: Spyware Victims File Damages Claims Against Intellexa
ECtHR: Court Finds Lithuania Violated Applicant’s Rights in CIA Secret Detention Programme
France: Appellate Court Modifies Marine Le Pen’s Sentence in EU Funds Embezzlement Case
UK: Court Sentences Neo-Nazi to 13.5 Years for Preparing Terrorist Attack
ECtHR: Court Rules Ukraine Failed to Investigate Discriminatory Assault on Religious Minority
South Korea: Supreme Court Upholds Former President Yoon’s Seven-Year Sentence
Palestine: Hamas Dissolves Gaza Governing Body to Pave Way for Technocratic Administration
UN: Calls for Human-Centred Global Governance of AI at Inaugural Meeting
UN: Experts Warn Belarusian Exiles Face Transnational Repression
Sudan: UN Investigators Warn of Atrocity Risks in El Obeid
Pakistan: Deadly Attacks in Balochistan Highlight Renewed Tensions in the Region
Cuba: Denounces US Blockade at UN Amid Deepening Energy Crisis
US-Iran: New US Strikes Threaten Ceasefire Agreement
NATO: Alliance Showcases Major Arms Deals at Ankara Summit as US Lifts Sanctions on Türkiye
UN: High Commissioner for Human Rights Appeals for End to Hostilities in DRC
Eswatini: New Group of US Third-Country Deportees Arrive Amid Immigration Crackdown
On 6 July 2026, a Viennese court sentenced two former Syrian security officials to eight years in prison. The court convicted Khaled al-Halabi, a former intelligence general, and Musab Abu Rukbah, a former police lieutenant colonel, for crimes committed in Raqqa between April 2011 and March 2013. Ruling under the principle of universal jurisdiction, the court found both men guilty of aggravated coercion, sexual coercion, and serious bodily harm, while al-Halabi was also convicted of torture. The court found that the defendants oversaw detention facilities where civilian protesters were subjected to severe beatings and inhumane conditions. Beyond the custodial terms, the court ordered the pair to pay €130,000 in compensation to the surviving victims. The verdict marks Austria’s first major criminal trial addressing crimes committed under the former Assad regime.
On 6 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) notified the Russian Government of complaints brought by 111 Ukrainian civilians in the cases Menyaylo and Others v. Russia and Lepekha and Others v. Russia. The applications concern allegations that Russian armed forces detained civilians in the basement of a school in Yahidne, Ukraine, during the full-scale invasion in March 2022. The applicants allege that they were held for almost a month in overcrowded and degrading conditions, allegedly used as human shields, and subjected to threats, humiliation and ill-treatment, resulting in 11 deaths. They rely on several Convention provisions, including Articles 2, 3, 5 and 13. The Court’s notification marks the beginning of its examination of the complaints and does not indicate that it has reached any conclusion on whether violations occurred.
On 7 July 2026, eight victims of Greece’s “Predatorgate” spyware scandal filed civil claims against surveillance company Intellexa SA and 13 individuals seeking €1 million each in damages. The claims concern alleged violations of privacy, communications confidentiality, and personal data rights following the discovery of Predator spyware on the phones of journalists, politicians, and other individuals. The lawsuits follow a February 2026 criminal conviction of Intellexa founder Tal Dilian and three others for breaches of personal data confidentiality, although the judgment remains under appeal. The scandal previously led to the resignation of Greece’s intelligence chief and the prime minister’s chief of staff. The civil claims are expected to be heard in April 2027.
On 7 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued a judgment in Al Nashiri v. Lithuania, ruling that Lithuania had violated multiple provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in relation to a Saudi Arabian national. The applicant is currently detained in Guantánamo Bay, facing capital charges before a US military commission concerning the bombing of the naval ship USS Cole in 2000. The ECtHR established that the applicant was held for over five months between 2005 and 2006 at a secret facility operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Lithuania. The Court found that Lithuanian authorities had assisted in transferring the applicant from its territory. The Court concluded this transfer occurred despite a real and foreseeable risk that the applicant would endure a flagrant denial of justice and face the death penalty in the US.
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-251027
On 7 July 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld an embezzlement conviction against Marine Le Pen while modifying the penalties imposed. The defendant was initially convicted in March 2025 for misappropriating over €2.9 million ($3.32m) in European Union funds to finance domestic party personnel between 2004 and 2016. Reviewing the substantive case, the appellate chamber reduced the period of ineligibility to stand for public office from five years to 45 months, suspending 30 months of that term. The court also imposed a three-year custodial sentence, suspending two years of the term and ordering that the remaining one year be served under house arrest with an electronic monitoring device. Following the verdict, the defence announced an immediate appeal to France’s highest jurisdiction, the Cour de Cassation.
On 8 July 2026, the Central Criminal Court in London sentenced Alfie Coleman, a British neo-Nazi, to 13.5 years’ imprisonment after he was convicted of preparing acts of terrorism motivated by an extreme right-wing ideology. Coleman was found guilty of attempting to acquire a firearm and ammunition from undercover officers as part of preparations for a planned attack. Prosecutors said he had expressed admiration for previous far-right attackers, including the perpetrator of the 2016 murder of UK lawmaker Jo Cox, and had compiled extremist material, including weapons and explosives manuals. Coleman was arrested in September 2023 following an undercover operation involving counterterrorism police and MI5. He was also convicted of 10 offences involving the collection of information likely to be useful to terrorists and received an extended five-year licence period following his release.
https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/british-neo-nazi-jailed-13-and-a-half-years-police-say-2026-07-08/
On 9 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued a Chamber judgment in Barsuk and Gyl v. Ukraine, ruling that domestic authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into an assault against two Jehovah’s Witnesses. The applicants were physically attacked while conducting door-to-door preaching and distributing religious literature in the Kharkiv region. Reviewing the state’s procedural obligations, the Court found violations of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and Article 9 (freedom of religion), taken in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). The Court held that Ukrainian authorities failed to adequately investigate whether the assault was motivated by religious hostility. Concluding the substantive review, the ECtHR ordered the state to pay €4,000 in non-pecuniary damage to each applicant, alongside joint legal costs.
On 9 July 2026, South Korea’s Supreme Court upheld a seven-year prison sentence imposed on former President Yoon Suk Yeol for obstructing authorities’ attempts to arrest him following his 2024 declaration of martial law. The Court confirmed the Seoul High Court’s findings that Yoon obstructed law enforcement efforts, fabricated official documents, failed to comply with legal procedures requiring cabinet consultation before imposing martial law, and disseminated false information to foreign media. Yoon’s lawyers stated that they would pursue a constitutional challenge against the ruling. The Supreme Court’s decision relates to obstruction and related offences and is separate from Yoon’s earlier life sentence in a separate case concerning charges of masterminding an insurrection linked to his martial law declaration. Yoon remains involved in several other legal proceedings.
On 9 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) Grand Chamber ruled in Jesus Pinhal v. Portugal that Portugal did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) by pursuing parallel criminal and administrative proceedings against a former vice-chairman of Banco Comercial Português. The applicant argued that criminal proceedings alongside separate regulatory actions by Portugal’s central bank and securities regulator amounted to being tried three times for the same conduct. The Grand Chamber reaffirmed that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 does not prohibit multiple proceedings where they form part of an integrated, coordinated enforcement system addressing different aspects of the same wrongdoing in a foreseeable and proportionate manner. The Court also held that Portugal’s reservation to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 was invalid but concluded that the proceedings nevertheless complied with the Convention’s guarantees against double jeopardy.
On 6 July 2026, Hamas announced the dissolution of the body that has governed Gaza since 2007, paving the way for the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a technocratic body established under a US-backed roadmap, to take over the enclave’s day-to-day civilian administration. The decision marks a significant political shift. Since the October ceasefire, Hamas has repeatedly stated that it was willing to step aside from civilian governance, while maintaining that the issue of its disarmament remains separate. The group said dissolving the governing body is intended to facilitate the administrative transition and move negotiations over Gaza’s future forward. Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said the decision was taken “to remove any pretexts for the occupation, which continues its aggression and war of extermination,” adding that the movement is ready to hand over governmental responsibilities to ensure the committee’s success. The move does not mean Hamas is relinquishing its political or military role in Gaza, but rather withdrawing from direct civilian governance. The NCAG has welcomed the announcement and says it is ready to assume its responsibilities once the necessary resources and conditions are in place. However, the committee has remained outside Gaza for months, reportedly because Israel has so far refused to allow its deployment into the territory.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/6/hamas-announces-dissolution-of-gaza-governing-body
On 6 July 2026, UN Secretary-General António Guterres urged stronger global rules for artificial intelligence (AI) at the first UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance in Geneva. He appealed for an international agreement that prioritises safety, particularly as digital abuses against children proliferate and as the use of “killer robots” in conflicts becomes more widespread. He also spoke to the revolutionary impact of AI on economies and societies, calling for greater inclusivity for billions of people worldwide, as well as a governance approach that protects human rights. Guterres placed emphasis on protecting children and urged countries to adopt an AI Child Safety Pledge, which would require AI developers to prove that the tech is safe for children and that it effectively safeguards them against sexual abuse and other harms. Calling for greater transparency in AI companies’ carbon, water, and land footprint, the UN chief appealed for a commitment to power all AI data centres with renewable energy by 2030. He also announced that over 20 countries have endorsed an initiative to increase public funding for AI to help foster knowledge exchange and capacity building in developing nations. This inaugural meeting forms part of the UN’s efforts to shape and drive human-centred governance of emerging technologies, and was attended by businesses, experts, researchers, civil society groups, and artists. The next meeting is scheduled to take place in New York in May 2027.
On 6 July 2026, several UN Special Rapporteurs raised the alarm over what appears to be ongoing transnational repression against eight exiled Belarusians. The former political prisoners were forcibly expelled from Belarus to Lithuania or Ukraine after they were released from detention. Upon arrival in December, they became aware that their Belarusian passports had been arbitrarily invalidated, endangering their fundamental rights to freedom of movement, family life, and legal status, and placing them at risk of statelessness. Without passports, they also face challenges accessing healthcare, financial services, employment, and other essential services. The UN experts highlighted the concerning case of Leanid Sudalenka, a former human rights professional and political prisoner who was convicted in absentia even after having left Belarus. He is reportedly now under three additional criminal investigations for exercising his fundamental rights. The UN officials urged Belarus to immediately stop using its “special proceedings” framework to target people abroad and stressed its incompatibility with the right to a fair trial. They stressed that the targeting and silencing of critics and human rights activists abroad has long-lasting harmful effects on the lives of Belarusians who have left their country. UN officials have raised concerns about transnational repression by Belarusian authorities for several years.
On 8 July 2026, UN investigators warned that El Obeid faces a serious risk of mass atrocities as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) increasingly replicate the tactics previously used in El Fasher. Their latest report concludes that atrocities committed by the RSF in El Fasher in October, including mass killings, abductions, gang rapes, enforced disappearances, and attacks on civilians, bear the markers of genocide, reinforcing concerns first raised in a February report. Investigators warned that the RSF is now deploying around El Obeid the same tactics documented in El Fasher, including encircling the city, attacking critical infrastructure, restricting humanitarian access, and disrupting essential services. In June alone, the UN verified 15 drone strikes in and around El Obeid that killed at least 45 civilians, while attacks on power stations caused blackouts, disrupted water supplies, and severely affected hospitals. Stressing that repeated UN warnings before the fall of El Fasher went unheeded, investigators urged the international community to act before the situation deteriorates further. They called for urgent Security Council action, a pause in hostilities to allow humanitarian aid, and cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC), warning that there is still a window of opportunity to prevent further atrocity crimes. The warning comes as Sudan remains one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, with at least 59,000 people killed and 14 million displaced since the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces of the military government (SAF) and the RSF began in April 2023, while 33.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.
On 8 July 2026, Pakistan’s military said that a series of attacks in the southwestern province of Balochistan had killed at least 42 people since Monday, including 18 police officers, 11 soldiers, and four civilians. The military also claimed that 54 fighters had been killed during operations launched in response to the attacks. The violence began when armed fighters attacked a security post protecting the Mangi dam project in Ziarat district, killing several police officers. On Wednesday, the military said another attack targeted a vehicle carrying soldiers on a highway in Balochistan, killing 11 soldiers. Pakistan’s military spokesperson, Lieutenant General Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry, vowed that security forces would continue operations against those responsible, accusing “many Afghans” of being involved in the attacks. Islamabad has repeatedly accused armed groups operating in Balochistan of using Afghan territory as a base, allegations that Kabul has denied. The attacks come amid long-running tensions in Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest but least populated province. The region has experienced several separatist movements since it was incorporated into Pakistan in 1948, shortly after the partition of British India. Baloch nationalist groups have long accused the Pakistani state of marginalising the province’s population and exploiting its natural resources, while some movements have called for greater autonomy or independence. The latest violence reflects the broader instability in Balochistan, where groups including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) have been involved in a long-running insurgency against the Pakistani state. The conflict combines security concerns with deeper political, economic, and historical grievances that have fuelled tensions in the region for decades.
On 8 July 2026, Cuba denounced what it called a “ruthless” US blockade during a UN General Assembly debate, as the island faced its third nationwide blackout since the beginning of 2026. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez accused Washington of waging a “multi-dimensional” economic war against the country, while several regional blocs, including African and Caribbean states, expressed support for Havana and condemned the embargo. The diplomatic dispute comes as Cuba’s energy crisis continues to worsen. Authorities attributed the latest blackout to severe fuel shortages and the deterioration of the national power grid, with essential services such as hospitals prioritised. The UN has also warned of growing shortages of food, drinking water, and medicine. Cuban officials argue that the situation has significantly deteriorated since January, when US President Donald Trump cut off oil deliveries from Venezuela and threatened sanctions against countries supplying fuel to the island. According to Havana, only one Russian oil tanker has reached Cuba since then, leaving the country struggling to keep its ageing power plants running. At the UN, Cuba estimated that the US embargo caused around US$8 billion in economic losses between March 2025 and February 2026, not including the impact of the recent fuel blockade. The debate also illustrated the persistent international opposition to the US embargo, although support for resolutions calling for its lifting has weakened in recent years, with a growing number of abstentions.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/8/at-un-cuba-rallies-support-against-ruthless-us-blockade
On 8 July 2026, the US launched a second consecutive wave of air strikes on Iran, marking the most serious escalation since the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in mid-June to end their recent conflict. According to US Central Command (CENTCOM), around 90 military targets were struck, including air defence systems, missile and drone storage sites, naval assets, and military infrastructure along Iran’s coastline. Iranian state media reported that one firefighter was killed in the attacks. The strikes came after Washington accused Iran of violating the ceasefire agreement by attacking commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The Trump administration argues that the MoU guarantees free passage through the strategic waterway, while Tehran maintains that it has the right to determine the conditions under which ships may transit the strait. Iran responded by launching attacks against US military bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, warning that further strikes could target other American bases in the region if US attacks continue. Iranian officials also reiterated that the Strait of Hormuz would only remain open under “Iranian arrangements”, rejecting what they described as American attempts to impose control over the waterway. Despite declaring that the ceasefire was effectively “over”, US President Donald Trump said he did not expect a return to full-scale war and suggested that negotiations on unresolved issues, including Iran’s nuclear programme and the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, could still continue. The latest escalation nevertheless raises fresh concerns over the durability of the mid-June agreement, which had ended weeks of fighting while leaving several key disputes unresolved.
On 8 July 2026, it was reported that during the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, Türkiye, the alliance unveiled billions of dollars in defence contracts and military projects, in an effort to convince US President Donald Trump that members are investing sufficiently in defence and strengthening collective security. Also at the summit, during a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Trump once more insisted that Greenland should fall under US control. The US President also declared the lifting of sanctions on Türkiye, signalling a warmer relationship between the two countries. This follows years of tension after Türkiye had purchased a Russian-made missile defence system, prompting the nation to be removed from the F-35 fighter jet programme. The warming relationship between Trump and Erdoğan has fuelled speculation about Türkiye’s possible readmission to the programme, which could enable the US to sell the country F-35s, despite opposition from Israel and US lawmakers. Separately at the summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a new call for Ukraine’s admission into NATO, highlighting his armed forces’ expertise and the value they would add to the alliance’s defence capacity, especially with regard to Russia. His appeal came amid growing concerns among European nations that a hybrid attack by Russia may be imminent.
On 9 July 2026, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, called for an urgent end to the fighting in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) following recent civilian deaths. Hostilities between the Congolese armed forces and the Rwanda-backed armed group M23 have intensified in South Kivu province, despite an ongoing US-brokered peace process. Both parties have deployed heavy artillery, armed drones, and other explosive weapons in areas populated by civilians, with disastrous consequences. Civilians have been wounded, displaced, and killed, while people’s livelihoods have been devastated. One million refugees have already fled the country, and the current fighting could displace more, Türk warned. The High Commissioner urged both warring parties to ensure humanitarian aid reaches people swiftly and safely, in line with their obligations under international humanitarian law. He called on Rwanda to end its backing of M23 and to withdraw its troops from the DRC. He also urged the international community to take urgent action to deter further violence and protect civilian lives, calling particular attention to the devastating harms caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.
On 9 July 2026, the government of Eswatini announced it had accepted 11 third-country deportees from the US as part of a new bilateral agreement. This marks the fourth group of arrivals into the African kingdom since it began accepting third-country deportees from the US in 2025. The deportations form part of a wider US immigration crackdown, with thousands of people having been deported to almost two dozen countries of which they are not nationals, because they cannot be directly transferred to their origin countries. In Africa, third-country deportees have also been sent to the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), among other countries. Eswatini has not made public the terms of its agreement with the US, nor information on deportees’ nationalities, legal status, or scheduled stay in the country. While Eswatini government officials have said they will protect the rights of deportees in line with international obligations, human rights groups have called out the lack of transparency and parliamentary scrutiny around the deal. Civil society groups have also challenged the deportations in court, given that third-country deportees are being held in prisons without charge. It is expected that the latest group of arrivals will stay at a maximum-security prison. Since transfers began last year, only two third-country deportees sent to Eswatini have left the country.