Skip to main content

Platform for Peace and Humanity

Six Years of Escalating Media Repression in Kyrgyzstan

Key Takeaways

  • Six years on from Kyrgyzstan’s Third Revolution of 2020, the pluralist spirit that once earned the country the moniker ‘the island of democracy’ has been significantly eroded. Within a broader context of repression and a crackdown on domestic dissent, the once-vibrant Kyrgyz media landscape has been systematically dismantled. Whereas in 2020 Kyrgyzstan ranked 82 out of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index, by 2026 it had plummeted to 146th place.
  • Since President Sadyr Japarov has been in power, new restrictive legislation has been introduced and many forms of direct and indirect censorship are taking place. Independent media outlets are regularly raided, websites blocked, and investigative journalists arbitrarily detained and even exiled.
  • The crackdown targets media organisations that are uncomfortable for the authorities because they expose corruption or present an alternative narrative on sensitive issues, such as border skirmishes or other military interventions.
  • Media repression has continued even after the change of leadership of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) in early 2026, and shows no sign of abating. The international community must remain committed to advocate for a free media in Kyrgyzstan.

On 7-8 November, Kyrgyzstan observed a two-day national holiday known as the Days of History and Commemoration of Ancestors. Inaugurated in 2017, the holiday is intended to honour the victims of past repressive political regimes, including those who rose up against Russian imperialist rule during the first World War and the many victims of the Stalinist purges of the 1930s.

In 2026, these state-sponsored acts of remembrance are seen as increasingly ironic given the current government’s deepening crackdown on domestic dissent. Repression in Kyrgyzstan has intensified significantly in the six years that President Sadyr Japarov has been in power; human rights organisations such as Amnesty International highlight the imprisonment of political opposition leaders, the prosecution of activists under vague charges such as ‘extremism’ and ‘inciting mass unrest,’ and the introduction of restrictive legislation that is stifling civil society. The pluralist spirit that previously characterised Kyrgyzstan, once heralded as Central Asia’s ‘island of democracy’, has been significantly eroded.

Of particular note is the escalating crackdown on independent media and investigative journalism that has taken place under President Japarov. Whereas in 2020 Kyrgyzstan ranked 82 out of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders, by 2026 it had plummeted to 146th place.1 The past six years have seen an increasing number of raids on independent media outlets, together with the arbitrary detention of dozens of journalists. Three prominent non-traditional media organisations have been banned outright, designated ‘extremist’. Many more organisations have suffered other forms of direct and indirect censorship. Six years on from the optimistic promise of the 2020 revolution, it is time to reflect on how the once-vibrant Kyrgyz media landscape was systematically dismantled.

 

The ‘Law on the Prevention of False Information’

October 2020 in Kyrgyzstan gave rise to the Third Revolution, so named for being the third time since Kyrgyz independence in 1991 that a political regime was ousted by a popular uprising. Over the ten years since the Second Revolution of 2010, a vibrant civil society had developed in Kyrgyzstan and a flourishing independent media had gained considerable strength; the country was seen as a beacon of democracy. Allegations of rampant vote buying and widespread corruption came to the fore during the elections of October 2020,2 however, leading to disputed election results and largescale protests in Bishkek.3 Within days, incumbent president Sooronbay Jeenbekov was ousted and Sadyr Japarov, liberated from prison during the Revolution, became president.4

Japarov’s Government lost little time in clamping down on civil society. One of their earliest laws targeting the independent media came into effect in July 2021; the so-called ‘Law on the Prevention of False Information’ gave power to an unnamed ‘authorised state body’ to shut down or block websites containing ‘false” or ‘inaccurate’ information.5 Technically the law in question did not originate in Japarov’s tenure; a draft had already been passed by the unicameral parliament under Jeenbekov, who then vetoed it. With Japarov newly in power, however, the bill was resubmitted to parliament with only slight modifications and quickly passed into law.

While the new ‘Law on False Information’ did not name the state body authorised to enforce it, in practice the Ministry of Culture emerged as the primary administrative tool for state censorship and media suppression. It has been backed up in its efforts by the heavy hand of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) and Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies—led operationally by President Japarov, and until February 2026 by then GKNB head Kamchybek Tashiev.

 

Early Targeting of TemirovLive

The first concrete actions by Japarov’s Government against an indepedent media organisation concerned TemirovLive, a YouTube channel founded in August 2020 by Bolot Temirov, investigative journalist and previous editor-in-chief of factcheck.kg. In January 2020, Temirov suffered an assault that left him hospitalised with concussion; the attack was assumed to be linked to his investigation into Raimbek Matraimov, a corrupt customs official turned millionaire politician.6 It was after this attack that he started TemirovLive.7 Dedicated to unveiling corruption within Kyrgyzstan, the channel quickly rose to prominence. It targeted state and non-state actors alike, including government officials and the ruling elite; from the very first videos it published, it was openly critical of the Kyrgyz authorities.

TemirovLive’s offices were first raided on 22 January 2022, two days after the channel published a high-profile video investigation exposing an alleged corruption scheme involving the family of the powerful head of the GKNB, Kamchybek Tashiev. During the raid, Temirov was initially charged with the illegal possession of drugs, which the authorities claimed to have found in his pocket. In April 2022, additional charges of document forgery and illegal border crossing were brought against him. A sequence of events followed that human rights organizations have described as ‘vindictive’ and politically motivated. Although successfully cleared of the drug charges, Temirov, a dual national, was stripped of his Kyrygz nationality and in November 2022 was deported to Russia.8 He continues to live in exile in an undisclosed location.

 

The Expanding Suppression of Independent Media

While Bolot Temirov was awaiting trial, new cases were opened against other investigative media outlets. On 1 February 2022, Kaktus.media was charged with ‘war propaganda’9 for citing an international news article which reported that Kyrgyz soldiers had fired the first shot in a border skirmish with Tajikistan.10 In March 2022, Taalaibek Duishenbiev, director of the opposition TV channel Next TV, was arrested by GKNB officers after a raid on the Next TV offices.11 Although the television channel had been critical of the government, Duishenbiev’s arrest was formally linked to material posted on Next TV’s Telegram channel, which he exercised no editorial control over.12 The social media post repeated a claim that Kyrgyzstan had been involved in the full-scale invasion in Ukraine.13 For this, Duishenbiev was charged with inciting ethnic hatred. In September 2022, he was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison, although ultimately released on three years’ probation.14

Also in 2022, the Kyrgyz government used the controversial Law on False Information to temporarily block independent news websites following complaints or demands to delete articles. The site Res Publica was blocked for two months in mid-2022 following reporting on corruption around the Manas Airport in Bishkek.15 A block on the site 24.kg followed a complaint about their reporting by the Ambassador Hotel, although the Ministry of Culture ultimately lifted it after only a few hours.16

Finally, in October 2022, access to the website of Radio Azattyk – the Kyrgyz branch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – was blocked (this time without a complaint), marking a major escalation in pressure against independent media in the country. As with Kaktus.media, the trigger was a report on border skirmish17. The material in question, produced by the Russian-language television channel Current Time, featured Tajik 18. Less than a week after its website was blocked, Radio Azattyk’s bank accounts were frozen by order of the national security agencies, allegedly for not abiding by financial/money-laundering regulations.

After the initial two-months allowed under the law, the Ministry of Culture extended the block of Radio Azattyk’s website,19 indicating that it would remain in place until the outlet removed the material in question. The pressure continued in 2023; in April that, a district court in Bishkek officially ruled that Radio Azattyk would be shut down if they did not delete the disputed video.20 In July 2023, a settlement was ultimately reached; Radio Azattyk removed the controversial material and was allowed to resume operations.21 Without this concession, the outlet would have remained suspended.

Two months after Radio Azattyk resumed operations, another independent media organisation found itself in the authorities’ sights. The Kloop Media Public Foundation was the parent organization of prominent independent investigative news outlet Kloop. Kloop openly reported on corruption, including the business empire of politician Raimbek Matraimov, but the authorities’ move came after the outlet published a piece implicating the family of President Japarov and the then head of the GKNB, Kamchybek Tashiev, linking them to the construction of an FC Barcelona football academy on land confiscated by the state.22 This time, the authorities were not content with merely blocking access to Kloop’s website. Instead, in August 2023 prosecutors in Bishkek filed a lawsuit to liquidate Kloop Media; the aim was to shut down the entire organisation.23 Kloop was accused of failing to register as a mass media outlet and engaging in media activity that was not included in its organisational charter. One year and several court cases later, on 16 July 2024 the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan rejected Kloop’s final appeal, upholding the move to liquidate the media house – a decision that Kloop was not informed about for a further five weeks.

Early 2024 saw further raids on media outlets conducted by the GKNB. On 15 January, the offices of 24.kg were raided and several people held for questioning.24 The following day, the offices of TemirovLive and its Kyrgyz language sister organisation Ait Ait Dese were again raided; this time eleven journalists were detained on charges of calling for mass unrest.25 These arrests once again followed on the heels of the publication of material critical of the government – this time allegations of corruption by the Minister of the Interior, Ulan Niyazbekov. Of the eleven journalists detained, two were ultimately sentenced to time in prison. Journalist Azamat Ishenbekov was sentenced to five years while Makhabat Tajibek Kyzy, Bolot Temirov’s wife and his successor at TemirovLive, received a six year sentence.26 Ultimately, Ishenbekov was released in April 2025 thanks to a Presidential pardon. Tajibek Kyzy remained in prison until March 2026, when the Supreme Court overturned her conviction and ordered a retrial of her case. Although her custodial sentence has replaced with travel restrictions, her retrial is still pending.

 

The 2024 Law on Foreign Representatives

In April 2024, the Kyrgyz government passed the ‘Foreign Representative Law’. Signed into act by President Japarov. This law requires all non-commercial organisations and media outlets receiving foreign funding and engaging in broadly defined ‘political activities’ to register as so-called ‘foreign representatives’.27 Organisations concerned by the law must mark all materials that they publish or distribute with a ‘foreign representative’ label, and must submit to annual independent audits, detailed financial reporting, together with the disclosure of founder and director data. As a December 2025 report by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights describes, the law has had a significant effect on civil society organisations, leading to significant self-censorship and a notable quietening of independent voices.28

 

A New Wave of Arbitrary Detention and the ‘Extremist’ Declarations

In May 2025, the GKNB swooped again; in coordinated raids, eight people associated with the Kloop media group were arrested. All were detained and interrogated for several hours, without access to legal counsel29. All eight were then required to apologise on camera. Although the security authorities gave no reason for their detention, a Presidential spokesperson later claimed in a social media post that they had been conducting ‘false’ investigations.

The majority of the detainees were eventually released after lengthy questioning and placed under gag orders. Four cases went to trial on charges of ‘public calls for mass unrest’. Their initial confessions, later retracted, were made under duress during pretrial detention, without legal counsel present. Two of those charged, both accountants, received three year suspended sentences. The other two – Joomart Duulatov and Alexander Alexandrov, both videographers with no editorial control – were sentenced in September 2025 to five years’ imprisonment.30 Following an appeal, the Bishkek City Court ultimately commuted their 5-year prison terms three years of probation, and both were released from the courtroom in November 2025.31

Shortly before the release of Duulatov and Alexandrov, in another court decision taken on 27 October 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s three most prominent independent investigative media organisations – Kloop, TemirovLive and Ait Ait Dese – were all declared ‘extremist’, along with their founders Bolot Temirov and Rinat Tukhvatshin.32 The ruling banned the outlets and prohibited the distribution of their work. It also opened up the possibility that former employees or even members of the public who engaged with their content could face penalties (under Article 330 of the Kyrgyz Criminal Code, distributing, storing, liking, or sharing materials from ‘extremist’ sources can be treated as a criminal offense).33 An appeal against this decision brought by Kloop Media was rejected in March 2026, and the extremist designation for the three organisations remains legally active and enforced today.34

At the same time as the extremist designation was made in 2025, the Kyrgyz authorities submitted a request to Interpol to issue a Red Notice – a worldwide request to locate and arrest a subject – for Rinat Tukhvatshin, the co-founder of Kloop. Interpol rejected the request on the grounds that it could not allow itself to be used for political purposes.

 

The Dismissal of Tashiev

On 10 February 2026, Kamchybek Tashiev, the powerful head of the GKNB and once close ally of President Japarov, was summarily dismissed from his post while overseas.36 His dismissal, together with the subsequent purge of those associated with him, briefly led to optimism within Kyrgyzstan’s muted civil society.37 Ultimately, however, Tashiev was charged with abuse of office and the ‘preparation of the violent seizure of power’, suggesting that the move against him was an integral part of Japarov’s consolidation of power. 38 In July 2026, a Bishkek court convicted Tashiev, sentencing him to a four-year suspended prison term with probation.

 

Conclusion

The six years since the 2020 Revolution in Kyrgzstan and the subsquent rise to power of Sadyr Japarov have been characterised by an increasingly repressive environment, including the censoring of dissenting voices and a deliberate dismantling of independent media.

From the introduction of the Law on False Information in 2021, through the early targeting of TemirovLive and the subsequent spate of raids on independent media and arbitrary detention of investigative journalists, to the widespread content blocks and ultimate liquidation of Kloop, the 2024 Law on Foreign Representatives and the ‘extremist’ designations of 2025, the crackdown has continued to escalate.

In 2026, the legal framework governing the media in Kyrgyzstan remains extremely restrictive, and the authorities retain broad powers to restrict, obstruct, or shut down media outlets. The criminalisation of journalism also continues; court cases against journalists are ongoing, and the threat of arbitrary detention remains real for many. Freedom House reports that internet freedom in Kyrgyzstan is also in decline, especially since the government established a state monopoly on international internet traffic and reassigned oversight responsibilities to the president’s office. Most chilling of all, widespread fear and self-censorship are silencing the once famous independent plurastic spirit of Kyrgyzstan.

 

Recommendations

  • The Government of Kyrgyzstan should take immediate steps to reverse the severe erosion of press freedom and media repression, including the following:
    • Cease the judicial harassment, arbitrary detentions, and criminal prosecution of journalists, and immediately release those currently detained for public-interest or anti-corruption reporting;
    • Repeal the repressive laws that adversely affect free media, including the so-called ‘Law Preventing False Information’ and the ‘Law on Foreign Representatives’;
    • Eliminate overly broad legal definitions of terms such as ‘false information’, ‘extremism’ and ‘national dignity’ and ensure any restrictions meet international proportionality standards;
    • Implement recommendations from the UN Human Rights Committee and Universal Periodic Review cycles to re-establish an enabling environment for civil society and free expression
  • The international community should continue to insist on the release of those currently detained for public-interest or anti-corruption reporting and to engage in advocacy efforts for a free, independent media in Kyrgyzstan and an enabling environment for a vibrant civil society.