Introduction
From July 7 to 9 2025, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) came together for a special session on the review of the amendments on the crime of aggression, known as the Kampala amendments. Adopted in 2010, the Kampala amendments define the crime of aggression and establish the conditions under which the International Criminal Court (ICC) can exercise jurisdiction over it. The crime is defined as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression.” It is uniquely a leadership crime, targeting high-level leaders and directly addressing the use of force between states.
This is a particularly sensitive topic for Central Asian nations given their proximity and historic ties to Russia. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 amounts to a crime of aggression per international law.[1] While Russia’s invasion doesn’t fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction, the crime of aggression still represents subject-matter jurisdiction and signifies a fundamental tension between Russia and the court. Moreover, the ICC has issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from Ukraine to Russia. Of note, these deportations have occurred largely within the context of Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine since 2014. Given that joining the ICC necessitates upholding its arrest warrants, many Central Asian countries seek to maintain a careful balance between broader international relations and diplomacy with Russia.
What follows is a summary of the current positions of the core Central Asian states, with the inclusion of Afghanistan, toward the International Criminal Court (ICC). Keeping in mind the most recent ASP session and current regional events, where possible, special regard is paid to each country’s position on the crime of aggression. We aim to assess how Central Asian governments are responding—or not responding—to recent developments around the crime of aggression, and to situate this within their broader geopolitical positioning and legal relationships with the ICC.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan is not currently a State Party to the Rome Statute. While it has adopted implementing legislation for the core crimes outlined in the Statute, it lacks provisions enabling cooperation with the ICC—a step that is not legally required for non-States Parties, but would be necessary if it sought closer alignment with the Court. The public discourse in this country is largely focused on domestic matters. According to the Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), the government’s reluctance to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) stems from “constitutional and financial restraints”.[2] The nation’s ongoing struggles with internal legal reforms, which have faced criticism from UN human rights experts, seem to be the primary focus of human rights discussions.
The debate over ICC accession effectively stalled after the government’s failure to fully investigate the 2010 Osh conflict, despite recommendations from the international commission of inquiry to hold senior officials accountable. An international commission of inquiry (KIC) had previously documented the complicity of these officials and recommended a full investigation.[3] Despite some prosecutions, the lack of a comprehensive and impartial investigation into the conflict highlighted the limitations of the domestic justice system. It is within this context that the debate over ratifying the Rome Statute effectively ceased, with the Kyrgyz state prioritizing national stability over full adherence to international justice mechanisms.The 2024 law requiring foreign-funded organizations to register as “foreign representatives” has further constrained civil society, mirroring similar legislation in Russia.[4] This matters directly in the context of the Rome Statute because NGOs often play a critical role in advancing ICC engagement: they document human rights violations, collect evidence, and can submit Article 15 communications to the Court that may trigger preliminary examinations.[5] NGOs also advocate for Rome Statute ratification and implementation at the national level—activities that are often politically sensitive and unwelcome by state authorities. By restricting NGO activity, governments in Central Asia not only limit domestic advocacy for ratification but also close off a crucial channel through which victims’ voices could reach the ICC. As of Q2 2025, no active discussion on Rome Statute ratification has been documented in Kyrgyz politics, underscoring the absence of political momentum and making near-term ratification of the Rome Statute unlikely.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country to have ratified the Rome Statute, doing so in 2000.[6] This formal commitment, however, has not translated into domestic implementation. While some international crimes are included in its criminal legislation, the coverage is incomplete and misaligned with the Rome Statute’s specific definitions. For instance, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan (1998) partially criminalizes genocide, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, but does not address crimes against humanity, and many underlying elements of war crimes remain unenumerated.[7] This omission means that, while some core crimes are acknowledged formally, Tajik courts cannot prosecute the full range of crimes as defined under the Rome Statute. Moreover, Tajikistan lacks the procedural framework required to cooperate effectively with the ICC which limits the country’s ability to assist the Court under Part 9.[8] Political discourse remains focused on internal governance and regional security, with no public discussion of the ICC’s mandate or the crime of aggression. The lack of legislative and procedural framework follow-through reflects a deliberate political choice to avoid full jurisdictional exposure, aligning with a broader regional trend of prioritizing sovereignty and stability over international judicial oversight.
An article from Civicus in May 2025 noted that exiled Tajik activists had filed a complaint with the ICC, accusing senior officials of crimes against humanity.[9] However, this action appears to be driven by external actors and has not ignited a wider, government-led public debate within the country itself.
This failure to act effectively transforms Tajikistan’s ratification into a symbolic gesture, one that does not alter the domestic legal status quo or provide victims with a new avenue for justice.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but has not ratified it, effectively stalling its commitment to the International Criminal Court.[10] Constitutional reforms under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev have been presented as steps toward modernization, yet have not led to meaningful judicial independence or openness to external legal mechanisms. As a non-State Party, Uzbekistan is under no legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC, though it could choose to align more closely through voluntary steps such as domestic incorporation of international crimes. The government’s approach though continues to emphasize state-led reform while avoiding commitments that could invite international scrutiny.
Similarly to Kyrgyzstan, in Uzbekistan, public discourse on human rights is dominated by domestic concerns, including the government’s handling of the Karakalpakstan protests and broader justice system reforms that would help to build a robust and independent justice system.[11] The country’s non-ratification of the Rome Statute is a backdrop to these discussions, a reflection of its weak application of international legal norms rather than a topic for active debate. The ICC is rarely mentioned in official or media channels, and there is no evidence of government or civil society engagement with international discussions on the Court’s future. This silence reflects both limited political will and a desire to avoid complicating sensitive regional relationships.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is not currently a signatory to the Rome Statute and therefore has no legal obligations toward the ICC, despite several recommendations for accession by international and domestic actors. In 2018, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court held a seminar involving NGOs from all five Central Asian countries to discuss the benefits of ratifying the Rome Statute.[12] Most recently, in 2023 UN member states Paraguay, Malta, Luxembourg, Austria, and Estonia recommended that Turkmenistan ratify the Rome Statute during its Universal Periodic Review.[13] These recommendations were examined and noted by Turkmenistan, yet there were no public comments regarding the decision not to accept them. This was the last visible attempt to influence Turkmenistan to adopt the Rome Statute.
While there is no publicly available explanation given by the Turkmen government explaining their absence from the ICC, considerations of other Central Asian countries, as well as Turkmenistan’s longstanding foreign policy, provide some context. Turkmenistan’s foreign policy has long been informed by a position of “permanent neutrality”.[14] First adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1995 and again in March 2025, the Resolution “Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan” has been cited by the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the UN Aksoltan Atayevathe as the basis of Turkmenistan’s foreign and domestic policy, and is enshrined in their constitution. The goal of this neutrality is to support stability and establish “mutually beneficial relations with the states of the region and the whole world”.[15]
As it stands, Turkmenistan has neither condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine nor endorsed the invasion. Economic instability and regional security concerns have been cited as influencing factors in recent rapprochement between Russia and Turkmenistan.[16]Given Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality coupled with increasingly friendly ties with Russia, potential ratification of the Rome Statute and assumption of the responsibilities that it entails seems a distant reality.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is not currently a signatory to the Rome Statute. As a non-State Party, Kazakhstan has no legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC. While there were rumours circulating on Kazakhstani Telegram channels in February that the country may be planning to ratify the Rome Statute,[17] the Prosecutor General’s Office dispelled such rumours in response to a request from the official news agency of Kazakhstan, Kazinform.[18]
The Human Rights Foundation and Human Rights Watch, along with the Joint Submission 4, a group of Kazakhstani NGOs, has recommended Kazakhstan ratify the Rome Statute.[19] The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has also recommended Kazakhstan ratify the Statute.[20] Kazakhstan’s failure to do so is most likely related to regional politics and a desire to maintain diplomatic relations with key partners.[21] More specifically, if Kazakhstan were to ratify the Rome Statute, it would be obligated to comply with the ICC’s warrants for the arrests of Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova,[22] as well as several members of the Russian military accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.[23] This presents complications to an already complex relationship between the two countries, particularly in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While Kazakhstan has distanced itself from Russia’s aggression and continues to diversify its diplomatic ties, its government still seeks to maintain its bilateral relationship with Russia.[24]
Afghanistan
Afghanistan formally acceded to the Rome Statute in February 2003.[25] However, the Taliban, which came back to power in August 2021 following US withdrawal from the country,[26] announced this past February that it will no longer recognize any legal obligations under the Rome Statute.[27] In a formal announcement from the Office of the Spokesperson, “The Position of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Institution Known as the ‘International Criminal Court’” pointed to the ICC’s failure to prosecute for alleged war crimes committed by “occupying forces and their allies” during the US-led occupation of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021. Further, they accused the ICC of political bias and posited that due to the lack of universal acceptance of the Rome Statute among all the major world powers and historical colonizers, “it is unwarranted for a nation such as Afghanistan which has historically endured foreign occupation and colonial subjugation to be bound by its jurisdiction”.[28]
Not mentioned in the announcement were the arrest warrants issued by ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan for Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and the Chief Justice of Afghanistan Abdul Kahim Haqqani.[29] These warrants were issued for the crime against humanity of persecution on gender grounds, under article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. The Office of the ICC Prosecutor cited the persecution of women, girls, and those not conforming to the Taliban’s notions of traditional gender identity and expression, by restrictions of the right to physical integrity and autonomy, freedoms of expression and movement, education, private and family life, and free assembly.
Although the Taliban government has officially withdrawn its accession to the Rome Statute, Article 127 of the Rome Statute dictates that the ICC maintains jurisdiction over crimes committed before this withdrawal.[30] According to Article 127, withdrawal takes effect one year after receipt of the withdrawal notice, unless a later date is specified.
While Afghanistan had acceded to the Rome Statute, the country had yet to ratify the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC or the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute.[31]
Conclusions
Central Asia’s engagement with the ICC is characterized by caution, limited legal commitments, and an absence of public debate. In all five republics, restrictive political environments, media controls, and laws targeting NGOs suppress open discussion of international justice. The search results from organizations like Human Rights Watch provide specific examples of the suppression of civil society and independent media. Journalists and human rights defenders are frequently imprisoned on spurious charges. This climate of fear and control effectively silences any potential debate about the ICC. With limited freedom of expression and assembly, there is no platform for legal scholars, human rights advocates, or victims’ groups to campaign for a stronger engagement with international justice.
Afghanistan’s situation is a powerful outlier that highlights the profound political nature of ICC engagement. The Taliban government’s official withdrawal from the Rome Statute, citing the ICC’s failure to prosecute “occupying forces”, is a strategic move to deflect scrutiny and delegitimize the court. This is a direct rejection of international judicial oversight and demonstrates a profound distrust of external legal bodies, which are often perceived as politically biased instruments of more powerful nations rather than neutral arbiters of justice. Elsewhere, non-engagement with the crime of aggression serves as a calculated strategy to balance international image, domestic stability, and geopolitical relationships—particularly with Russia.
Despite its withdrawal, the ICC retains jurisdiction over crimes committed before this action, meaning the legal and political complexities of Afghanistan’s relationship with the court will persist for the foreseeable future.
In effect, the Central Asian states’ non-engagement with the crime of aggression is a well-calculated strategy and is driven more by political will than legal obstacles. It allows them to maintain a careful balance between their international image, domestic stability, and complex geopolitical relationships. Their silence on this issue is not a sign of indifference but a clear expression of a regional preference for sovereignty and strategic self-interest over a full commitment to international criminal justice and strategic approach, insulating governments from the political risks of cooperating with a court whose decisions could implicate domestic leaders or key allies.
Unless these governments come to see cooperation with the Court as something that strengthens, rather than threatens, their sovereignty and stability, meaningful engagement will remain rare. Closing this gap will require persistent diplomacy, focused technical support, and protection for independent voices that can present the ICC not as an outside burden, but as a tool for accountability that benefits their own citizens and the region as a whole.