Pakistan’s Bleeding Ulcer: Escalating  Guerilla War in Balochistan  

Violence has surged in the Pakistani province of Balochistan as non-state armed  factions have become increasingly bold in the face of serious weakness exhibited by  the state, both within Balochistan and other provinces. This security crisis for Pakistan is  reaching a dramatic crescendo as an increasingly unified insurgency openly confronts  the armed forces.   

Always on the periphery of Pakistan, Baloch have periodically engaged in armed  resistance in order to assert their interests against Islamabad, or to protest abuses.¹ The  21^st Century has seen a marked shift in the social and tactical-operational dynamics of  the conflict, as Baloch formations have slowly transitioned from being principally rural  and organised along tribal lines, to a more urbanised and politically nationalist stance.²  

Key drivers of conflict between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani state have included  the long-standing under-development of the region, interference in the province’s  politics by the central government, and systematic abuses and violence conducted by  security forces.³ The growing frustration in the province over high Chinese investments  in the region has further inflamed the situation. The projects have not responded to  citizens’ interests or concerns so far, and have rather brought about segregation,  restrictions on access to the sea for fishing, and suspicions around the true motives  behind the investments. This ultimately translated into violence and an increase in  military and security presence in the region.⁴  

Military and Political Struggle  

Most news media, when describing the Baloch insurgency, ascribe actions simply to the  Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), founded in 2000. According to analysis from West  Point’s Combating Terrorism Centre, the BLA underwent a split in 2017, producing the  BLA-Jeeyand and the BLA-Azad.⁵ It is specifically the BLA-J which has been responsible  for the uptick in major attacks through their Operations “Zir Pahahzag,” which targets  Chinese workers and personnel; and “Dara-e-Bolan/Herof”, which aimed to temporarily  occupy highways and even urban areas.⁶  

Since 2018, the BLA-J and other major factions, the Balochistan Liberation Front and the Baloch Republican Guard, have been coordinating their activities through the Baloch Raaji  Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), and on 3 March announced plans to further coalesce into a “Baloch  National Army”.⁷ Perhaps the clearest sign of the Baloch factions’ bolder stance is the  hijacking of the “Jaffar Express” on 11 March, during which BLA gunmen successfully stopped  the train and took as many as 200 hostages.⁸ Casualty reports from the incident are  inconsistent, with the Pakistani Armed Forces claiming to have killed 33 militants alongside  26 hostages and military deaths, while the BLA claimed to have ultimately executed 214  “enemy personnel” (that is, members of the armed forces or paramilitary travelling on the  train).⁹  

Witness reports from hostages describing the execution of multiple groups of hostages  by militants, as well as others being shot when they attempted to flee, lends credence  to a higher number of deaths than the official count.¹⁰ Additionally, while a great amount  of attention is naturally garnered by the Baloch’s increasingly brazen and spectacular  attacks, a sustained civil protest movement has been peacefully demonstrating in  Balochistan’s cities.¹¹ The main organisation within this movement, the Baloch Yakjehti  (“Unity”) Committee (BYC), is led largely by Baloch women. The BYC emerged in 2020,  and its main effort has been towards resolving the human rights situation in the province,  confronting the impunity and rampant violence of the State.¹² Although formal political unity  between the civic and militant arms is not yet fully evident, Pakistani government claims  notwithstanding¹³, the BYC’s existence is a clear indication of the nationalist movement’s  increasing embeddedness in Baloch society.