Key takeaways

• The legislative elections show a continuity of Azerbaijan’s authoritarian and “family centred” system, with a near total absence of a campaign period and low voter participation.
• An escalation of the crackdown on dissenting voices, especially those in favour of peace with Armenia, marked the months before the election
• Discourse warning of “foreign influences” risks further polarising Azerbaijan’s relation with Western powers.

Introduction

2024 was a year of elections for Azerbaijan. The presidential vote, which was not due until October 2025, was moved ahead to February 2024 following the military success of Azerbaijan’s offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. Predictably, incumbent President Ilham Aliyev secured his fifth consecutive term since he took over from his father, Heydar Aliyev, in 2003.

The Azerbaijanis were invited to vote for a second time this year to elect the 125 deputies sitting in the National Assembly, the Mili Mejlis. Again, Azerbaijanis had to cast their votes earlier than expected: initially planned for November 2024, the parliamentary elections were moved up to 1 September following the President’s choice to dissolve the Assembly on 28 June 2024. This decision followed calls from certain deputies to avoid an overlap between the elections and the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), which took take place in Baku from 11 to 22 November 2024.

This election was a historic one as it is the first vote to be held in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory since 1993, when Armenia regained control of the enclave during the first Karabakh war (1988-1994) [1]. It also comes as it’s been over a year since the Azerbaijani’s offensive and eventual entire control of the enclave, which forced the near entirety of its over 100,000 ethnically Armenian population to flee to Armenia [2]. The region is still dealing with the aftermath of this monumental shift, and the subject is at the centre of Azerbaijan’s political priorities. In consequence, this election is a telling example of the direction the regime is taking.

The parliamentary election

The election took place on 1 September, with the 125 members of the Assembly elected on a “first-past-the-post” basis in each constituency. Despite polling predicting the narrowest victory yet for New Azerbaijan, the presidential party, it secured the majority with 68 out of 125 seats, a loss of only one seat [3]. Unsurprisingly, the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXCP) refused to participate in elections it denounced as “fraudulent”, as it has for the last six elections [4]. Musavat, Azerbaijan’s oldest party and a major opposition figure of both the Soviet and the Heydar Aliyev’s regime, is one of the few true opposition parties to participate. However, it failed to secure any seat, and its leaders denounced irregularities in the electoral process [5].

The next biggest group in the Assembly is not a group at all but 45 independent candidates, whose politics don’t significantly differ from the government’s. Nine other parties considered government proxies [6], won 11 further seats. All in all, a proper opposition party occupies only one seat, out of 125. The election suffered from a blatant lack of legitimate pluralism, as described by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) election observation mission in its report [7].

Overall, the new Milli Majlis is remarkably like the one elected in 2020 and shows a clear continuity of the current power balance, heavily skewed in favour of President Ilham Aliyev and his family (his wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, has been vice-president since 2017). Further manifesting the stability of the regime, several new entrants in this Assembly are sons and daughters of current or past deputies [8].

Although the process was held efficiently and within the deadlines, the election itself was marred by low engagement. Only 6.4 million voters registered, 1.2 million less than those of voting age [9]. Of those registered, only two million cast their ballot, a low turnout of around 37.3%, raising questions of legitimacy [10].

Further adding to these concerns, the OSCE ODIHR also described in its preliminary findings “serious irregularities and inconsistencies in the application of important procedures” and found evidence of deliberate falsification of entries in certain voting offices [11].

An invisible election

Although the voting process itself carried on in an orderly manner, an increasing pressure on dissenting voices by the government marked the two months of campaigning.

Some obstacles are structural: as noted by the OSCE, the necessity for all parties to present their print campaign material to the lower-level election commissions prior to their distribution creates a risk of auto-censorship [12]. Moreover, the electoral campaign was nearly non-existent, and it generated very little public discussion and media time [13]. Restrictive campaign regulations and their enforcement, especially freedom of assembly and expression, hindered candidates from conveying their messages and prevented voters from accessing information freely [14]. Newspaper and online media with paid space became the only space for campaigning [15].

Even more concerning was the extent to which the government was willing to intervene in monitoring election discussions. First, the authorities declared they would monitor the contents of the election on the internet, even though the law does not regulate campaigning via social media and online platforms [16]. Indeed, access to several prominent online newspapers was blocked during the campaign.

Second, several notable arrests of critical voices have taken place over the last months. Most shocking is the arrest of Bahruz Samadov, a PhD student and writer, when he returned from his studies in Prague to Azerbaijan. He had written for several media outlets about Azerbaijan’s authoritarian regime. On 23 August, after two days of disappearance, the Sabail District Court announced he was held and charged with treason, facing a sentence of 12 to 20 years in prison [17]. After his arrest, the Azerbaijani government detained Samad Shikhi and Javid Agha, two advocates for peace. They were freed a few days later after being brought to testify against Bahruz Samadov [18].

This is the second time a researcher was detained on such a charge, after the arrest of Igbal Abilov on 24 July. He is accused of working against Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity by communicating with Armenian academics [19]. Often, the charges brought against opponents are not political in nature (narcotics of financial). The fact that these two men are charged with treason shows that the government doesn’t shy away from the political implications and is also seeking stronger sentences. The increase in the gravity of charges is evidently related to their work with Armenia or their advocacy for peace between the two countries [20].

These arrests illustrate a worrying harsher stance towards opposing voices, and a willingness of the government to silence any critics, especially those regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and peace with Armenia. This is part of a trend of the authorities to denounce “foreign influences”.

Increasing international polarisation

The election and arrest of opponents is set in the context of a broader defiance of Azerbaijan’s government against the West and States that expressed support for Armenia during and following the offensive. This growing tension is reflective of Azerbaijan’s increasingly assertive stance on external involvement in its domestic affairs.

In February 2024, Azerbaijan threatened to withdraw from the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Court of Human Rights and other major bodies, following leaving the CoE Parliamentary Assembly which was about to reject its credentials. This is one of the symptoms of growing tensions with the EU and its members, especially France. Amid a growing number of diplomatic disputes, France even recalled its ambassador to Azerbaijan for consultations on the worsening ties between the countries [21].

These diplomatic tensions have intensified Azerbaijan’s distancing from the West, a trend that aligns with its growing alignment with Russia. The two countries have remained politically and economically close since the fall of the USSR, and Russia has played a central role in the follow-up of the Nagorno-Karabakh by placing peacekeepers (who left in May) on the territory. Although Azerbaijan remains weary of Russia’s influence, so far refusing to give it the control over the Zangezur Corridor, a connexion through Armenia to Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan [22], its tension with the West has brought it close to Russia. Azerbaijan’s pivot toward Russia reflects not only its desire to strengthen ties with a key regional player but also its need to fill the vacuum left by its distancing from Western actors. This alignment with Moscow, in turn, pushes Azerbaijan into a more adversarial stance toward the West.

While Azerbaijan’s scepticism of foreign influence is not new, these recent elections have unfolded in an atmosphere where the country is more focused than ever in identifying external enemies and prioritising its internal and border security concerns.

The situation with Armenia

Finally, these elections are also taking place in the aftermath of Azerbaijan’s offensive and integration of Nagorno-Karabakh into its territory. After the departure of the near totality of the population into Armenia, Azerbaijan has conducted a rapid campaign to integrate in all aspects the territory. Changing the street names, repainting the stadium in Azerbaijan’s colours, and destroying the building of the former National Assembly of Artsakh [23].

Azerbaijan’s actions align with its emphasis on “sovereignty” and the crackdown on voices calling for peace but stand in stark contrast with its stated goal to reach a peace deal with Armenia. After several attempts at peace negotiations brokered by Russia, the US and the EU, bilateral talks seemed to have recently led to progress towards a deal: in early August Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that a formal offer for a peace treaty, and a deal on a joint border commission has already been signed. However, unresolved issues persist, such as the Zangezur Corridor (although Azerbaijan agreed in August to remove mention of this question from the peace agreement [24][25]) and Azerbaijan’s demand for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to be enshrined in Armenia’s Constitution [26][27]. Critics warn that any agreement reached might be largely symbolic without addressing the deeper, substantive issues.

Baku’s rhetoric remains uncompromising and escalates provocations, notably with the celebration of “Sovereignty Day” on September 20, the anniversary of the assault. The Milli Mejlis has become a symbolic focal point for these tensions. In his first address to the new National Assembly on 23 September, President Ilham Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan’s priority is the increase of military capabilities to face rising threats. He also warned of “external influences” entering the country, a clear continuation of Azerbaijan’s intractable position in its relation to Armenia, as well as a further division of the world between allies and enemies [28].

References:

[1] The Associated Press, ‘Azerbaijan’s ruling party on course for narrow victory, exit poll shows.’ (2024) Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/1/voting-under-way-in-azerbaijan-snap-parliamentary-election. Accessed 22 September 2024.

[2] Human Rights Watch, ‘Guarantee Right to Return to Nagorno Karabakh.’ (2023) Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/05/guarantee-right-return-nagorno-karabakh.%20Accessed%2019%20September%202024. Accessed 19 September 2023.

[3] The Associated Press, ‘Azerbaijan’s ruling party on course for narrow victory, exit poll shows.’ (2024) Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/1/voting-under-way-in-azerbaijan-snap-parliamentary-election. Accessed 22 September 2024.

[4] Heil A, ‘Azerbaijan’s Second Snap Vote Since Karabakh Victory Could Further Signal Democratic Dead-End.’ (2024) Radio Free Europe. https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-elections-aliyev-democracy/33098431.html. Accessed 21 September 2024.

[5] Ibid

[6] RFI with AFP, ‘Azerbaïdjan: sans surprise, le parti du président Ilham Aliev remporte des législatives dénoncées par l’opposition.’ (2024) RFI. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/europe/20240902-azerba%C3%AFdjan-sans-surprise-le-parti-du-pr%C3%A9sident-ilham-aliev-remporte-des-l%C3%A9gislatives-d%C3%A9nonc%C3%A9es-par-l-opposition. Accessed 20 September 2024.

[7] OSCE, ‘Azerbaijan, Early Parliamentary Elections, 1 September 2024: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.’ (2024), https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/575497. Accessed 22 September 2024.

[8] Eurasianet, ‘Snap election in Azerbaijan: Here come the kids.’ (2024) Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/snap-election-in-azerbaijan-here-come-the-kids. Accessed 23 September 2024.

[9] OSCE, ‘Azerbaijan, Early Parliamentary Elections, 1 September 2024: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.’ (2024), https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/575497. Accessed 22 September 2024.

[10] Bagirova N, ‘Azerbaijan’s ruling party retains parliamentary majority after snap vote.’ (2024) Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/azerbaijans-ruling-party-set-retain-parliamentary-majority-snap-election-2024-09-01/. Accessed 20 September 2024.

[11] OSCE, ‘Azerbaijan, Early Parliamentary Elections, 1 September 2024: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.’ (2024), https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/575497. Accessed 22 September 2024.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Bagirova N, ‘Azerbaijan’s ruling party retains parliamentary majority after snap vote.’ (2024) Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/azerbaijans-ruling-party-set-retain-parliamentary-majority-snap-election-2024-09-01/. Accessed 20 September 2024.

[14] Restrictive campaign regulations and their enforcement, particularly regarding freedom of assembly and expression, hindered candidates from conveying their messages and prevented voters from accessing information freely.

[15] OSCE, ‘Azerbaijan, Early Parliamentary Elections, 1 September 2024: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.’ (2024), https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/575497. Accessed 22 September 2024.

[16] Ibid

[17] OC Media, ‘Bahruz Samadov charged with treason.’ (2024) OC Media. https://oc-media.org/bahruz-samadov-charged-with-treason/. Accessed 20 September 2024.

[18] Bardouka Y, ‘When advocating for peace becomes treason — the arrest of Bahruz Samadov.’ (2024) OC Media. https://oc-media.org/features/when-advocating-for-peace-becomes-treason-the-arrest-of-bahruz-samadov/. Accessed 20 September 2024.

[19] Farhadova, Aytan. “Talysh researcher arrested for ‘treason’ in Azerbaijan.” OC Media, 25 July 2024, https://oc-media.org/talysh-researcher-arrested-for-treason-in-azerbaijan/. Accessed 21 September 2024.

[20] Bardouka Y, ‘When advocating for peace becomes treason — the arrest of Bahruz Samadov.’ (2024) OC Media. https://oc-media.org/features/when-advocating-for-peace-becomes-treason-the-arrest-of-bahruz-samadov/. Accessed 20 September 2024.

[21] Le Monde with AFP ‘France recalls ambassador to Azerbaijan ‘for consultations.’’ (2024) Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2024/04/16/france-recalls-ambassador-to-azerbaijan_6668615_7.html. Accessed 22 September 2024.

[22] Krivosheev K, ‘The Cost of Russia’s Friendship with Azerbaijan.’ (2024) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/the-cost-of-russias-friendship-with-azerbaijan?lang=en. Accessed 30 September 2024.

[23] Barseghyan A, ‘Azerbaijan ‘drops demand for Zangezur Corridor’ from peace agreement.’ (2024) OC Media. https://oc-media.org/azerbaijan-drops-demand-for-zangezur-corridor-from-peace-agreement/. Accessed 25 September 2024.

[24] Ibid

[25] Crisis Group, ‘A Still-fraught Path to Peace for Armenia and Azerbaijan’. (2024), War & Peace. Podcast. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/war-peace-season-6. Accessed 30 September 2024.

[26] Gavin G, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan tout possible peace deal.’ (2024) POLITICO.eu. https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-azerbaijan-tout-possible-south-caucasus-peace-deal/. Accessed 23 September 2024.

[27] Eurasianet, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan take new step towards finalizing peace deal.’ (2024) Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/armenia-and-azerbaijan-take-new-step-towards-finalizing-peace-deal. Accessed 21 September 2024.

[28] Azernews, ‘First session of seventh convocation of Azerbaijan’s Milli Majlis starts – President Ilham Aliyev attends session.’ (2024) AzerNews. https://www.azernews.az/nation/231628.html. Accessed 21 September 2024.