A New Constitution for Kazakhstan

On 1 July 2026, a sweeping set of constitutional reforms came into force in Kazakhstan, ending the sitting parliament and launching a significant legal transformation in the Central Asian state. The reforms, which amend over 80% of the previous constitution’s articles, are tantamount to the adoption of a new constitution. Although resoundingly approved by the Kazakh population in a referendum held earlier this year, constitutional scholars and civil society groups have raised concerns about both the reforms themselves and the process by which they were arrived at.

A History of Constitutional Redesign

Kazakhstan is no stranger to constitutional reform; the 2026 changes mark the seventh set of major amendments in less than 35 years. The original constitution of January 1993, adopted soon after Kazakh independence, was the result of an unsuccessful compromise between two major political factions in the newly autonomous state. It generated institutional friction through its failure to establish a clear separation of powers and was replete with contradictions.^[1] To address these issues, a major reform process was launched just two years later. An Expert Consultative Council, established by then President Nursultan Nazarbayev, drew up a new text following a process of analysis and consultation. That document, also approved with a significant majority in a constitutional referendum, entered into force on 5 September 1995.

Over the intervening decades, the 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan has been amended repeatedly: first in 1998, then in 2007, 2011, 2017, 2022, and now in 2026. The multiple redesigns have largely focused on the articles concerning parliamentary and presidential powers, leading to them being collectively interpreted as either a sensitive quest for balance between executive authority and parliamentary oversight^[2], or more starkly as an overt attempt to consolidate executive power.^[3]

The 2026 Reform Process

Compared to previous reforms, the constitutional redesign that has unfolded in 2026 is notable for how extensive it is. The package of amendments put to referendum concerned 77 articles, or 84% of Kazakhstan’s Constitution.^[4]  This makes the process tantamount to adopting a completely new constitution – an important point from a procedural standpoint, as the Constitutional Review Commission that was established in 2026 was specifically tasked with developing amendments to an existing constitution, not with drafting a new one. By characterising the proposed draft as a revised constitution, the authorities bypassed a formal Constitutional Court review and truncated the reform process. ^[5]

When the draft text was introduced by the authorities in early 2026, they said it had been developed taking into account proposals from citizens, political parties, public organisations, and legal experts.^[6] Critics of the reform process note that the compressed timeline on which it unfolded was insufficient for real debate, however.^[7]  Following the establishment of the Constitutional Reform Commission on 21 January 2026, the group presented a draft package (consisting of a preamble, 11 sections and 96 articles) within just ten days.^[8] The constitutional referendum then took place just four weeks after the draft was published publicly.

Critics also note the lack of impartiality in the process. The group initially set up to lead the constitutional review comprised only pro-presidential parties and politically loyal members of public organisations and academia,^[9] and it was the Constitutional Court’s Chairman who doubled as Head of the Reform Commission.^[10] The Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law further noted that significant pressure was exerted on potentially critical voices, including the detention of activists.^[11] Moreover, while public proposals could technically be submitted via a state petition portal as part of the process, these proposals were never published for public debate.^[12]

Following the drafting process, the constitutional referendum took place on 15 March 2026. Official statistics recorded a voter turnout of 73%, of which the overwhelming majority (87%) voted in favour of the reforms. Significantly, however, the referendum was formulated as a single ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question, with the Kazakh people simply asked whether or not they accepted the draft Constitution that had previously been published. The only possible outcome was the acceptance or rejection of the reform package as a whole; there was no provision for individual amendments to be treated separately.^[13]

On 17 March 2026, just two days after the referendum, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed the new constitution. He then immediately issued a decree concerning the implementation of the reforms, which included notice that the new constitution would take effect as of 1 July 2026.^[14]

The Key Changes Coming into Force

The 2026 Constitution embodies far-reaching and important changes that have the scope to reshape the legal and political landscape in Kazakhstan. When presenting the proposed reforms to the nation prior to the referendum, President Tokayev framed the amendments as the embodiment of a modernisation process, necessary to reflect the thirty years of political and socio-economic evolution since independence.^[15]  Elsewhere, the Kazakh authorities described the reforms as a move away from consolidated presidential governance and towards ‘strengthening human rights guarantees’, including the ‘absolutisation of the right to life’ and ‘stronger safeguards for honour and dignity’.^[16]  In contrast, both constitutional scholars and civil society groups have raised concerns about the substance of the reforms. Amnesty International, for example, has called the amendments, ‘an alarming rollback of human rights protections and the rule of law and a blatant attempt to concentrate presidential power’.^[17]

Broadly speaking, the constitutional reforms coming into force in Kazakhstan on 1 July are focused on the following key areas^[18]:

Reform of Parliament  

The new constitution transforms the Kazakh parliament from bicameral to unicameral, thereby requiring the immediate dissolution of the Senate or Upper House. The single remaining chamber, to be renamed the Kurultai, will consist of 145 members serving five-year terms, elected based on a system of proportional representation. Elections for the new parliament must be held within two months of the entry into force of the new constitution.

The unicameral system is touted by the authorities as a means for improving representation and enabling greater accountability. Critics note, however, that the dissolution of the second chamber removes a layer of scrutiny, resulting in fewer opportunities to challenge proposed legislation. Notably, the new constitution also mandates the Kurultai to prioritise the reading and adoption of Presidential bills over other forms of legislation.^[19] It also grants the President the power to dissolve the unicameral Parliament should it attempt repeatedly to counter Presidential legislation or appointments.

Creation of New Unelected Roles/Bodies

Alongside the transition to a unicameral Parliament, Kazakhstan’s constitution establishes a new Vice President position and a supreme advisory body, the People’s Council – both directly appointed by the President.^[20]

The Vice President role revives a position that existed in Kazakhstan’s very first constitution, but which was abolished in the 1995 reforms. As well as appointing the Vice President, it is the President who determines the scope of his deputy’s powers, and who may relieve the Vice President of his/her duties. By virtue of not being elected, the Vice-President, first in line to succeed the President in the event of a resignation, dismissal or death, lacks any form of public mandate or popular legitimacy. Should he choose to, there is nothing to stop the President effectively designating a successor and clearing the path for succession.^[21]

The new 126-seat People’s Council (Halyk Kenesi), meanwhile, is an unelected ‘supreme advisory body’ that is vested with the right of legislative initiative. ^[22] It has the power to develop proposals and recommendations on domestic policy, public accord, and national values, and may submit draft laws to the Kurultai and initiate national referenda.^[23] In this way, the Council provides a potential parallel channel for the initiation of legislative change in cases where the Parliament might be unable or unwilling to pursue legislation. Critics say that this equips the President with a tool for putting pressure on the Kurultai, and ultimately creates the possibility of ‘constitutional subterfuge’ should the actions of the unelected body obscure the independent judgment of the elected legislature.^[24]

Consolidation of Presidential Powers

Kazakhstan’s new constitution clearly strengthens the President’s powers by augmenting presidential control over appointments as well as legislation. It is the President alone who appoints key roles, including the new Vice President, the Chairperson and judges of the Constitutional Court, members of the Central Electoral Committee, and members of the Upper Auditory Chamber.^[25] It is also the President rather than the Parliament that will now appoint (and who may dismiss) the Prosecutor General, the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, and the Human Rights Ombudsman – all key oversight roles responsible for scrutinising and potentially criticising state institutions. With only formalistic parliamentary approval required, there is little to stop the President appointing political loyalists to key constitutional offices, fettering the independence of the so-called fourth branch or  ‘guarantor’ institutions (public bodies outside the traditional legislative, executive, and judicial branches, intended to safeguard democratic governance).^[26]

The President yields authority over the Kurultai by nominating its chairperson and retaining the power to dissolve the parliament in new expanded circumstances (such as if the Kurultai repeatedly dissents to appointments that formally require its approval).^[27] In the event of a temporary absence of Parliament, the new constitutional framework also makes provisions for the President to enact laws, including those of a constitutional nature, thereby undermining the principle of separation of powers.^[28]

Significantly, the 2026 constitution also expands Presidential immunity,^[29]  as well as creating a legal loophole through which the incumbent President could potentially extend his term.^[30]

Amendment of Individual and Collective Rights

In continuity with previous versions of the Kazakh Constitution, the new text nominally safeguards freedom of association and other interrelated civil and political rights. The preamble of the new Constitution identifies the protection of individual rights as the state’s highest priority; in the body of the text, however, a notable emphasis is then placed on the protection of state sovereignty and collective interests (such as public order, health, and ‘public morality’) over individual rights. Most significantly, the grounds for restricting fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech or freedom of assembly, have been expanded. Moreover, the ambiguity of terms such as ‘morality’, which does not have a clear legal definition in Kazakhstan, is particularly concerning to civil society groups as it opens the door for the restriction of civil liberties through subjective interpretation. ^[31]  A Human Rights Watch statement notes, for example, that the vague wording of the Constitution’s free-speech provisions could “enable excessive and undue restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.”^[32]

Human rights groups have also called out the redefinition of marriage in the 2026 constitution. Previously defined as a ‘union of two people’, the reformulation elevates the definition of marriage as a union ‘between a man and a woman’ to constitutional level. This amendment raises concerns that the constitution is being used to enshrine discrimination against the LGBTI community, a group which already faces stigma and harassment in Kazakhstan.^[33]

Strengthened State Oversight of Civil Society

Kazakhstan’s new constitution introduces additional restrictions on the operating environment for non-governmental and non-commercial groups. In particular, it mandates the public disclosure of “information on the movement and assets of a non-profit organization from a foreign state, international and foreign legal entity, foreign citizen and stateless person.”^[34] This amendment elevates to the constitutional level a provision that was previously regulated by national legislation and is seen as a move towards greater State control over civil society.

These changes, taken together with related ongoing legal initiatives, including the current drafting of a new law on NGOs and reform of Kazakhstan’s charity legislation, have generated considerable public debate, with specific concerns about the likely risks to civic space.^[35] Civil society in Kazakhstan has become increasingly diverse and visible since the country’s independence, with the Ministry of Information and Public Development reporting over 23,000 registered non-commercial organisations.^[36] Non-governmental organisations, particularly in the case of organisations focused on human rights and the rule of law, serve a role as impartial watchdogs over state institutions, and anything which could adversely affect their operations and independence risks impeding this role. ^[37]

Deprioritisation of International Law

Finally, the amendments to Kazakhstan’s constitution include the elimination of a key provision which gave ratified international commitments precedence over domestic law.^[38] The 2026 constitution simply states that other ‘normative acts’ will determine the status of international law. Kazakhstan is a member of many international organisations and a signatory to a wide range of legally binding international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Removing the constitutional principle of primacy opens the door for such treaties to be interpreted as inconsistent with the Constitution,^[39] thereby creating considerable uncertainty around the enforcement provisions. This could conceivably affect the fulfilment of Kazakhstan’s international human rights obligations or climate commitments, amongst other things.^[40]

So What Happens Next?

After the acceptance of the referendum and the signature of the new Constitution in March, the reforms described above came into effect in Kazakhstan as of 1 July 2026. Following the dissolution of parliament, elections for the new unicameral Kurultai must be held within the coming two months, and after the new parliament’s first session, the President will need to appoint key roles, including the Vice President, the Chairperson and judges of the Constitutional Court, and members of the Central Electoral Committee. Other amendments came into force with immediate effect.

Conclusion

President Tokayev has argued that the constitutional changes coming into force, together with other political reform processes currently underway, will steer Kazakhstan away from a ‘super-presidential’ system toward a presidential republic with an authoritative and influential Parliament.^[41] The President has called the 2026 constitutional reform a new phase in the country’s development, describing it as all about ‘maturity, renewal, and betting big on the future.’^[42]

Sceptics point to the 2022 constitutional reform process, under which amendments originally touted as paving the way for a more balanced governing system ultimately yielded little change in the way government operated.^[43] Commentators also note that whether or not the new constitution can achieve the Government’s stated goals will depend to a large extent on how the many vaguely constructed provisions are interpreted and implemented in practice.  Harsher critics contend that the nature and scope of the 2026 constitutional amendments are indicative of ‘a trajectory toward the deeper entrenchment of authoritarian and restrictive practices within the constitutional order’.^[44]

While viewpoints differ, what is certain is that the entry into force of Kazakhstan’s 2026 constitution marks a significant step in the reshaping of the nation’s political system and is potentially a watershed moment in its regional and international standing. With the new constitution, Kazakhstan is aligning itself with a broader trend in which the stabilisation of political leadership takes precedence over the transfer and redistribution of power. It also signals a notable shift in matters of economic policy, international law, and human rights. The enactment of such significant change in Kazakhstan, the world’s ninth-largest country and an economy with a GDP per capita growth that surpassed China in 2025, is a message that the international community should not ignore.

^[1] Kaustubh Tiwari, ‘Kazakhstan’s New Constitution and the Rise and Rise of Authoritarianism’, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 17 April 2026, http://www.iconnectblog.com/kazakhstan’s-new-constitution-and-the-rise-and-rise-of-authoritarianism/

^[2] ‘Key Facts About Kazakhstan’s Constitution’, The Astana Times, 30 August 2025, https://astanatimes.com/2025/08/key-facts-about-kazakhstans-constitution/

^[3] Yerzhan Dosmukhamedov, ‘Kazakhstan’s New Constitution: Reform or Power Consolidation?’, The Diplomat, 8 April 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/kazakhstans-new-constitution-reform-or-power-consolidation/

^[4] Ayana Birbayeva, ‘Kazakhstan Proposes Constitutional Reform Affecting 84% of Basic Law’, The Astana Times, 29 January 2026, https://astanatimes.com/2026/01/kazakhstan-proposes-constitutional-reform-affecting-84-of-basic-law/

^[5] Dimash Alzhanov, ‘A New Constitution for Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Reform as a Façade for Presidential Monopoly’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 20 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-kazakhstan-parliamentary-reform-facade-presidential-monopoly 

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Yerzhan Dosmukhamedov, ‘Kazakhstan’s New Constitution: Reform or Power Consolidation?’, The Diplomat, 8 April 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/kazakhstans-new-constitution-reform-or-power-consolidation/

^[8] Dimash Alzhanov, ‘A New Constitution for Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Reform as a Façade for Presidential Monopoly’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 20 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-kazakhstan-parliamentary-reform-facade-presidential-monopoly

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] ‘The Repression of Freedom of Expression Continues in Kazakhstan’, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 1 April 2026, https://bureau.kz/en/news/the-repression-of-freedom-of-expression-continues-in-kazakhstan/

^[12] Dimash Alzhanov, ‘A New Constitution for Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Reform as a Façade for Presidential Monopoly’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 20 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-kazakhstan-parliamentary-reform-facade-presidential-monopoly

^[13] Durdiyeva, Selbi, ‘New Old Kazakhstan: Assessing Kazakhstan’s Proposed Constitutional Changes’, Verfassungsblog, 12 March 2026, https://verfassungsblog.de/kazakhstan-constitution/

^[14] Iana Fremer, Kazakhstan: New Constitution Adopted Following Nationwide Referendum, Library of Congress, 27 May 2026,   https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2026-05-27/kazakhstan-new-constitution-adopted-following-nationwide-referendum/

^[15] Durdiyeva, Selbi, ‘New Old Kazakhstan: Assessing Kazakhstan’s Proposed Constitutional Changes’, Verfassungsblog, 12 March 2026, https://verfassungsblog.de/kazakhstan-constitution/

^[16] Ayana Birbayeva, ‘Kazakhstan Proposes Constitutional Reform Affecting 84% of Basic Law’, The Astana Times, 29 January 2026, https://astanatimes.com/2026/01/kazakhstan-proposes-constitutional-reform-affecting-84-of-basic-law/

^[17] Amnesty International, ‘Kazakhstan: Proposed new Constitution reflects erosion of human rights standards and rule of law’, 13 March 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/03/kazakhstan-proposed-new-constitution-reflects-erosion-of-human-rights-standards-and-rule-of-law/

^[18] Durdiyeva, Selbi, ‘New Old Kazakhstan: Assessing Kazakhstan’s Proposed Constitutional Changes’, Verfassungsblog, 12 March 2026, https://verfassungsblog.de/kazakhstan-constitution/

^[19] Ibid.

^[20] Dimash Alzhanov, ‘A New Constitution for Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Reform as a Façade for Presidential Monopoly’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 20 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-kazakhstan-parliamentary-reform-facade-presidential-monopoly

^[21] Kazakhstan constitutional referendum fact sheet, Eurasianet, 12 March 2026, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-constitutional-referendum-fact-sheet

^[22] Dimash Alzhanov, ‘A New Constitution for Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Reform as a Façade for Presidential Monopoly’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 20 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-kazakhstan-parliamentary-reform-facade-presidential-monopoly

^[23] Iana Fremer, Kazakhstan: New Constitution Adopted Following Nationwide Referendum, Library of Congress, 27 May 2026,   https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2026-05-27/kazakhstan-new-constitution-adopted-following-nationwide-referendum/

^[24] Tiwari, K, ‘Kazakhstan’s New Constitution and the Rise and Rise of Authoritarianism’, I•CONnect, 17 April 2026,  https://www.iconnectblog.com/kazakhstans-new-constitution-and-the-rise-and-rise-of-authoritarianism/

^[25] Durdiyeva, Selbi, ‘New Old Kazakhstan: Assessing Kazakhstan’s Proposed Constitutional Changes’, Verfassungsblog, 12 March 2026, https://verfassungsblog.de/kazakhstan-constitution/

^[26] Kaustubh Tiwari, ‘Kazakhstan’s New Constitution and the Rise and Rise of Authoritarianism’, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 17 April 2026, http://www.iconnectblog.com/kazakhstan’s-new-constitution-and-the-rise-and-rise-of-authoritarianism/

^[27] Iana Fremer, Kazakhstan: New Constitution Adopted Following Nationwide Referendum, Library of Congress, 27 May 2026,   https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2026-05-27/kazakhstan-new-constitution-adopted-following-nationwide-referendum/

^[28] Dimash Alzhanov, ‘A New Constitution for Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Reform as a Façade for Presidential Monopoly’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 20 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-kazakhstan-parliamentary-reform-facade-presidential-monopoly

^[29] Ibid.

^[30] Durdiyeva, Selbi, ‘New Old Kazakhstan: Assessing Kazakhstan’s Proposed Constitutional Changes’, Verfassungsblog, 12 March 2026, https://verfassungsblog.de/kazakhstan-constitution/

^[31] https://www.icnl.org/resources/civic-freedom-monitor/kazakhstan?do=pdf

^[32] ‘Kazakhstan: Draft Constitution Raises Rights Concerns’, Human Rights Watch, 16 February 2026,

https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/16/kazakhstan-draft-constitution-raises-rights-concerns

^[33] Amnesty International, ‘Kazakhstan: Proposed new Constitution reflects erosion of human rights standards and rule of law’, 13 March 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/03/kazakhstan-proposed-new-constitution-reflects-erosion-of-human-rights-standards-and-rule-of-law/

^[34] International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), ‘Civic Freedom Monitor: Kazakhstan’, ICNL, 8 May 2026.  https://www.icnl.org/resources/civic-freedom-monitor/kazakhstan?do=pdf

^[35] Ibid.

^[36] Ibid.

^[37] Durdiyeva, Selbi, ‘New Old Kazakhstan: Assessing Kazakhstan’s Proposed Constitutional Changes’, Verfassungsblog, 12 March 2026, https://verfassungsblog.de/kazakhstan-constitution/

^[38] Bojan Brkic & Galiya Khassenkhanova, ‘Kazakhstan: Largest country in Central Asia approves new constitution’, EuroNews, 17.03.2026, https://www.euronews.com/2026/03/17/largest-country-in-central-asia-votes-for-the-new-constitution

^[39] Dimash Alzhanov, ‘A New Constitution for Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Reform as a Façade for Presidential Monopoly’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 20 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-kazakhstan-parliamentary-reform-facade-presidential-monopoly

^[40] International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), ‘Civic Freedom Monitor: Kazakhstan’, ICNL, 8 May 2026.  https://www.icnl.org/resources/civic-freedom-monitor/kazakhstan?do=pdf

^[41] Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan: https://www.akorda.kz/en

^[42] Iana Fremer, Kazakhstan: New Constitution Adopted Following Nationwide Referendum, Library of Congress, 27 May 2026,   https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2026-05-27/kazakhstan-new-constitution-adopted-following-nationwide-referendum/

^[43] Kazakhstan constitutional referendum fact sheet, Eurasianet, 12 March 2026, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-constitutional-referendum-fact-sheet

^[44] Dimash Alzhanov, ‘A New Constitution for Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Reform as a Façade for Presidential Monopoly’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 20 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-kazakhstan-parliamentary-reform-facade-presidential-monopoly