Donald Trump’s executive order designating certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organisations and specially designated foreign terrorists is a move that would target the group with economic and travel sanctions.[1] Namely, chapters in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt were designated because, according to the executive order, they “engage in or facilitate and support violence and destabilisation campaigns that harm their own regions, United States citizens, and United States interests”, citing cooperation with or support of Hamas.[2]
On 24 November 2025, the White House published a fact sheet stating that the Order:
The White House documents justify the designation of the branches in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt by stating that:
On 13 January 2026, the Secretary of State Marco Rubio released a statement announcing the imposition of terrorist designations against chapters in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. The statement adds that:
“These designations reflect the opening actions of an ongoing, sustained effort to thwart Muslim Brotherhood chapters’ violence and destabilisation wherever it occurs. The United States will use all available tools to deprive these Muslim Brotherhood chapters of the resources to engage in or support terrorism.”[4]
The Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has additionally designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and announced moves to designate the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, stating that “the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood uses unrestrained violence against civilians to undermine efforts to resolve the conflict in Sudan and advance its violent Islamist ideology.”[5]
The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational pan-Islamist organisation, originally founded in Egypt in 1928 by scholar Hassan al-Banna, which subsequently spread to other Muslim countries. Joas Wagemakers, an Associate Professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies at Utrecht University, states that the Brotherhood was in part founded as a result of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, leading to a vacuum without governing authorities to implement Islam, as well as in response to British colonialism.[6] Al-Banna believed that “reviving Islamic principles in society could enable the Muslim world to resist Western colonialism.”[7] Thus, ideologically, the Brotherhood “sees its role as propagating Islam”, using the slogan of “Islam is the solution”, and has an anti-colonialist stance which sometimes takes the form of anti-Western sentiments.[8]
Today, the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood is highly contested, seen by detractors as extremist and fundamentalist, while supporters consider it a peaceful representation of Islamism in democratic institutions.[9] The Brotherhood’s leaders state that they denounced violence decades ago and now seek to implement Muslim rule through elections and peaceful means, however, some offshoots have armed wings.[10] Wagemakers emphasises that its ideology has evolved over time, moving away from the idea of an Islamic state in the 1990s and 2000s, and instead supporting a civic state with an Islamic authority but without full implementation of shari’a law.[11]
However, the Counter Extremism Project assert that “despite having the freedoms to operate legally in most Western democracies, the Muslim Brotherhood nonetheless pursued a policy of obsessive secrecy” and has founded a “constellation of organisations” to “advance its cause rather than openly adopting a political platform.”[12]
It is important to note that, despite in theory having one leader, local branches have autonomy, and groups in the West may be part of the same broad movement, but are not part of the same overarching organisational structure.[13] As such, the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be considered one universal monolith, and broad assertions about the ideology or activities of the Brotherhood do not necessarily apply to all chapters or associated groups.
Despite this complexity, numerous countries in diverse areas of the globe have either banned the Muslim Brotherhood, proscribed it as a terrorist organisation, or taken other punitive measures against it.[14] Nationalist Arab rulers have most commonly been the ones to outlaw the Brotherhood, such as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Hafez al-Assad in Syria.[15] More recently, a ban was implemented in Jordan, despite the Islamic Action Front Party (a political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood) holding a significant presence in the Jordanian Parliament. The United States is not the only recent example of a country designating the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists. However, it is the only Western government to have implemented full designation of some branches.
A week before the Executive Order, an article by Michael Jacobson and Matthew Levitt from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy argued that taking action against the entire group would be ineffective, but the administration should target Brotherhood chapters that support Hamas and focus on national security threats presented by individual branches.[16] This largely reflects the approach announced by the government, which designates only certain branches. Others, such as professor Rohan Gunaratna, have supported designating the Brotherhood, arguing that its ideology creates “permissive conditions” promoting “exclusivism, extremism, violence and terrorism.”[17]
However, Marc Lynch, professor at George Washington University and director of the Project on Middle East Political Science, counters the idea that the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organisation, arguing that “naming it one will only bolster repression in the Middle East and the United States.” He explains that the evidence used to justify the executive order is “scant” and the designation undermines democracy in the Middle East.[18] In 2019, when designation of the Brotherhood was being discussed during Trump’s first term, Lynch and others affirmed that, whilst some affiliates are violent, there is no consensus that it is a terrorist organisation and the Brotherhood tends to position itself as a nonviolent alternative to Islamic militancy.[19] He further argued that designation would be a “major reward to key Arab autocratic allies” who see the Brotherhood as both a threat and electoral competition.[20]
When asked in what ways the Muslim Brotherhood is a threat to U.S national security, Nathan Brown, an expert on Middle East politics and professor at George Washington University, responded “none at all”.[21] This contradicts the language used in the executive order, which talks of safeguarding American security, thus strengthening claims that the move is more due to US interests in the Middle East and relations with Israel than direct threats to the U.S itself. Brown also comments that other allies of the US, such as the United Arab Emirates, would likely be pleased with the designation, whilst “for other governments where the brotherhood is tolerated, it would be a thorn in bilateral relations”, such as Turkey and Qatar.[22]
This can be seen in the response of the Egyptian government, which has welcomed the decision, with the Foreign Ministry stating “this is a significant step that reflects the extremist ideology of this group and the direct threat it represents for regional and international security and stability.”[23] It is significant to note that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood won the country’s only democratically held presidential election in 2012, before President Mohamed Morsi was overthrown a year later in a military coup.[24] Support for banning the Muslim Brotherhood, therefore, could be seen as linked to autocratic nationalist concerns and election competition in countries like Egypt.
The Muslim Brotherhood chapters affected by the designation have responded to deny the claims made by the US. Salah Abdel Haq, acting general guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, said the group “categorically rejects this designation and will pursue all legal avenues to challenge this decision, which harms millions of Muslims worldwide”. He denied “all allegations that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has directed, funded, provided material support for or engaged in terrorism” and argued that it is “unsupported by credible evidence and reflects external foreign pressure by the UAE and Israel rather than an objective assessment of US interests or facts on the ground.”[25]
Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood chapter in Lebanon, known as al-Jamaa al-Islamiya and represented in parliament, affirmed that the ruling has “no legal effect within Lebanon” and argued that the US designation “serves the interests of the Israeli occupation, which continues its aggressions against our country and people”.[26] Critically, Muslim Brotherhood-inspired organisations in the Middle East have been vocal critics of Israel’s war in Gaza within their countries and the US explicitly states ties to Hamas as the justification behind their designation as terrorists.[27]
Furthermore, Al Jazeera writes that “in the US and other countries in the West, right-wing activists have for years tried to demonise Muslim immigrant communities and Israel’s critics with accusations of links to the Muslim Brotherhood.” Significantly, after Donald Trump’s designation, governors in Texas and Florida moved to crack down on leading Muslim civil rights groups, including the Council on American-Islamic Relations, which denies any links to the Brotherhood and has sued them in response.[28]
These responses to the designation, therefore, imply that it could open the door to further crackdowns on Muslim groups in the US, providing a justification for this by linking other groups with the Muslim Brotherhood. Marc Lynch agrees, writing that
“Trump’s designation of the Brotherhood could establish a legal basis for scrutinizing these organizations’ funding, licensing, and membership. It could also become the basis for even more aggressive State Department screening of visa applicants as well as Immigration and Customs Enforcement harassment and deportations.”[29]
As such, Trump’s designation potentially poses a risk to human rights in the United States.
To better understand the political tension surrounding the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, it is useful to look at the example of Jordan. In April 2025, Jordan’s Minister of Interior, Abdellah Hilal al-Farrayeh, announced a total ban on the Muslim Brotherhood. He declared that promoting its “ideology” was now illegal and “any activity by the group, regardless of its nature, is considered a violation of the law”. Consequently, their offices and premises were to be shut down and assets confiscated.[30]
In the same month as the ban, Jordanian authorities arrested 16 members of the Muslim Brotherhood for allegedly plotting attacks on targets within Jordan involving rockets and drones.[31] Al-Farrayeh claimed that members of the Brotherhood “operate in the shadows and engage in activities that could undermine stability and security.”[32] The Brotherhood denied any links to the plot, saying that “the group had always pursued a peaceful political course and that Jordan’s branch of the Brotherhood had operated legally for decades.”[33]
Implementing bans on the Brotherhood in Jordan is particularly complicated since the group’s political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), holds a significant presence in the Jordanian Parliament. The IAF was not officially banned, but authorities carried out raids on their offices around the time of the ban, and it has since come under further scrutiny, despite its insistence that it is a separate entity from the Muslim Brotherhood with no organisational ties, including being told to drop the religious reference from the party’s name.[34]
In September 2024, Jordan held its first election using a system of proportional representation. The IAF won 31 out of 138 seats, tripling its representation, in large part due to its pro-Palestinian stance amid Israel’s war in Gaza, signifying “a Jordanian message of defiance to Israel.”[35] At the time, Jordan was attempting to “walk a political tightrope” by “maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel”.[36]
Strategiecs think tank argues that the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas “poses a security threat to Jordan” due to the Brotherhood’s “stance during the war and its mobilization rhetoric” which has “incited confrontations between its members and public security forces” and mobilised “protests and unrest on Jordanian streets.”[37]
However, some commentators cast doubt over whether a ban is the most effective course of action. Neil Quilliam from Chatham House stated in an article that the move to ban the Brotherhood in Jordan was “risky amid heightened tensions over Gaza and uncertain US policy.”[38] He argued that the Brotherhood in Jordan has generally worked within political institutions and without violence but the government has previously taken action to limit it during periods of high regional tension. Consequently, he stated, “the move seems carefully calibrated and intended to stem rising popular support for the movement as the kingdom navigates a difficult regional backdrop.”[39]
Furthermore, around the same time, Donald Trump was publicly discussing plans to “depopulate” Gaza by transferring its inhabitants to Jordan and Egypt, as well as questioning the scale of US aid provided to Jordan. This further illustrates the kingdom’s vulnerabilities and may help to explain why it moved to prevent the Brotherhood from exacerbating popular anger, which would cause further difficulties.[40]
Donald Trump’s own designation of the Brotherhood as terrorists could create further challenges for Jordan if one of its major parliamentary parties risks being subject to US security assessments. Jordan, which has generally been seen as a key regional partner by the US, has already been put at risk by Donald Trump’s presidency.[41]
In conclusion, it is clear that bans and designations of the Muslim Brotherhood are multifaceted. States that implement them tend to allege that it is solely for reasons of national security, but critics generally agree that there are more complex geopolitical motivations at play, particularly in relation to Israel’s war in Gaza and, in the Middle East, electoral competition from political wings of the Brotherhood making it a threat to autocratic governments.
There is a general consensus that the Muslim Brotherhood as a whole cannot be classified as a terrorist organisation, as many branches engage peacefully in the political process and eschew violence. However, there are established links between sections of the Brotherhood and terrorist activity and violent groups.
Overall, bans and designations are not necessarily the most effective way of monitoring the Brotherhood and preventing violence. In many cases, such as Jordan, the ban is seen by some as a threat to democracy in the region by limiting elected political parties with popular support, which may further heighten tensions. In regard to the US designation, critics assert that there is limited evidence that the Brotherhood poses a direct threat to US national security, instead suggesting that it is motivated by interests in the Middle East and relations with Israel.
[1] Max Matza, ‘Trump moves to sanction some Muslim Brotherhood chapters as terrorist groups’, BBC News (25 November 2025) >https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1w9j0jqj99o> accessed 29 March 2026.
[2] The White House, ‘Designation of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated foreign terrorists’, Executive Orders (24 November 2025) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/11/designation-of-certain-muslim-brotherhood-chapters-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/> 29 March 2026.
[3] The White House, ‘Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump begins process to designate certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated foreign terrorists’ (24 November 2025) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-begins-process-to-designate-certain-muslim-brotherhood-chapters-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/> accessed 29 March 2026.
[4] Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, ‘Terrorist Designations of Muslim Brotherhood Chapters’, U.S. Department of State (13 January 2026) >https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/terrorist-designations-of-muslim-brotherhood-chapters/> accessed 29 March 2026.
[5] Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, ‘Terrorist Designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood’ (6 March 2026) <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/terrorist-designation-of-the-sudanese-muslim-brotherhood/> accessed 31 March 2026.
[6] European Eye on Radicalisation, ‘The History and Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood: An Interview with Joas Wagemakers’ (6 July 2022) <https://eeradicalization.com/the-history-and-ideology-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-an-interview-with-joas-wagemakers/> accessed 29 March 2026.
[7] The Guardian, ‘What is the Muslim Brotherhood – explained in 30 seconds’ (25 November 2025) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/25/what-is-muslim-brotherhood-islamist-movement-explained> accessed 19 March 2026.
[8] European Eye on Radicalisation (n 6).
[9] Ranko, A., Jacobs, A. ‘Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and in the West: Organization, Strategy, and Ideology’, Ceylan, R., Kiefer, M. (eds) Der islamische Fundamentalismus im 21. Jahrhundert (2022) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37486-0_6> accessed 29 March 2026.
[10] Sam Mednick and Abby Sewell, ‘What to know about the Muslim Brotherhood after the US terrorist designation’, The Independent (13 January 2026) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/muslim-brotherhood-sunni-hamas-islamist-israel-b2899801.html> accessed 31 March 2026.
[11] European Eye on Radicalisation (n 6).
[12] Counter Extremism Project, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions’ (13 January 2025) <https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/muslim-brotherhood-britain-analysis-recent-sanctions> accessed 19 March 2026.
[13] European Eye on Radicalisation (n 6).
[14] ImArabic, ‘Global map of the confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood: bans, classifications, and diversified measures’ (25 November 2025) <https://en.imarabic.com/global-map-of-the-confrontation-with-the-muslim-brotherhood-bans-classifications-and-diversified-measures/> accessed 29 March 2026.
[15] Middle East Eye, ‘Trump moves to name some Muslim Brotherhood chapters terrorist organisations’ (24 November 2025) <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/trump-inches-closer-designating-muslim-brotherhood-foreign-terrorist-organisation> accessed 29 March 2026.
[16] Michael Jacobson and Matthew Levitt, ‘A More Effective Approach to Countering the Muslim Brotherhood’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (18 November 2025) <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/more-effective-approach-countering-muslim-brotherhood> accessed 30 March 2026.
[17] Professor Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Designating the Muslim Brotherhood: A Game Changer in The Fight Against Terrorism?”, Eurasia Review (19 March 2026) <https://www.eurasiareview.com/19032026-designating-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-game-changer-in-the-fight-against-terrorism-analysis/> accessed 31 March 2026.
[18] Marc Lynch, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Still isn’t a Terrorist Organisation’, Foreign Policy (10 December 2025) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/10/trump-muslim-brotherhood-israel-egypt-saudi-arabia-palestine-democracy/> accessed 31 March 2026.
[19] Marc Lynch, ‘Attempts to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization have failed before. Why is it returning now?’, The Washington Post (1 May 2019) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/01/designating-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-organization-has-failed-before-why-is-it-returning-now/> accessed 31 March 2026.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Middle East Eye (n 15).
[22] Fatima Hussein and Matthew Lee, ‘Trump administration labels 3 Muslim Brotherhood branches as terrorist organisations’, AP News (13 January 2026) <https://apnews.com/article/muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-organizations-trump-sanctions-d862fcc5b04558f9af8d648dd4e9a0d1> accessed 30 March 2026.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ali Harb, ‘US labels Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan as terrorists’, Al Jazeera (13 January 2026) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/13/us-labels-muslim-brotherhood-orgs-in-egypt-lebanon-jordan-as-terrorist> accessed 30 March 2026.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Marc Lynch (n 18).
[30] Mohammed Ersam, ‘Jordan bans Muslim Brotherhood and its ideology’, Middle East Eye (23 April 2025) <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-bans-muslim-brotherhood-and-its-ideology> accessed 31 March 2026.
[31] Suleiman Al-Khalidi, ‘Jordan says it has foiled attacks by Muslim Brotherhood’, Reuters (15 April 2025) <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-plot-involving-rockets-drones-source-says-suspects-linked-hamas-2025-04-15/> accessed 31 March 2026.
[32] David Gritten, ‘Jordan bans Muslim Brotherhood after arrests over attack plots’, BBC News (24 April 2025) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn4w8prpkepo> accessed 31 March 2026.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Middle East Eye, ‘Jordan’s Islamic Action Front told to drop religious reference from party name’ (26 February 2026) <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-orders-islamic-action-front-party-remove-religious-references-name> accessed 31 March 2026.
[35] Mohammed Ayesh, ‘How Jordan’s elections sent a message of defiance to Israel’, Middle East Eye (12 September 2024) <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/how-jordans-elections-sent-message-defiance-israel> accessed 31 March 2026.
[36] Al Jazeera, ‘Jordan’s Islamist opposition party tops parliamentary elections’ (11 September 2024) <https://ww.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/11/jordans-islamist-opposition-party-tops-parliamentary-elections> accessed 31 March 2026.
[37] Hazem Salem Dmour and Abdulmalik Amer, ‘The Decision to Ban the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: the Hand of the Law Against Transnational Ideologies’, Strategics Think Tank (28 April 2025) <https://strategiecs.com/en/analyses/the-decision-to-ban-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-jordan-the-hand-of-the-law-against-transnational-ideologies> accessed 31 March 2026.
[38] Dr Neil Quilliam, ‘Jordan’s ban on the Muslim Brotherhood is no surprise but comes against a dangerous backdrop’, Chatham House (2 May 2025) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/jordans-ban-muslim-brotherhood-no-surprise-comes-against-dangerous-backdrop> accessed 31 March 2026.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Dr Neil Quilliam, ‘The return of Donald Trump is bad news for Jordan’, Chatham House (21 November 2024) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/11/return-donald-trump-bad-news-jordan> accessed 31 March 2026; Rayhan Uddin, ‘Why Trump’s plans are an existential threat for Jordan’, Middle East Eye (13 February 2025) <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/why-trump-plans-existential-threat-jordan> accessed 31 March 2026.
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