© REUTERS/Manu Brabo via Reuters
Beginning in 2019, a severe inflation crisis devastated the Lebanese economy. In that year alone, the Lebanese pound lost 98% of its value, its GDP contracted by 6.7%, and its once lauded banking system was rendered insolvent.[1] The ‘Switzerland of the East’ suddenly saw a third of its population pushed into poverty just before the Covid pandemic shut down its vital tourism industry and a tragic port explosion in Beirut killed 200, injured 6500, and displaced 300,000 people.[2] The result: inflation further skyrocketed, averaging around 175% each year from 2020 to 2023, and an estimated GDP per capita loss of 40%.[3] The political fallout from this economic event has yet to be fully reconciled.
As the economic haemorrhaging finally began to slow, Israel’s response to the 7 October 2023 attack introduced a series of bombings, cross-border incursions and occupation of strategic points in Southern Lebanon, disrupting commerce, agriculture, killing and wounding thousands and displacing an estimated 1 million people (and sharply rising).[4] In late February 2026, the American “Operation Epic Fury” began against Iran, just one month after the World Bank had approved a long-negotiated loan of $350 million to Lebanon.[5]
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shia militia in Lebanon, has escalated further in recent months, with fighting concentrated in the southern parts of Lebanon. The Lebanese Ministry of Public Health reports that Israel’s “Operation Northern Arrows” killed 3,042 people and wounded 9,301 between 2 March and 19 May 2026.[6] Much of this time was marked by a stated ceasefire between the United States and Iran, but this ceasefire did not seem to have any effect on the fighting in Lebanon, despite a separate ceasefire agreement between the Israeli and Lebanese governments on 16 April 2026.[7]
This is because Hezbollah operates as a non-state actor and, in addition to the protection of its own interests, works as a proxy force for Iran. They are not necessarily beholden to any agreement that may be made in Pakistan concerning the United States and Iran, nor between Israel and Lebanon. They may respond to pressure from their Iranian backers, but it is not clear they would simply lay down their arms if a U.S-Iran peace is successfully negotiated, so long as Israel continues to occupy parts of Lebanon. They are likely to continue fighting so long as their resources permit or until a specific ceasefire agreement is reached between them and Israel.
Over the last few months, the food security situation in Lebanon has degraded significantly.
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) estimates that at least 22% of the Lebanese population (1.1 million people) is currently experiencing acute malnutrition, while a further 2% (100,000 people), concentrated in the south of the country, employ unsustainable emergency strategies such as asset liquidation to cover food consumption gaps.[8] These numbers appear highly likely to worsen if Israel expands operations in Southern Lebanon to the extent they have stated publicly, despite concern expressed by the U.S.[9] Any Israeli strikes being carried out in the capital city of Beirut would surely pile more misery onto the already beleaguered Lebanese population, as Deutsche Welle reports that over 227,000 have already fled across the border into Syria.[10]
Figure 1: A regional snapshot of food security in the Levant. (by Kristian Weber)
These compounding factors, coupled with Lebanon’s reliance on agricultural imports for around 80% of its total supply, render it essentially helpless to begin to solve this crisis on its own.[11] The IPC already estimates that at least 25% of the Lebanese population meets 25-50% of their caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance, a number that continues to climb so long as the conflict continues.[12] Without continued and potentially increased international food aid, Lebanon may soon face emergency food security conditions like those seen in Gaza, with the prospect of famine not yet of utmost concern, but still looming in the distance.
In the southern regions of Lebanon, where the majority of the fighting and bombing has taken place, the agricultural sector has suffered a devastating blow that will take years to recover from. An estimated 78% of farmers in the regions are counted among the displaced, as well as an estimated 1.9 million livestock killed.[13] The Lebanese Agricultural Ministry reported in May 2026 that about 23% of the country’s agricultural land has been severely affected by the conflict.[14] Citrus production was particularly hit, seeing an estimated drop of 70%, as well as reduced production of bananas, tobacco, olives and olive products like olive oil.[15] These crops are not feasibly replaceable in the market and cannot be grown in other regions of the country, representing long-term damage to the Lebanese agricultural sector. This is not to mention the fields that will go unplanted this year, nor the increase in the cost of agricultural inputs due to the rise in the cost of natural gas, a key component in fertiliser production.
The longer the conflict continues, the more damage there will be to Lebanon’s already limited ability to produce enough food to meet the demands of its population. Any long-term food security strategy in Lebanon must be predicated on a sustainable and lasting peace between Israel and Hezbollah. With domestic agricultural production only accounting for 20% of the food needs of the country, Lebanon will need to increasingly rely on food imports while paying a premium due to its severely weakened currency. The road ahead appears to be rough for Lebanon, but with strong international cooperation in regard to humanitarian assistance in the short term to address the current crisis, and long-term support for the agricultural sector, some of the harsher consequences of the conflict may be mitigated or altogether avoided.
[1] World Bank, ‘Lebanon’ https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/lebanon#tab-about accessed 10 June 2026; World Bank, ‘Lebanon Sinking into One of the Most Severe Global Crises Episodes, amidst Deliberate Inaction’ (1 June 2021) https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/01/lebanon-sinking-into-one-of-the-most-severe-global-crises-episodes accessed 10 June 2026.
[2] Ruth Michaelson, ‘Port of Beirut Explosion Aftermath Leaves Scars on Already Broken Lebanon’ The Guardian (3 August 2023) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/03/port-of-beirut-explosion-aftermath-scars-on-already-broken-lebanon accessed 10 June 2026.
[3] Trading Economics, ‘Lebanon Inflation Rate’ https://tradingeconomics.com/lebanon/inflation-cpi accessed 10 June 2026; World Bank (n 1)
[4] International Rescue Committee, ‘Lebanon Crisis: What Is Happening and How to Help’ https://www.rescue.org/article/lebanon-crisis-what-happening-and-how-help accessed 10 June 2026.
[5] World Bank, ‘Lebanon: World Bank Approves US$350 Million Financing for Social Protection, Economic Empowerment and Digital Transformation’ (27 January 2026) https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/01/27/lebanon-world-bank-approves-us-350-million-financing-for-social-protection-economic-empowerment-and-digital-transformati accessed 10 June 2026.
[6] Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, ‘Updated Total Toll of the Aggression: 3042 Martyrs and 9301 Wounded’ https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Media/view/84776/1/updated-total-toll-of-the-aggression-3042-martyrs-and-9301-wounded accessed 10 June 2026.
[7] US Department of State, ‘Ten-Day Cessation of Hostilities to Enable Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon’ (April 2026) https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/ten-day-cessation-of-hostilities-to-enable-peace-negotiations-between-israel-and-lebanon accessed 10 June 2026.
[8] Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), ‘Lebanon: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis’ https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1163301/?iso3=LBN accessed 10 June 2026.
[9] New York Times, ‘Israel–Lebanon Ground Invasion’ (31 March 2026) https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/31/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon-ground-invasion.html accessed 10 June 2026; Barak Ravid, ‘Trump and Netanyahu Discuss Israel-Lebanon Conflict’ Axios (1 June 2026) https://www.axios.com/2026/06/01/trump-netanyahu-israel-lebanon-call accessed 10 June 2026.
[10] Deutsche Welle, ‘Displaced by Iran War: Out of Lebanon into Syrian Crisis’ https://www.dw.com/en/displaced-by-iran-war-out-of-lebanon-into-syrian-crisis/a-76822402 accessed 10 June 2026.
[11] International Trade Administration, ‘Lebanon Agricultural Sector’ https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/lebanon-agricultural-sector accessed 10 June 2026.
[12] Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), ‘Lebanon: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis’ https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1163301/?iso3=LBN accessed 10 June 2026.
[13] Anera, ‘How War Is Devastating Lebanon’s Agricultural Sector’ https://www.anera.org/blog/how-war-is-devastating-lebanons-agricultural-sector/ accessed 10 June 2026; L’Orient-Le Jour, ‘Over 56,000 Farmland Hectares Affected by Israeli Attacks in South Lebanon, Agriculture Ministry Begins Emergency Response’ https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1506159/over-56000-farmland-hectares-affected-by-israeli-attacks-in-south-lebanon-agriculture-ministry-begins-emergency-response-.html accessed 10 June 2026.
[14] L’Orient-Le Jour, ‘Over 56,000 Farmland Hectares Affected by Israeli Attacks in South Lebanon, Agriculture Ministry Begins Emergency Response’ https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1506159/over-56000-farmland-hectares-affected-by-israeli-attacks-in-south-lebanon-agriculture-ministry-begins-emergency-response-.html accessed 10 June 2026.
[15] Anera (n 13).
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