Platform for Peace and Humanity

The Digital Iron Curtain: Internet Censorship and Cyber Surveillance in Turkmenistan’s Authoritarian Landscape

The Peace and Security Monitor

Key Takeways

• Digital technologies in Turkmenistan are weaponized by the Turkmenistani authorities as tools to monitor, censor, and punish dissent in the society, thereby significantly limiting access to information.

• The Turkmenistani government monopolizes internet services, with low access rates and high costs that severely undermine citizens’ usage of digital platforms.

• While Turkmenistani law protects the freedom of expression, in practice, the government suppresses dissent and severely limits civic engagement. Cases like the illegal arrest of journalist Nurgeldi Halykov illustrate the risks faced by Turkmenistani citizens attempting to express critical views against the government.

• Digital repression and cyber surveillance in Turkmenistan severely impact human security and human rights by fostering a climate of fear and misinformation among citizens, shrinking civic spaces and undermining social trust.

Introduction

In authoritarian regimes, digital platforms are both lifelines and liabilities. In Turkmenistan, one of the most repressive and isolated states globally, online expression has become a perilous act. In late 2023, a 26-year-old man from the Mary Region, located in the south-east of Turkmenistan, was reportedly detained after posting a critical comment about food shortages in a private Telegram group.1 While this arrest did not make international headlines, nor was the man charged under any transparent legal processes, this case represents only one among numerous instances of politically motivated arrests that regularly occur in Turkmenistan’s tightly controlled digital space. Accordingly, through the opaque mechanisms of digital surveillance and censorship, the country’s government systematically monitors its citizens, suppressing dissent, even in private or encrypted communications.2

This article investigates how the Turkmen government employs digital technologies as instruments of repression, transforming tools designed to connect and inform into powerful levers of social control and repression. Accordingly, it asks a crucial question: How do Turkmenistani authorities rely on internet censorship and cyber-surveillance to restrict freedom of expression and undermine human security?

Despite numerous international calls for reform from United Nations (UN) bodies and international human rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Turkmenistan remains largely impermeable to external pressure due to its geopolitical insulation, strategic neutrality, and significant possession of natural resources that allow the regime to avoid conditional aid and bilateral pressure.3 This lack of accountability heightens the urgency of research and sustained documentation of human rights violations and repressive practices within the country’s digital sphere. Accordingly, while traditional media has long been censored in the country, the intensification of digital restrictions and state-sponsored surveillance technologies 4 highlights a new phase of tech-enabled authoritarian repression, one that operates quietly, effectively, and in many cases, invisibly.

For these reasons, unveiling the mechanisms behind digital authoritarianism in Turkmenistan is essential to comprehensively understand the evolving nature of human security and human rights violations in contemporary repressive regimes in Central Asia. Accordingly, while the post-Soviet Central Asian region has long struggled with limited political freedoms, weak civil societies, and restricted press landscapes, Turkmenistan presents today an extreme manifestation of authoritarian consolidation: a single-party state with no free press, no viable opposition, and one of the lowest rates of internet freedom in the world.5 Moreover, as the state slowly expands internet access and new digital infrastructures, these new technologies are co-opted to surveil, punish, and isolate citizens, rather than empower them. Eventually, by addressing this pressing issue, this article contributes to the broader global discourse on the erosion of internet freedom, the freedom of expression, and the rise of digital authoritarians as an increasingly emerging governance model.

This piece begins by providing an overview of Turkmenistan’s authoritarian media landscape and the government’s approach to information control. It then explores the country’s internet infrastructure, followed by a detailed analysis focusing on the state’s censorship techniques and surveillance practices. Finally, by analyzing the imprisonment of journalist Nurgeldi Halykov, this report illustrates the consequences of digital dissent on human security and human rights. The conclusion summarises the key arguments and provides recommendations for international actors and human rights organizations.

Contextual Background: Turkmenistan’s Authoritarian Media Landscape

Since gaining independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkmenistan has developed into one of the most authoritarian regimes in the world, characterised by intense and pervasive state control, the absence of political pluralism, and systematic suppression of dissent.6 The country’s first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, established a cult of personality and a highly centralised political system, eliminating opposition parties, restricting civil society, and exerting control over all branches of government. His successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, who came to power in 2006, and later his son, Serdar Berdymukhamedov, have perpetuated and expanded this autocratic legacy, further entrenching autocratic rule through constitutional amendments, rigged elections, and relentless censorship.7

Nowadays, Turkmenistan exemplifies a deeply entrenched authoritarian media system, where the Turkmenistani government exercises absolute control over the media landscape, in both traditional and digital information channels and platforms. Accordingly, all television channels, radio stations, and newspapers are state-owned or tightly regulated under strict government oversight.8 Conventional and digital content is meticulously curated and used as a tool for disseminating state propaganda, suppressing dissent, and projecting a positive image of the nation and its leadership, with any form of criticism being strictly prohibited, thereby contributing to the country’s extreme information isolation.9

Photograph of young Turkmenistani men and women working in a computer lab (Turkmenportal.com 26 April 2024),
accessed 8 June 2025.

Within this tightly controlled media scheme, Turkmenistani journalists operate under severe restrictions, and independent media are virtually non-existent within the country’s borders. Those individuals who deviate from the official governmental narrative face severe repercussions, including harassment, imprisonment, and even torture.10 For this reason, the few independent journalists residing in Turkmenistan work undercover, as they risk prosecution and put their families under heavy control and pressure by government officials. Foreign reporters are rarely granted access to the country, and those permitted entry are faced with tight monitoring and limited movement.

Despite the existence of a 2013 law that formally prohibits censorship,11 in practice, this legal provision remains purely symbolic. Accordingly, all publications require government authorization before dissemination, no transparency exists concerning the list of prohibited or banned websites or content, and new media outlets are regularly blocked without any official explanation.

Information Monopoly and Control: The Internet Infrastructure and Digital Access in Turkmenistan

In the digital realm, the Turkmenistani government has established one of the most restrictive and state-controlled internet regimes globally.12 While the government nominally promoted digital development and connectivity, these efforts are part of the country’s deliberate mechanisms of social and political control. Accordingly, internet access is severely limited, with less than 30% of the population having access to it, with even lower penetration rates in rural areas such as in the Mary and Lebap regions.13 In those cases where internet is available, its access is deliberately expensive and slow as it is constrained by extensive official censorship and surveillance. Accordingly, the state-owned provider, Turkmentelecom, holds a monopoly over internet services, controlling all fixed broadband and mobile data networks, thereby enabling the government to monitor and control online activity comprehensively.14

Moreover, the government deliberately restricts independent internet service providers to effectively limit internet usage among the Turkmenistani population and monitor internet traffic through packet inspection techniques to filter content and identify users attempting to access prohibited information. Through these repressive strategies, official authorities are able to successfully limit and block access to numerous websites, including social media platforms such as YouTube, WhatsApp, and Signal, as well as independent news outlets, and even tools designed to circumvent censorship, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).15 Beyond infrastructural limitations, digital exclusion is also reinforced through pricing policies. In a country where the average monthly salary is roughly $250, monthly broadband packages can cost between $50 and $70, putting internet access beyond the reach of many households.16 This economic barrier is further compounded by the government’s control over hardware distribution. Accordingly, the market availability of devices capable of circumventing censorship, such as smartphones with pre-installed VPNs or Tor browsers, are rarely available in the domestic market, and importing them is increasingly difficult under tightening customs regulations.17

Photograph of a Turkmenistani woman in a café in Ashgabat using a computer (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 5 August 2023), accessed 3 June 2025.

In 2019, the establishment of the State Cybersecurity Service under the Turkmenaragatnashyk Agency marked a significant shift in the government’s ability to enforce digital censorship. Tasked with safeguarding the nation’s “cyber-sovereignty,” the Agency operates with little transparency or public accountability.18 Accordingly, it has entered into agreements and frameworks with foreign cybersecurity services to improve its surveillance capabilities, further enhancing the government’s control over digital information flows.

This environment of scarcity and surveillance has created a digital caste system in Turkmenistan, where only the political elite and their trusted associates enjoy uncensored and stable internet access. Ordinary citizens are forced into patterns of self-censorship or technological resignation, further isolating them from global information flows and civil society networks.19 Meanwhile, digital scarcity becomes a tool of coercion: by denying internet access or threatening its removal, the government leverages control over information as a form of punishment and reward.

Digital Dissent and Freedom of Expression: What are the Broader Human Security and Human Rights Implications in Turkmenistan?

At the normative level, Turkmenistan is bound by an extensive body of international law protecting the right to freedom of expression. Notably, in 1977, Turkmenistan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which, under Article 19(2), provides that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression,” including the right “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”20 This provision entails both negative obligations to refrain from interference and positive duties to protect and facilitate this right through concrete legislative and institutional measures. Further legal provisions derive from Turkmenistan’s ratification of other core human rights instruments, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.21

Turkmenistan’s domestic legal framework theoretically reflects these commitments. Article 42 of the Constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, and the 2013 Media Law purports to prohibit censorship and state interference in media activities.22 Additionally, the government has established various bodies such as the Interagency Commission on Enforcing Turkmenistan’s International Human Rights Obligations (1996), the Parliamentary Committee on the Protection of Human Rights and Liberties (2005), and the Institute of State, Law and Democracy (2018) to institutionalize and oversee human rights protections.23 In practice, however, these instruments and mechanisms offer little more than symbolic compliance.

Accordingly, while formal legal guarantees may be enshrined on paper, empirical conditions reveal a vastly different reality. In a highly repressive and information-controlled government such as Turkmenistan, where the state de facto holds the monopoly of information flows and systematically limits its citizens’ freedom of expression, the internet becomes one of the few spaces for civic discussions, participation, and dissent.24 Yet, the use of digital platforms and channels is fraught with risk. Within this framework, the detention and imprisonment of freelance journalist Nurgeldi Halykov embodies the human rights and human security implications faced by Turkmenistani citizens who seek to circumvent government-imposed information controls and exercise their right to free expression.

In July 2020, Nurgeldi Halykov was arrested by Turkmenistani authorities after exposing the unreliability of COVID-19 statistics and data delivered by the Turkmenistani government.25 While the charges against Halykov appeared administrative on their face, the underlying motive was unmistakably political and had one aim: to suppress the dissemination of unauthorized information and deter similar acts of digital dissent. Although in a second stage of prosecution, this arrest was revealed to be an act framed by authorities through fabricated criminal charges unrelated to Halykov’s digital activity, the journalist was convicted without a fair trial or any meaningful due legal process.26 This results in what scholars have described as “abusive legalism”,27 referring to the use of the law and legal mechanisms not to uphold human rights and promote accountability and justice, but rather to suppress them.

Photograph of Nurgeldi Halykov (Turkmen.news, 14 December 2020), accessed 3 June 2025.

The implications of Nurgeldi Halykov’s politically motivated arrest and conviction had a broader scope, which extends beyond the immediate breach of an individual’s freedom of expression and right to due process.28 Accordingly, Halykov’s imprisonment sent a clear message to every Turkmenistani man and woman, to activists, and independent journalists alike: the digital realm is not a haven for dissent.Consequently by denying access to pluralistic information, the Turkmenistani government fully undermines civic engagement.

As a result, this entrenched form of digital authoritarianism severely restricts civil space and constraints human security. Accordingly, by denying access to pluralistic and independent information, the Turkmen state obstructs individuals’ capacity to make informed decisions and develop critical thinking and civic awareness. Moreover, this climate of misinformation and fear discourages public discourse and erodes social trust and cohesion.29 This dynamic is specifically amplified during periods of public emergency, such as economic crises or health epidemics, where access to reliable and timely information could represent a matter of survival for many Turkmenistani citizens who live in vulnerable conditions.30 Accordingly, the ultimate consequence of digital authoritarianism is not merely the erosion of the freedom of expression and civil liberties, but the reproduction of authoritarian control that reinforces social stratification and a sense of powerlessness among the population.

In conclusion, while the Turkmen government remains formally committed to legal provisions and International Human Rights Law standards, their lack of implementation highlights a profound and systemic disjuncture between law and practice. Accordingly, those same state institutions established to safeguard human rights and enhance human security function less as independent bodies and more as legitimizing tools for authoritarian governance. Nurgeldi Halykov’s case thus crystallizes this broader dynamic: despite existing legal protections, acts of digital dissent are criminalized as existential threats to regime stability.

Conclusion

The digital realm in Turkmenistan reflects the entrenchment of a new form of authoritarian control, one that is silent, systemic, and technologically sophisticated. While in many countries, the advancement of technology and the access to internet platforms and channels represents a step toward democratic participation, civic empowerment, and informed publics, in Turkmenistan, those same digital tools and infrastructures have been weaponised by the state into an instrument of coercion, punishment, and fear. Turkmenistani citizens, human rights defenders, and journalists like Nurgeldi Halykov, who attempt to exercise their basic right to freedom of expression, are met with swift and severe retribution, often through arbitrary detention, surveillance, torture, or politically motivated trials.

This report has illustrated how Turkmenistan’s government uses digital censorship, infrastructure control, and cyber-surveillance to maintain an information monopoly and repress civic dissent, thereby stifling democratic discourse and undermining any form of organized opposition or accountability. These practices are not isolated anomalies, but they represent a deliberate digital strategy of authoritarian entrenchment designed to silence pluralism and engineer compliance.

As authoritarian regimes increasingly adapt to the digital age, defending the freedom to speak, connect, and access information online must be understood as an essential pillar of both human rights protection and human security promotion in the 21st century. In Turkmenistan, silence is not merely imposed, but it is infrastructurally engineered. Dismantling that architecture begins with exposing it.

Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations aim to disrupt the mechanisms of digital repression, empower civil society actors, and uphold Turkmenistani citizens’ basic human rights.

Recommendations for the Government of Turkmenistan:

• Uphold the right to freedom of expression and access to information by guaranteeing uncensored access to internet platforms and other means of digital and independent media in line with international human rights treaties ratified by Turkmenistan;

• Cease state-sponsored surveillance and censorship by immediately dismantling unlawful digital surveillance programs and content blocking practices and adopting transparent frameworks for any national security-related monitoring;

• Protect digital and press freedom activists from harassment by immediately ending intimidation, arrests, and arbitrary detentions of journalists and digital rights defenders; and

• Promote digital literacy and internet accessibility to the entirety of the Turkmenistani population by investing in the development of digital infrastructures to ensure equitable internet access, especially in rural and marginalized areas of the country.

Recommendations for International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs):

• Establish an international coalition against digital authoritarianism by building a multi stakeholder platform to coordinate efforts, share intelligence, and amplify advocacy on digital repression;

• Impose targeted sanctions on enablers of repression by enacting and enforcing export controls and sanctions on firms and intermediaries supplying surveillance or censorship tech to authoritarian regimes;

• Enhance digital security training for vulnerable communities by developing localized, language-accessible training programs on digital hygiene and secure communication for Turkmenistani journalists, activists, and diaspora members; and

• Engage regional actors as pressure multipliers by working with regional powers and institutions (e.g., the OSCE, OIC, Central Asian states) to diplomatically pressure Turkmenistan to meet its digital rights obligations.

Endnotes

1 Freedom House (2023). Freedom in the World 2023: Turkmenistan. Freedom House. https:// freedomhouse.org/country/turkmenistan/ freedom-world/2023?utm_source=chatgpt.com

2 Human Rights Watch (2025). World report 2025 – Turkmenistan: Events of 2024. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country chapters/turkmenistan

3 Human Rights Watch (2024). World report 2024 – Turkmenistan: Events of 2023. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country chapters/turkmenistan

4 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Turkmenistan.

5 Reporters Without Borders (2024). World Press Freedom Index 2024: Turkmenistan. Reporters Without Borders. https://rsf.org/en/country/ turkmenistan

6 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Turkmenistan.

7 Committee to Protect Jounralists (2019). 10 Most Censored Countries. Committee to Protect Journalists. https://cpj.org/reports/2019/09/10- most-censored-eritrea-north-korea turkmenistan-journalist/

8 Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2024: Turkmenistan.

9 Amnesty International (2025). Turkmenistan 2024. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/ en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern europe-and-central-asia/turkmenistan/report turkmenistan/

10 Reporters Without Borders (2022). Turkmenistan, a Country that is Persecuting its Last Journalists to Death. Reporters Without Borders. https://rsf.org/ en/turkmenistan-country-persecuting-its-last journalists-death

11 Freedom House (2015). Freedom of the Press 2015 – Turkmenistan. Freedom House. https://www. refworld.org/reference/annualreport/freehou/2015/ en/107167

12 Amnesty International, Turkmenistan 2024.

13 The Diplomat (2023). How and Why Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Shut Down the Internet. The Diplomat. https://magazine.thediplomat.com/2023-04/how and-why-kazakhstan-and-turkmenistan-shut down-the-internet

14 Meduza (2023). Turkmenistan’s Walled Garden: How Central Asia’s Most Autocratic Country Plans to Build its own ‘Autonomous Internet’”. Meduza. https:// meduza.io/en/feature/2023/03/10/turkmenistan-s walled-garden

15 Committee to Protect Jounralists (2019). 10 Most Censored Countries.

16 Meduza, Turkmenistan’s Walled Garden: How Central Asia’s Most Autocratic Country Plans to Build its own ‘Autonomous Internet’”.

17 Ibid.

18 The Diplomat, How and Why Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Shut Down the Internet.

19 Ibid.

20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976 993 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), Art. 19(2).

21 United Nations. (1965). International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments mechanisms/instruments/international convention-elimination-all-forms-racial; United Nations. (1989). Convention on the Rights of the Child. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child; United Nations. (2006). Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. . https://www.un.org/ development/desa/disabilities/convention-on the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html

22 Institute of State, Law and Democracy of Turkmenistan. (n.d.). About the Institute. https:// instsld.gov.tm/en/about

23 Inter-Parliamentary Union. (n.d.). Committee on Protection of Human Rights and Liberties – Turkmenistan. https://data.ipu.org/parliament/TM/ specialized-bodies/TM-LC-SB04/

24 Freedom House (2023). Freedom on the Net 2023: Turkmenistan. Freedom House. https:// freedomhouse.org/country/turkmenistan/ freedom-net/2023

25 Committee to Protect Journalists (2022). Turkmenistan Journalist Nurgeldi Halykov Facing Retaliation in Prison Following Coverage of His Case. Committee to Protect Journalists. https://

cpj.org/2022/05/turkmenistan-journalist-nurgeldi halykov-facing-retaliation-in-prison-following coverage-of-his-case/

26 Ibid.

27 Scheppele, K. L. (2018). Autocratic legalism. The University of Chicago Law Review, 85(2), 545– 583. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=6085&context=uclrev

28 Committee to Protect Journalists (2025). Journalist Nurgeldi Halykov Barred from Leaving Turkmenistan. Committee to Protect Journalists. https://cpj. org/2025/01/journalist-nurgeldi-halykov-barred from-leaving-turkmenistan/

29 Amnesty International, Turkmenistan 2024. 30 Ibid.