Violence Against Civilians Escalates Amid Insurgency in Southern Thailand

The protracted insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South has emerged as one of Southeast Asia’s longest-running internal conflicts. This conflict pits the Thai state against a range of insurgent groups most notably the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) seeking political recognition, cultural autonomy, and justice for historical grievances. This struggle has resulted in over 7,000 deaths since 2004.¹ The ongoing violence affects not only national security but also the safety, livelihoods, and well-being of civilians. The conflict continues to challenge Thailand’s internal stability and raises pressing questions about national integration, minority rights, and the role of the international community in supporting peace.

Historical Background

The modern day Thai Southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and certain parts of the Songkhla province and areas of Northern Malaysia, originally were a part of the Pattani sultanate till the 19^th century.² In 1902, Pattani was formally subjugated by Siam³ and the Anglo-Siamese Treaty between Great Britain and Siam in 1909 cemented the borders and the Pattani came under the direct rule of Bangkok.⁴ Subsequently, Siamese authorities initiated a process aimed at national unity through cultural assimilation along coercive Buddhist values, Thai language and Thai monarchy.⁵

This process included various measures such as displacing the political role played by the local aristocracy and marginalising the pondoks (Muslim religious schools). The 1921 Compulsory Primary Education Act, made it compulsory for all children to attend state primary school for four years and to learn the Thai Language.⁶ When Prime Minister Pibulsonggram came into power in 1938, the name of the country was changed from ‘Siam’ to ‘Thailand’, meaning ‘nation of Thais’.⁷ Minority languages including the Malay language used in Pattani were banned in public offices.⁸ Malay or Arabic surnames and Malay ethnic attire were also forbidden in public places.⁹ There was widespread dissatisfaction with the government during the early years of the 20th century which erupted in violence after the end of the Second World War.¹⁰ The disappearance of Haji Sulong, who led a campaign against the assimilation policies of the government in 1954 was a turning point in the conflict.¹¹ In the 1960s and 1970s, several rebel organisations emerged including the BRN.¹² While different governments in power had varying approaches to the issue, ranging from hardline security crackdowns to attempts at negotiation and development, none have been successful in resolving the conflict so far.

Eruption of Violence from 2004

In 2004, the conflict escalated into a more violent phase, with major incidents such as the Tak Bai massacre and Krue Se Mosque siege. In April 2004, insurgents attacked 11 police offices in Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala.13 After which, 32 insurgents took refuge in the historic Krue-Se mosque. Security forces surrounded the mosque and killed the insurgents.14 The tactics used by the forces were questioned and condemned by local and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).¹⁵

In October the same year, the infamous “Tak Bai incident” took place. Due to the detaining of six men alleged to have provided insurgents with weapons, there was a mass protest against this detention in front of the Tak Bai police station.¹⁶ The security forces opened fire against the protestors causing seven deaths and more than 1,000 protestors were piled into trucks and brought to an army camp about 150 km away.¹⁷ During the journey, 78 died from asphyxiation as a result of being smothered by the bodies of other detainees.¹⁸ There was a domestic and international outcry condemning the act of the government.

These incidents marked the resumption of violence in Southern Thailand, leading to the Thai government’s heavy-handed military response to the conflict and damaging the prospect of peace that had been gained through several years of negotiations between the government and insurgent groups.¹⁹

Current Context

In the current context, the conflict has become increasingly violent. The recent killing of a 16-year-old novice monk and injuring of a 12-year-old monk form part of a trend whereby attacks are carried out on the Buddhist clergy by the BRN.²⁰ These attacks are not only directed at the religion itself but also towards the State, as Buddhist temples symbolize Thai state authority in territories that separatists consider rightfully belonging to ethnic Malay Muslims.²¹ It is also symbolic of religious hatred and reflective of the ethnic disharmony in the southern provinces of Thailand, fueled by decades of cultural suppression. The brutality of some of the attacks has caused great fear among the clergy forcing them to leave their respective temples in the South.²² Initially, the conflict was rooted in ethnic and national tension but such attacks on the clergy have added a religious dimension to the conflict as well.²³ Reportedly, it will take time to undo the aggrievance of the Buddhist community towards the Muslim community in Southern Thailand.²⁴ Further, such attacks are aiming to drive away local Thai Buddhist civilians. In addition to the targeting of Buddhist monks, other targets include military and government officials and facilities, commercial locations, state schools and teachers, Buddhist civilians, amongst whom some suspected of being informers, medical personnel and public health centres, and Malay Muslims in support of Thai authorities.²⁵

Violations of International Law 

There are records of major human rights violations being committed by insurgents as well as Thai authorities. State sanctioned incidents such as the Tak Bai massacre was a cause for many human rights violations with protestors being shot at, shackled, and transported in inhumane conditions by security forces.²⁶ Over the years, Human Rights Watch has recorded numerous cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, “disappearances,” and extrajudicial killings by Thai authorities.²⁷ However, there has been impunity towards security forces and no accountability towards Malay civilians.²⁸ This impunity has fueled Malayan civilians’ distrust of the government and their conviction that justice will not be served. There have been instances where insurgents have acted in retaliation to the actions of the government and their conviction that justice will not be served. There have been instances where insurgents have acted in retaliation to the actions of the government. For instance, next to the body of a killed Thai farmer, insurgents had left a note saying “You killed our innocent people. I will kill your innocent people” capturing the cyclic nature of the violence in the region.²⁹

Insurgent groups have also committed major human rights violations, not just towards Thai Buddhist civilians but also towards Muslim Malay individuals who have been accused of supporting Thai authorities.³⁰ In addition to the use of explosives to destroy buildings and attack Buddhist civilians, insurgents have used weapons such as machetis to brutally kill people. They have deliberately targeted civilians and public institutions as symbols of the Thai State.³¹ Children have also become victims of these attacks. Attacking civilians during armed conflict constitutes not only human rights violations but also breaches international humanitarian law (IHL), which prohibits attacks on civilians, civilian objects, and places of worship.³² Insurgent tactics such as reprisals, civilian executions, and mutilation are also explicitly prohibited under international law.³³

Government Response and Challenges

After the resurgence of violence in 2004, the Thai government under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra largely took a security and military approach.³⁴ He imposed martial law, emergency decrees which gave the Thai authorities sweeping powers including the power to detain individuals without a charge for 30 days, and deployed thousands of military troops.³⁵ His successor Surayudh Chulanond attempted to de-escalate the tensions.³⁶

Despite the government’s efforts, violence in the region continued to intensify and in 2007, the government adopted a more aggressive counterinsurgency policy which did not resolve the situation. It was not until the 2011-2014 elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra that Thailand commenced formal negotiations with the insurgents in 2013, specifically with the BRN.³⁷ Malaysia acted as the facilitator in the process. However, the process was hindered and ultimately stalled by anti-government protests, lack of cooperation from the military not following through the ceasefire and resuming combat operations in the South, as well as anger over the fact that only one insurgent group was involved in the negotiations.

In 2014, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) seized power through a military coup and restarted the peace negotiation process facilitated by Malaysian authorities. The new negotiations involved the Thai regime and a new insurgent group: MARA Patani.³⁸ The BRN, the largest active insurgent group, was not part of the negotiations.³⁹ Despite many meetings, no substantial progress was made.⁴⁰ In 2019, the NCOP gained political legitimacy as a result of winning elections and the BRN resumed its negotiations with the Thai government in 2020.⁴¹ The 2020 Peace Talks were considered as a breakthrough due to the direct engagement with the BRN. While the COVID-19 pandemic did hinder face to face meetings, both parties were able to agree on a set of general principles⁴² and Ramadan ceasefires both in 2022 and 2023.⁴³ In January 2024, both parties announced a Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace as well. However, Paetongtarn Shinawatra came to power as Prime Minister in August 2024. The chief negotiator was replaced and his successor was not immediately appointed.⁴⁴ The BRN criticised the delay and warned that trust was eroding.⁴⁵ During the 2025 Ramadan period, ceasefire efforts were not successful.⁴⁶ At present, the peace process remains at a standstill. The lack of a clear political roadmap, coupled with ongoing violence and leadership transitions within the Thai government⁴⁶, have hindered progress.

Conclusion 

Lasting peace in Southern Thailand requires more than intermittent negotiations or ceasefires, it demands political will, mutual trust, inclusive dialogues with all insurgent factions and a commitment to justice. While security operations may reduce short-term violence, they cannot resolve deep-rooted grievances tied to identity, governance, and marginalisation and these realities need to be recognised. A just and durable peace will require both sides to prioritise human dignity, democratic participation, and reconciliation. Without a genuine commitment to these principles, the conflict in the Deep South will remain unresolved, and opportunities for peace will continue to slip away further driving the civilian human cost of warring parties breaching IHL.