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Platform for Peace and Humanity

The Rise of the Central Asian Narcotics Hub: Drug Trafficking and Domestic Responses

Grace Bell

© Reuters via Reuters Connect

Key Takeaways

  • While illicit substances have traditionally flowed from South Asia through Central Asia and onward to Russia and Europe along the “Northern Route”, this is now changing. Alongside more traditional drugs, synthetic substances have begun to dominate markets, and local production and consumption within Central Asia has increased, particularly among its young people.
  • The emergence and persistence of synthetic or “designer” drugs, and particularly their use amongst Central Asia’s youth, presents a clear risk to the health and wellbeing of the population. Both the destabilising effects of criminal organisations involved in the drug trade and the individual harms that come with drug use and addiction present serious risks.
  • Detection, prevention, and deterrence have proven challenging for enforcement agencies rushing to adapt to the changing market: the use of the internet, particularly Telegram, the changing ‘look’ of trafficking methods, and the constantly evolving nature of synthetic substances and their precursors are all obstacles to effective controls.
  • All five Central Asian states acceded to all three UN drug control conventions (1961, 1971, and 1988) in the years immediately following independence from the Soviet Union. This binds them to criminalise non-medical drug activity, regulate licit supply chains, and cooperate on cross-border enforcement. While Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have each passed new legislation tightening criminal penalties and expanding enforcement against synthetic drugs and online trafficking, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have pursued more incremental, less transparent updates to their existing frameworks.

 

Introduction

The illicit drug trade in Central Asia emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when drugs began to flow from South Asia, through Central Asia, and onward to Russia and Europe along the “Northern Route”.[1] Drug-producing countries in South Asia, such as Afghanistan, sent their products through Central Asia and into consumer markets in Europe and Russia. The most common substances seen were traditional: opium, heroin, marijuana, and hashish.

This is now changing. For one, illicit narcotics are now being both produced and consumed within Central Asian states, supporting a growing domestic market.[2] This troubling trend is evident in the data. Across Central Asia, there has been a rise in drug seizures and raids of drug labs in recent years. For example, according to the UNODC, authorities across Central Asia reported a 50% increase in the amount of meth seizures in late 2024 compared to three years prior, with the average quantity of the seizures more than doubling.[3] Propping up this domestic demand is a growing number of young users.[4] Uzbekistan has reported an increase in the number of school students in the Uzbek capital using synthetic drugs.[5] Meanwhile, reports from Kyrgyzstan related that synthetic drugs are primarily being used by people between 18-25 years old, with some users as young as 13.[6]

Another change is in the product itself. Alongside more traditional drugs, synthetic substances have begun to dominate markets. For example, mephedrone (“meow meow”, “MCAT”, or “drone”) and Alfa-PVP (“Flakka”) are two popular illicit substances that have emerged in Central Asia in the past 10 years.[7] According to the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC), while cannabis remains the most prevalent drug in the region, opiates (heroin, opium) are losing their market share to a rapidly growing body of synthetic drugs.[8] CARICC’s April 2026 report also found variations by country. While cannabis still makes up the majority of drug seizures seen in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Kazakhstan’s market is dominated by synthetic drugs, and large-scale seizures of potent substances such as pregabalin and sibutramine as well as more traditional drugs characterise Uzbekistan’s trade. Information on Turkmenistan was not available for their report and was therefore excluded.

 

A Web of Harms

The harms of drug trafficking are felt throughout communities. Perhaps most obvious, drug users face a myriad of potential negative health effects, not just the potential for addiction. New synthetic drugs are particularly addictive, as the chemicals in them can exaggerate the brain’s response leading to addiction.[9] What’s more, treatment for those suffering from addiction or life-threatening reactions is made all the more difficult as those facilitating treatment cannot be certain what substances they are treating. This is especially troubling given the growing number of young drug users in the region. Batma Estebesova, a drug addiction specialist and director of the Socium Foundation, points to the development that is occurring in young adulthood, and the negative effects that drug use has on early development.[10]

Couriers occupy the lowest rung of the drug trade, and are often recruited from among the poorest and most vulnerable. Enticed by promises of financial gain and with seemingly few other legal avenues to make a reasonable living, couriers face many risks of the trade. For example, a 2025 report by RFE/RL’s Central Asian Migrants’ Unit found that drug couriers were being recruited from Kyrgyzstan via Telegram advertisements posted by fellow Kyrgyz citizens. Upon completing their ‘job’, they were often reported to authorities by the very people that hired them as a means to avoid payment.[11] Beyond the direct physical, legal and other threats of getting involved in the drug trade, couriers’ lives are set off course. A recent UNODC regional assessment warned that young people are especially at risk of being drawn into “a vicious circle of drug abuse and drug trafficking instead of realising opportunities for legitimate employment and education”.[12] While perhaps a less sympathetic group, couriers are often harmed by the drug trade in which they operate.

Finally, the destabilising effects of criminal organisations involved in the drug trade present serious risks to the communities and states in which they operate. Relatives are lost to addiction and overdoses, and young people who might otherwise have contributed to their communities are instead pulled into cycles of offending and incarceration. Research also points to deeper entanglement between traffickers and the state itself, with high-ranking officials in parts of the region implicated in organising rather than merely tolerating the trade.[13] Criminal organisations funded by drug profits can ingrain themselves further into the communities in which they operate, becoming a seemingly unshakable presence.

 

Trafficking Has a New Look

Detection has become increasingly difficult as authorities struggle to adapt to a changing trade. Perhaps the most influential change to the illicit market has been the use of the internet, particularly Telegram, to sell products and expand trafficking networks.[14] Illicit substances can now be advertised, purchased, and delivered via the internet. This has made detection all the more difficult as deliveries can now be made without contact between supplier and consumer.[15] Further, traffickers have used the internet to recruit couriers across borders. Online postings made by drug traffickers promise attractive economic opportunities for those willing to transport or manufacture their illicit substances.

Another obstacle to effective detection is enforcement agents’ ability to identify illicit substances when they see them.[16] Until recently, agents looked for big packages of traditional drugs passing through Central Asia. However, new synthetic drugs travel in smaller packages, and authorities must now account for the movement of their precursors, which are constantly changing. As their name implies, synthetic drugs are manmade and thus highly adaptable to changing regulations. In other words, as authorities become privy to precursor ingredients, synthetic, or “designer” drugs can be redesigned. In a twisted game of cat and mouse, precursors and the drugs themselves change and new ones emerge as quickly as their predecessors are banned, with authorities a step behind.[17] Problems with detection are further exacerbated by a lack of proper equipment to detect and combat these new synthetic substances.[18] Furthermore, the rise in domestic consumption means that many of these shipments are no longer destined to cross borders – authorities must look inward.[19]

 

Legal Developments

Following independence, all five Central Asian states acceded to all three UN drug control conventions (1961, 1971, and 1988).[20] This requires them to criminalise non-medical drug activity, regulate licit supply chains, and cooperate on cross-border enforcement.[21] While Kazakhstan,[22] Uzbekistan,[23] and Kyrgyzstan[24] have each passed new legislation toughening  criminal penalties and expanding enforcement against synthetic drugs and online trafficking, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have in recent years pursued more incremental, less transparent updates to their existing frameworks.[25]

Kazakhstan introduced new measures increasing punishments for production and distribution in early 2025. In January 2025, President Tokayev signed legislative amendments strengthening punishments for production and distribution of drugs, particularly for distribution to minors, in educational institutions, and for officials involved in said distribution. At the same time, he made punishments for first-time offenders acting as couriers more lenient.[26] While there were rumours that the age of criminal liability for drug-related offences would be lowered from 16 to 13, this has been denied by the Deputy Head of Kazakhstan’s Department for Combating Drug Crime.[27]

In June 2026, in response to the spread of synthetic drug use and internet-based sales, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev approved a new law introducing a new chapter to the Criminal Code titled “Crimes Against Public Health and the Nation’s Gene Pool”. This chapter increases criminal liability for the circulation of illegal drugs and related substances, and strengthens punishments for over 10 categories of drug-related crimes.[28] At the same time, a separate law entitled “On Narcotic Drugs and Potent Substances” identifies 7 key areas for state policy and defines the responsibilities of 14 government agencies involved in the fight against drug trafficking. Key areas include raising public awareness, preventing drug crimes online, improving early prevention, diagnosis, and treatment, and social rehabilitation for those suffering from addiction.[29] Of note, Uzbekistan has also introduced plans to tighten state control and oversight of legal drug circulation via digital monitoring from import to sale.[30]

Kyrgyzstan has introduced several new laws aimed at the drug trade in the past few years. In March 2024, President Sadyr Japarov signed a new national law on illicit drug trafficking which explicitly covers synthetic analogues and precursors, closing a gap which had let novel synthetic substances evade control.[31] Kyrgyzstan’s Service on Countering Illicit Drug Trafficking (SCIDT) worked in collaboration with the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) Programme Office in Bishkek to develop the legislation, which targeted limitations of the existing framework.[32] This followed a law passed months earlier which split off drug treatment provisions into a separate national health code, formally separating public-health functions from criminal enforcement.[33] Kyrgyzstan has continued updating its drug legislation into 2025 and 2026, largely through secondary amendments rather than new statutes. In March 2025, authorities updated the official list of controlled substances, and a February 2026 draft proposes adding 20 more, including several synthetic nitazene opioids.[34] Separately, a March 2026 parliamentary bill seeks to close wording gaps across several existing laws so that psychotropic, synthetic, and potent substances fall under existing restrictions.[35]

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have been far less transparent with both the extent of the problem within their borders and their actions to dismantle the trade. Unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, neither Tajikistan nor Turkmenistan has pursued significant legal reform in recent years. Turkmenistan practices a “zero-tolerance policy” on illegal drugs, and no discernible drug use problem can be found in the country. However, the government and state media don’t discuss drug use or prevention measures, which leaves a big question mark as to the reality on the ground. Furthermore, a scandal in 2025, which found the head of the railway company Demirýollary and his companion caught with LSD in their carry-on luggage, points to at least some presence of synthetic substances in the country. Turkmenistan has reported no legal changes since its main drug law from 2004, and the country’s confidentiality makes it hard to confirm whether anything has changed since.[36]

On the other hand, while Tajikistan regularly reports on successful enforcement and detection efforts, they rarely report on drug use problems.[37] As for legislation, the state’s drug laws still rest on 1999 legislation and a 2021-2030 national strategy, with only routine implementation updates rather than any new legislation.[38]

 

Conclusion

Central Asia’s drug trade has changed faster than many of its legal frameworks. As synthetic substances, online sales, and domestic consumption reshape the market, states have responded unevenly. While Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are tightening penalties and closing legislative gaps, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan remain comparatively opaque about both the scale of the problem and their response to it.

Yet legislation alone cannot address a trade built on poverty, limited opportunity, and a growing population of young users. Without matching enforcement with investment in prevention, treatment, and support for those most vulnerable to exploitation, the region risks punishing the symptoms of the drug trade while leaving its root causes untouched.

 

Recommendations

  • Target the root causes of the drug trade. While states may be tempted to err towards harsher and more broad-sweeping punishments, educational and economic reform are strong weapons to be used in the fight against drug trafficking. As many are drawn to the drug trade out of economic necessity, targeting these causal factors rather than solely punishing involvement with illicit substances should be a major focus. Further, the rise in drug use among Central Asian youth demonstrates a clear need for stronger drug education for young people. Existing UNODC-led prevention efforts offer a foundation, but coverage remains uneven across the region and should be expanded and, where possible, funded and run domestically rather than relying primarily on international donors.
  • Enhance transparency across the region. In order to get a full picture of the extent of the drug trade and how it operates in Central Asia as a whole, greater reporting and transparency from Turkmenistan and Tajikistan is necessary. This should also shed light on current laws, and potentially open the door for new legislation adapted to this changing landscape.
  • Establish stronger regional mechanisms for monitoring synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances. Central Asian states should strengthen systems for the early identification and monitoring of new psychoactive substances (NPS), including synthetic opioids, stimulants, and emerging analogues. National authorities should maintain regularly updated lists of controlled substances and establish procedures allowing newly identified substances to be subject to temporary or expedited controls while their risks are assessed. Regional information-sharing through CARICC should be expanded to include real-time alerts concerning newly detected substances, precursor chemicals, trafficking methods, and emerging patterns of consumption. This would reduce the gap between the emergence of new substances and the ability of authorities to regulate them.
  • Strengthen regional cooperation beyond traditional border enforcement. Because the Northern Route increasingly involves multiple jurisdictions and because online trafficking can connect actors across borders without physical contact, regional cooperation should extend beyond traditional information-sharing between police and customs authorities. Central Asian states should strengthen joint investigations, controlled deliveries, intelligence-sharing, forensic cooperation, and cooperation between prosecutors and financial-investigation authorities. CARICC can provide an important platform for this cooperation, particularly by developing regional threat assessments focused specifically on synthetic drugs, online markets, and precursor trafficking.
  • Strengthen safeguards against corruption and state involvement in trafficking. The potential involvement of public officials in drug trafficking presents a particularly serious threat to effective enforcement. Central Asian states should strengthen internal anti-corruption mechanisms within police, customs, border, judicial, and other institutions involved in drug control. Investigations into suspected official involvement should be independent, adequately resourced, and capable of reaching senior actors rather than focusing exclusively on low-level offenders. Asset tracing and financial investigations should accompany major drug-trafficking investigations so that authorities can identify and confiscate the proceeds of organised criminal activity.
  • Integrate human rights considerations into drug-control policies. The region’s response should remain consistent with international human rights standards. Tougher criminal penalties should not come at the expense of due process, proportionality, privacy, or access to healthcare. Drug-dependent persons should not be treated exclusively as criminal offenders, while victims of trafficking and individuals exploited as couriers should be identified and protected where appropriate. A human-rights-based approach would allow governments to pursue organised criminal networks effectively while reducing the risk that vulnerable individuals bear the greatest burden of enforcement.

[1] Екатерина Хван, “Наркоторговля в Кыргызстане: ‘синтетика’ через Telegram” (dw.com, 21 July 2024) https://www.dw.com/ru/novye-tendencii-narkotorgovli-v-kyrgyzstane-sintetika-cerez-telegram/a-69715169 accessed 17 July 2026

[2] Pannier B, “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse – Foreign Policy Research Institute” (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 5 December 2025) https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/12/central-asia-has-a-drug-problem-and-it-is-growing-worse/ accessed 10 July 2026

[3] UNODC Regional Office for Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan, “Central Asia Steps Up Regional Action in Light of Growing Concerns About Rise in Drug Consumption” (United Nations, 5 December 2025) https://www.unodc.org/roca/en/news/2025/central-asia-steps-up-regional-action-in-light-of-growing-concerns-about-rise-in-drug-consumption.html accessed 20 July 2026

[4] Pannier B, “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse – Foreign Policy Research Institute” (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 5 December 2025) https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/12/central-asia-has-a-drug-problem-and-it-is-growing-worse/ accessed 10 July 2026

[5] Pannier B, “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse – Foreign Policy Research Institute”.

[6] Екатерина Хван, “Наркоторговля в Кыргызстане: ‘синтетика’ через Telegram” (dw.com, 21 July 2024) https://www.dw.com/ru/novye-tendencii-narkotorgovli-v-kyrgyzstane-sintetika-cerez-telegram/a-69715169 accessed 17 July 2026

[7] DEA, “Flakka (Alpha-PVP)” (www.dea.gov) https://www.dea.gov/factsheets/flakka-alpha-pvp accessed 15 July 2026; Reed J, “Clubbers Are ‘Turning to New Legal High Mephedrone’” BBC News (13 January 2010) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-10004366 accessed 17 July 2026; Adegboyega Oyemade, “Meow Meow or Miaow Miaow: A New Drug of Concern” (2010) 7 Psychiatry (Edgmont) 10 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3028466/ accessed 17 July 2026

[8] CARICC, “Express Analysis of Drug Seizures in CARICC Member States 1St Quarter 2026” (Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors, 15 April 2026) https://www.caricc.org/media/reports/2026/CARICC_bulletin_259_eng.pdf accessed 1 August 2026

[9] Creagh S and others, “The New Classes of Synthetic Illicit Drugs Can Significantly Harm the Brain: A Neuro Imaging Perspective With Full Review of MRI Findings” (2018) 2 Clinical radiology & imaging journal 000116 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6048967/ accessed 4 August 2026

[10] Екатерина Хван, “Наркоторговля в Кыргызстане: ‘синтетика’ через Telegram” (dw.com, 21 July 2024) https://www.dw.com/ru/novye-tendencii-narkotorgovli-v-kyrgyzstane-sintetika-cerez-telegram/a-69715169 accessed 17 July 2026

[11] RFE/RL’s Central Asian Migrants’ Unit, “Promises of High-Paid Work Lure Kyrgyz Into Russian Drug Trade” (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 6 June 2025) <https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-russia-drug-trafficking-recruitment-crime/33435102.html&gt; accessed 10 August 2026

[12] UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, “Enhancing Border Control and Cross-Border Cooperation UNODC Programme for Central Asia” https://tajikistan.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/Enhancing%20Border%20Control%20and%20Cross-Border%20Cooperation_brochure%202021-EN%20%28web%29_0.pdf accessed 4 August 2026

[13] Alexander Kupatadze, ‘Beyond Conventional Boundaries’ (2023) World Affairs https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200231178852 accessed 20 July 2026; Sebastien Peyrouse, ‘Diagnosing Central Asia’s Drug Problem’ (Reconnecting Asia, CSIS, 22 October 2021) https://reconasia.csis.org/diagnosing-central-asias-drug-problem/ accessed 20 July 2026.

[14] Pannier B, “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse – Foreign Policy Research Institute”.

[15] Sadokat Jalolova, “Uzbekistan Toughens Anti-Drug Laws as Synthetic Narcotics and Online Trafficking Rise – The Times Of Central” (The Times Of Central Asia, 12 June 2026) https://timesca.com/uzbekistan-toughens-anti-drug-laws-as-synthetic-narcotics-and-online-trafficking-rise/ accessed 17 July 2026

[16] Pannier B, “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse – Foreign Policy Research Institute”.

[17] Екатерина Хван, “Наркоторговля в Кыргызстане: ‘синтетика’ через Telegram” (dw.com, 21 July 2024) https://www.dw.com/ru/novye-tendencii-narkotorgovli-v-kyrgyzstane-sintetika-cerez-telegram/a-69715169 accessed 17 July 2026

[18] “Глава СБНОН назвал проблемы, с которыми сталкивается служба при борьбе с наркотиками” (Kaktus.media, 3 June 2024) https://kaktus.media/doc/502421_glava_sbnon_nazval_problemy_s_kotorymi_stalkivaetsia_slyjba_pri_borbe_s_narkotikami.html accessed 17 July 2026

[19] Pannier B, “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse – Foreign Policy Research Institute”.

[20] UNODC, “Legal Framework” <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/legal-framework.html> accessed 1 August 2026; United Nations Treaty Collection, “Chapter VI: Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances” (UN Treaty Collection) https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6 accessed 20 July 2026.

[21] Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (adopted 30 March 1961, entered into force 13 December 1964) 520 UNTS 151, as amended by the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (adopted 25 March 1972, entered into force 8 August 1975) 976 UNTS 105; Convention on Psychotropic Substances (adopted 21 February 1971, entered into force 16 August 1976) 1019 UNTS 175; United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (adopted 20 December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990) 1582 UNTS 95.

[22] Bulatkulova S, “Kazakhstan Strengthens Legal Framework for Drug Trafficking – The Astana Times” (Astana Times 2025) https://astanatimes.com/2025/01/kazakhstan-strengthens-legal-framework-for-drug-trafficking/ accessed 20 July 2026

[23] Sadokat Jalolova, “Uzbekistan Toughens Anti-Drug Laws as Synthetic Narcotics and Online Trafficking Rise – The Times Of Central” (The Times Of Central Asia 12 June 2026) https://timesca.com/uzbekistan-toughens-anti-drug-laws-as-synthetic-narcotics-and-online-trafficking-rise/ accessed 17 July 2026

[24] Краснова Е, “New Drugs Banned: The List Will Be Expanded by 20 Substances” (News of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek and Osh — latest events today, 17 February 2026) https://open.kg/en/news/local-news/73301-novye-narkotiki-pod-zapret-spisok-popolnjat-20-veschestv.html accessed 4 August 2026; OSCE, “OSCE Supports the Strengthening of Legal Measures Against Illicit Drug Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan” (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 29 March 2024) https://bishkek.osce.org/programme-office-in-bishkek/565573 accessed 4 August 2026

[25] Pannier B, “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse – Foreign Policy Research Institute”.

[26] Bulatkulova S, “Kazakhstan Strengthens Legal Framework for Drug Trafficking – The Astana Times” (Astana Times 2025) https://astanatimes.com/2025/01/kazakhstan-strengthens-legal-framework-for-drug-trafficking/ accessed 20 July 2026

[27] Volkov A, “Kazakhstan: Age of Criminal Responsibility for Drug Crimes Will Not Be Lowered” (Orda.kz, 13 October 2025) https://en.orda.kz/kazakhstan-age-of-criminal-responsibility-for-drug-crimes-will-not-be-lowered-8775/ accessed 4 August 2026

[28] Sadokat Jalolova, “Uzbekistan Toughens Anti-Drug Laws as Synthetic Narcotics and Online Trafficking Rise – The Times Of Central” (The Times Of Central Asia 12 June 2026) https://timesca.com/uzbekistan-toughens-anti-drug-laws-as-synthetic-narcotics-and-online-trafficking-rise/ accessed 17 July 2026

[29] “Measures to Combat Drug Addiction and Ensure Road Safety Were Considered” (Republic of Uzbekistan President, 11 June 2026) https://president.uz/uz/lists/view/9300 accessed 17 July 2026

[30] Sadokat Jalolova, “Uzbekistan Toughens Anti-Drug Laws as Synthetic Narcotics and Online Trafficking Rise – The Times Of Central” (The Times Of Central Asia 12 June 2026) https://timesca.com/uzbekistan-toughens-anti-drug-laws-as-synthetic-narcotics-and-online-trafficking-rise/ accessed 17 July 2026

[31] President of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Подписан Закон «О Наркотических Средствах, Психотропн” (President.kg, 2026) https://president.kg/ru/news/all/25185 accessed 4 August 2026

[32] OSCE, “OSCE Supports the Strengthening of Legal Measures Against Illicit Drug Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan” (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 29 March 2024) https://bishkek.osce.org/programme-office-in-bishkek/565573 accessed 4 August 2026

[33] КУДРЯВЦЕВА Т, “Утвержден Закон О Защите Здоровья Граждан В Кыргызстане – | 24.KG” (24.kg, 13 January 2024) https://24.kg/vlast/284139_utverjden_zakon_ozaschite_zdorovya_grajdan_vkyirgyizstane/ accessed 4 August 2026

[34] Краснова Е, “New Drugs Banned: The List Will Be Expanded by 20 Substances” (News of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek and Osh — latest events today, 17 February 2026) https://open.kg/en/news/local-news/73301-novye-narkotiki-pod-zapret-spisok-popolnjat-20-veschestv.html accessed 4 August 2026

[35] Комарова Е, “Proposed Amendments to Laws to Combat Psychoactive and Potent Substances” (News of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek and Osh — latest events today, 3 March 2026) https://open.kg/en/news/local-news/77966-predlagajutsja-popravki-v-zakony-dlja-borby-s-psihoaktivnymi-i-silnodejstvujuschimi-veschestvami.html accessed 4 August 2026

[36] CIS, “Information | CIS Legilation” (Cis-legislation.com) https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=102378 accessed 4 August 2026

[37] Pannier B, “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse – Foreign Policy Research Institute”.

[38] Drug Control Agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, “The National Drug Control Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2021–2030 – Drug Control Agency Under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan” (2021) https://akn.tj/en/2021/04/15/national-drug-control-strategy-of-the-republic-of-tajikistan-for-2021-2030/ accessed 4 August 2026

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