Key Insights

• Five years after the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan remains the only country globally where girls and women are formally excluded from secondary and higher education, with approximately 2.4 million girls currently denied access to secondary education.
• The restrictions extend far beyond education. New UN Women data shows that more than half of surveyed Afghan women rarely leave their homes, while widespread restrictions on employment, movement and public participation continue to deepen their exclusion.
• In 2026, Afghanistan’s gender crisis is entering a phase of institutionalisation and normalisation. The Taliban are embedding women’s exclusion more deeply into law and enforcement mechanisms, while international engagement is increasingly shifting from isolation of the authoritarian regime toward pragmatic cooperation.

Five years after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Afghanistan remains the only country in the world where girls and women are formally excluded from both secondary and higher education. Since the takeover, girls have been denied access to formal education beyond Grade 6, while women have been barred from university education since December 2022. Approximately 2.4 million Afghan girls have been denied secondary education since the Taliban imposed the ban, with UNESCO warning that the consequences will extend far beyond the current generation.^[1]

The restrictions, however, extend far beyond education. Since 2021, the Taliban have issued more than 100 decrees restricting women’s access to employment, healthcare, freedom of movement and public life. The effects are clearly visible in recent UN Women data, which shows that nearly half of Afghan women surveyed now leave their homes only once or twice a month, and almost 75% of them reported feeling unsafe being outside without a mahram (male guardian). Additionally, 70% of the surveyed women report poor mental health and only 7% are employed, compared to 84% of men.^[2]

Yet the defining development of 2026 is not simply the continuation of these restrictions, but rather their increasing institutionalisation alongside growing international engagement with the Taliban. New legislation is embedding discrimination into Afghanistan’s legal framework, while governments around the world are increasingly engaging the de facto authorities on migration, security and economic issues. As international engagement with the Taliban expands, the international community faces a growing risk, namely that pragmatic cooperation might gradually normalise a system built on the systematic exclusion of women and girls.

From Restrictions to Institutionalised Exclusion

Since 2021, the Taliban have progressively dismantled women’s rights to education, employment, political participation, freedom of movement and access to public spaces, despite the pledges made upon their return to allow women to work and study^[3]. What initially appeared to be a series of individual restrictions has developed into a comprehensive system governing virtually every aspect of women’s lives.

Education remains the most visible example of the wider consequences of these restrictions. Their impact extends beyond the girls excluded from classrooms to the institutions and communities that depend on an educated female population. UNICEF estimates that Afghanistan could lose up to 20,000 women teachers and 5,400 female health workers by 2030, while women’s representation in the civil service has already declined^[4], thereby weakening their overall political representation and involvement in decision-making. The economic costs are equally significant, as restrictions on girls’ education and women’s employment are estimated to cost the country $84 million annually in lost economic output, with losses accumulating for as long as the restrictions remain. At the same time, lower levels of maternal education increase risks of poor health outcomes for children, including under-vaccination, low birthweight, and stunting.^[5] The result is a cycle of exclusion that weakens Afghanistan’s human capital, public institutions, and prospects for long-term stability.

The restrictions are increasingly being reinforced through law. Most recently in May 2026, the Taliban promulgated Decree No. 18, the Code on Judicial Separation of Spouses, codifying the grounds on which women may petition for judicial separation. UNAMA warned that the decree further entrenched “systemic discrimination in law and practice”^[6] against women and girls. Amnesty International subsequently raised concerns that the decree contains provisions that can uphold marriages arranged during childhood and restrict women’s and girls’ ability to challenge or leave such marriages, by giving male relatives greater control over marriage decisions, removing any meaningful recognition of consent.^[7] These provisions further erode women’s legal autonomy.

This builds on the Taliban’s broader efforts to remove women from public life. In August 2024, the so-called Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice required women to cover their bodies and faces in public and prohibited their voices from being heard in public. The decree also expanded the powers of the Taliban’s morality police to enforce these restrictions.^[8]

Recent developments demonstrate that these laws are not merely symbolic. In June 2026, Taliban morality police and security forces arrested at least 30 women by de facto Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice officials, together with de facto Police in Herat, for allegedly violating dress-code requirements, while dozens more received verbal warnings. When residents gathered to protest the arrests, security forces used excessive force, killing at least one boy and injuring others.^[9]

These developments point to a broader transformation, highlighting that women’s exclusion is no longer confined to individual restrictions on education, employment or movement, but is increasingly being embedded in the laws and institutions governing Afghan society. The imposed restrictions reinforce one another. Exclusion from education and employment undermines women’s economic independence; limits on movement restrict access to healthcare and essential services; and reduced legal autonomy makes it harder to challenge abuse or defend their rights. Together, they create a system in which women’s ability to participate independently in Afghan society is progressively eroded.

The consequences of this system are particularly visible in healthcare. Afghanistan has one of the world’s highest maternal mortality ratios. Whilst between 2001-2023, maternal deaths fell from 1,311 to 521 deaths per 100,000 live births, the ratio was estimated at 638 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2024, although limitations in available data mean the true figure may be higher.^[10] The UN Special Rapporteur has also warned that requiring women to be accompanied by a mahram can delay or prevent access to emergency treatment, with potentially fatal consequences. These barriers are compounded by shortages of female health workers, reduced operating hours, facility closures and weak referral systems, particularly affecting women seeking care at night or in rural areas.^[11]

The shortage of female health workers is itself being aggravated by the Taliban’s education policies. Women currently account for only 27% of non-specialised physicians, 18% of specialised physicians and 29% of nurses. The UN Special Rapporteur warns that restrictions on medical, nursing, midwifery and allied health education are dismantling the pipeline of future health professionals, while existing female health workers are retiring, emigrating or being forced out of practice. At the same time, gender segregation in healthcare creates additional barriers for women seeking treatment. In many provinces, women and girls must receive care in separate spaces, while female health workers are segregated from their male colleagues. Where a female patient needs to consult a male doctor, she must be accompanied by a mahram and communicate through him, undermining her ability to seek care privately and confidentially.^[12] The result is a healthcare system in which women are increasingly both unable to provide and unable to access essential healthcare.

The shrinking space for women is also affecting those seeking to defend their rights. In July 2026, Taliban authorities detained six staff members of the Women and Children Legal Research Foundation, an Afghan organisation working on women’s and children’s rights. The detainees’ families were reportedly not informed of their whereabouts or the charges against them.^[13] The arrests came amid broader restrictions on civil society and illustrate how the space for Afghan women to organise, document abuses and advocate for their rights is itself being eroded.

This shrinking civic space is compounded by growing financial pressure on women’s organisations. In August 2026, UN Women warned that more than half of the 74 women’s organisations it surveyed were at risk of closing within a year because of funding shortages. The warning comes as the UN’s humanitarian appeal for Afghanistan remains severely underfunded,^[14] whilst the country is facing an acute food security crisis due to drought, economic insecurity and the mass return of refugees. The erosion of women’s civil-society networks therefore risks creating double pressure, as Taliban restrictions are narrowing the space in which women can organise, while declining international funding reduces the resources available to sustain that work.

The shift from individual restrictions towards institutionalised discrimination has already been recognised by the international community. On 2 March 2026, Colombia delivered a Joint Statement at the UN Human Rights Council on behalf of a cross-regional group of 56 countries expressing grave concern over the deterioration of the human rights situation of women and girls in Afghanistan. The statement warned that the Taliban’s so-called penal code and related regulations were further institutionalising discrimination and violence against women and girls, while broader restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and public participation formed a “systematic and institutionalised pattern of discrimination that may amount to international crimes”.^[15] It called on the Taliban to repeal discriminatory edicts and urged the international community to strengthen accountability and support for Afghan women and girls.^[16] Yet the breadth of this condemnation also highlights a growing divide in the international response, with Reuters reporting that Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan, as well as all five Central Asian states and India, were absent from the Statement.^[17]

International Accountability and Its Limits

The Taliban’s treatment of women and girls has prompted increasingly concrete international accountability measures, going beyond political condemnation. In 2023, the Council of the EU imposed restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on various individuals, including “the acting Taliban Ministers of Education and Justice and the acting Taliban Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan because of their role in depriving Afghan girls and women of their right to education, access to justice and equal treatment between men and women”^[18]. The United States has similarly used targeted measures against Taliban officials responsible for repressing women and girls, including visa restrictions on individuals responsible for or complicit in restrictions on women’s education, employment, movement and freedom of expression^[19], as well as Treasury designations targeting senior Taliban officials for serious human-rights abuses, including against Fariduddin Mahmood and Khalid Hanafi in relation to the repression of women and girls.^[20]

Perhaps most significantly, in January 2025, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court applied for arrest warrants against Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Abdul Hakim Haqqani, later issued in July 2025.^[21] In particular, the judges “found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed – by ordering, inducing or soliciting – the crime against humanity of persecution, under article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, on gender grounds, against girls, women and other persons non-conforming with the Taliban’s policy on gender, gender identity or expression; and on political grounds against persons perceived as ‘allies of girls and women’”.^[22]

The warrants represent a significant step towards accountability in Afghanistan, where domestic avenues for challenging the Taliban’s policies are effectively unavailable. The warrants are important because they treat the systematic persecution of Afghan women and girls not simply as a human-rights concern, but as conduct potentially engaging individual criminal responsibility under international law. Yet their practical impact remains uncertain, if not null. The ICC has no police force of its own and depends on states to arrest and surrender suspects. However, neither Akhundzada nor Haqqani is likely to leave Afghanistan, while the Taliban have no incentive to surrender their leaders. Unless one of the suspects travels to a state obliged and willing to cooperate with the Court, or the political circumstances change significantly, the warrants are therefore unlikely to result in arrests in the foreseeable future.

This enforcement gap matters beyond Afghanistan. The ICC is already facing a broader crisis of confidence, with growing criticism over the perceived uneven application of international criminal justice. The strong mobilisation of Western states following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been contrasted with the political resistance surrounding the Court’s warrants against Israeli leaders, reinforcing criticism in parts of the Global South that international justice is applied selectively. The Court’s own institutional difficulties, including the dismissal of Prosecutor Karim Khan in July 2026^[23] following a prolonged dispute over allegations of misconduct, have added to questions about its authority and resilience.^[24] The Court’s position has also been weakened by direct political pressure. In February 2025, the United States imposed sanctions on the ICC and its officials, targeting the Court over its investigations and proceedings involving US and Israeli nationals.^[25] For a court whose effectiveness ultimately depends on state cooperation, such measures illustrate the wider political constraints surrounding international criminal accountability.

For Afghanistan, the concern is not simply that two warrants are likely to remain unenforced. It is that legal accountability is developing alongside a political environment increasingly willing to accommodate the Taliban. As more governments deepen practical relations with the de facto authorities, the distance between holding Taliban leaders legally accountable and treating them as necessary political interlocutors becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile.

Increased Repression and Decreased International Isolation

While the Taliban face growing attempts at international accountability for their treatment of women and girls, international engagement with the de facto authorities is simultaneously expanding. Russia formally recognised the Taliban in 2025, while China, India, Iran, Pakistan, the Central Asian states and other governments have maintained or expanded engagement with the de facto authorities. Western governments, meanwhile, are increasingly pursuing practical cooperation on migration, security and regional stability.^[26] This creates a growing contradiction between holding the Taliban accountable and increasingly treating them as a necessary interlocutor.

This tension is visible also in the EU’s recent approach. In June 2026, a Taliban delegation travelled to Brussels for discussions with EU officials concerning the return of Afghan nationals without a legal right to remain in the EU. The proposed engagement had emerged amid calls from EU Member States for more effective pathways to return Afghans considered to have no legal basis to stay or to pose a security risk. Civil society organisations, however, warned that cooperation on returns risked legitimising the Taliban and placing Afghans at risk of serious human-rights violations.^[27] The United States illustrates the same tension. While continuing to refuse recognition of the Taliban, Washington has maintained direct engagement with the de facto authorities, including high-level talks in Kabul in 2025 over detained Americans, prisoner exchanges and bilateral relations.^[28]

These concerns are particularly relevant when engagement involves returns to Afghanistan. A 2025 UNAMA report documenting the experiences of Afghans following involuntary return recorded cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, and threats to personal security by the de facto authorities. While the report covers returnees more broadly, its findings underscore the need to assess the specific risks faced by individuals whose circumstances may place them at heightened risk of rights violations under Taliban rule, as well as the compatibility of forced returns with the principle of non-refoulement.^[29] For Afghan women and girls, forced return would mean being sent back into a system of institutionalised gender discrimination, where their access to education, employment, freedom of movement, and public life is severely restricted.

Although states continue to distinguish engagement from formal recognition, the expansion of practical cooperation with the Taliban increasingly raises questions about how far pragmatic diplomacy can coexist with meaningful international pressure over human-rights violations. It can be argued that states have legitimate reasons to maintain channels with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities, as humanitarian assistance, migration management, and regional stability all require some degree of communication. The concern is therefore not necessarily whether the international community should engage with the Taliban, but under what conditions that engagement takes place.

If diplomatic engagement increasingly focuses on migration and security while women’s rights become a secondary concern, international pressure on the Taliban risks becoming fragmented. The Taliban can then obtain diplomatic and practical benefits without addressing the policies that have made Afghanistan one of the world’s most severe gender crises.

The danger is particularly acute because the international community’s attention is already competing with other global crises. This is what makes the current moment different. The question is no longer simply whether the world knows what is happening to Afghan women, but rather whether the international community will allow the situation to become normal.

Conclusions

Five years after the Taliban’s return, Afghanistan’s gender crisis risks entering a new phase. It is not simply one of continued repression, but of institutionalisation and normalisation. The Taliban are embedding restrictions on women more deeply into law and practice, while the space for Afghan civil society to resist these policies is narrowing. At the same time, international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly pragmatic, driven by security, economic and migration concerns.

The international community faces a difficult but necessary balancing act. While engagement with Afghanistan cannot simply be abandoned, particularly when regional security requires channels of communication, neither should pragmatic cooperation come at the cost of addressing the systematic exclusion of women as an immutable feature of Afghan governance. Maintaining pressure, supporting Afghan civil society, and ensuring accountability must remain integral to international policy and engagement.

Ultimately, the future of Afghanistan cannot be separated from the future of Afghan women and girls. If their exclusion becomes normalised, the international community risks not only abandoning a fundamental human rights commitment, but also undermining the foundations for an inclusive, stable and peaceful Afghanistan.

Policy Recommendations

• Make political engagement conditional on measurable human rights benchmarks. States and international organisations may maintain necessary channels with the Taliban but should clearly distinguish communication from normalisation. Political, economic and diplomatic engagement with the de facto authorities should not expand without demonstrable and independently verified improvements in women’s and girls’ rights, particularly in education, employment, freedom of movement and access to healthcare.
• Keep Afghan women at the centre of decisions about Afghanistan’s future. States and international organisations should create independent and safe channels for Afghan women and women-led civil society organisations to participate in discussions on Afghanistan, including on humanitarian assistance, development, migration and engagement with the Taliban. Where participation inside Afghanistan could expose women to retaliation, international actors should consult women through secure remote channels and organisations operating outside the country. Importantly, their participation should not depend on Taliban approval.
• Protect the civic space and financial sustainability of Afghan civil society, particularly women-led civil society organisations. International donors, including the EU, should prioritise flexible, long-term, and multi-year funding for Afghan women-led organisations, including those operating from outside Afghanistan, as restrictions and funding shortages increasingly threaten their ability to operate. Funding should be designed in consultation with Afghan civil society, allowing local organisations to identify priorities and shape how resources are used.
• Ensure migration cooperation complies with non-refoulement and international law. Any cooperation on returns should be based on individualised risk assessments and effective monitoring, with particular attention to people at heightened risk under Taliban rule. The documented treatment of involuntary returnees demonstrates that returns cannot be treated simply as a technical migration-management issue.
• Strengthen accountability for gender-based persecution and institutionalised oppression. States should cooperate with the ICC and support efforts to hold perpetrators accountable for international crimes, including by enforcing ICC arrest warrants when suspects come within their jurisdiction. They should also make greater use of universal jurisdiction under national law, where applicable, to investigate and prosecute serious international crimes committed in Afghanistan, including gender-based persecution and other international crimes, thereby broadening the avenues available to hold Taliban officials accountable.

^[1] UNICEF, ‘More than 2.6 Million Girls in Afghanistan Have Been Denied a Secondary Education since 2021’ (14 August 2026), <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/more-26-million-girls-afghanistan-have-been-denied-secondary-education-2021> accessed 20 August 2026

^[2] Olivia Le Poidevin, ‘Half of Afghan Women Rarely Leave Home as Taliban Restrictions Deepen, UN Agency Says’ (Reuters, 12 August 2026), <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/half-afghan-women-rarely-leave-home-taliban-restrictions-deepen-un-agency-says-2026-08-12/> accessed 21 August 2026

^[3] Shruti Menon, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban to allow women to work, study and travel?’ (BBC News, 8 August 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/62469204> accessed 25 August 2026

^[4] UNICEF, ‘Restrictions on girls’ education and women’s employment in Afghanistan could lead to a loss of over 25,000 female teachers and health workers by 2030’ (28 April 2026), <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/restrictions-girls-education-and-womens-employment-afghanistan-could-lead-loss-over> accessed 25 August 2026

^[5] Le Poidevin (n 3)

^[6] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ‘UNAMA Statement on Afghanistan’s De Facto Authorities’ Decree No 18, Code on Judicial Separation of Spouses’ (2026), <https://unama.unmissions.org/en/news/unama-statement-on-afghanistans-de-facto-authorities-decree-no-18-code-on-judicial> accessed 21 August 2026

^[7] Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: New Code Enabling Child Marriage Compounds Dismal Situation for Women’s and Girls’ Rights’ (10 June 2026), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/06/afghanistan-new-code-enabling-child-marriage-compounds-dismal-situation-for-womens-and-girls-rights/> accessed 21 August 2026

^[8] Council of the European Union, ‘Afghanistan: Statement of the High Representative on behalf of the EU on latest restrictions imposed by the Taliban on the people’ (26 August 2024), <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/08/26/afghanistan-statement-of-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-latest-restrictions-imposed-by-the-taliban-on-the-people/> accessed 20 August 2026

^[9] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ‘UNAMA Alarmed by Arrests of Women in Herat, Afghanistan, and Excessive Use of Force’ (2026), <https://unama.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/unama-alarmed-by-arrests-of-women-in-herat-afghanistan-and-excessive-use-of> accessed 21 August 2026

^[10] Richard Bennett, Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, UN Doc A/HRC/61/63 (2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session61/advance-version/a-hrc-61-63-auv.pdf> accessed 21 August 2026, 12

^[11] Bennett (n 9), 12

^[12] Bennett (n 9), 9

^[13] Human Rights Watch, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Disappear 6 Rights Workers’ (13 August 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/08/13/afghanistan-taliban-forcibly-disappear-6-rights-workers> accessed 21 August 2026

^[14] Olivia Le Poidevin, ‘UN Urges Support for Afghan Women amid Tightening Taliban Curbs’ (Reuters, 14 August 2026), <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-urges-support-afghan-women-amid-tightening-taliban-curbs-2026-08-14/> accessed 21 August 2026

^[15] Government of Iceland, ‘HRC61 – JST – Situation of Human Rights of Women and Girls in Afghanistan’ (2 March 2026), <https://www.government.is/publications/statements/statement/2026-03-02-HRC61-JST-Situation-of-human-rights-of-women-and-girls-in-Afganistan/> accessed 21 August 2026

^[16] Government of Iceland (n 14)

^[17] Le Poidevin (n 13)

^[18] Council of the European Union, ‘Human rights violations: EU lists 18 individuals and five entities responsible for gender-based violence and linked to the Navalny and Kara-Murza cases’ (20 July 2023), <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/20/human-rights-violations-eu-lists-18-individuals-and-five-entities-responsible-for-gender-based-violence-and-linked-to-the-navalny-and-kara-murza-cases/> accessed 25 August 2026

^[19] US Department of State, ‘Announcement of Visa Restrictions in Response to the Repression of Women and Girls in Afghanistan’ (12 January 2023), <https://2021-2025.state.gov/announcement-of-visa-restrictions-in-response-to-the-repression-of-women-and-girls-in-afghanistan/> accessed 25 August 2026

^[20] US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuse and Commemorates the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (8 December 2023), <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1972> accessed 25 August 2026

^[21] International Criminal Court, ‘Situation in Afghanistan: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Issues Arrest Warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani’ (8 July 2025), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-afghanistan-icc-pre-trial-chamber-ii-issues-arrest-warrants-haibatullah-akhundzada> accessed 21 August 2026

^[22] Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, ‘Statement of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor on the issuance of arrest warrants in the Situation in Afghanistan’ (23 May 2025), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-office-prosecutor-issuance-arrest-warrants-situation-afghanistan> accessed 25 August 2026.

^[23] UN News, ‘International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan dismissed’ (UN News, 16 July 2026), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/07/1168025> accessed 21 August 2026

^[24] Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘The ICC is in its worst crisis yet — and Europe’s double standards are a big part of the problem’ (EUobserver, 16 July 2026), <https://euobserver.com/226421/the-icc-is-in-its-worst-crisis-yet-and-europes-double-standards-are-a-big-part-of-the-problem/> accessed 21 August 2026

^[25] Executive Order 14203, ‘Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’ (6 February 2025) 90 Fed Reg 9369, <https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933981/download?inline> accessed 25 August 2026

^[26] Annie Kelly, ‘Concerns grow over increased global ties with Taliban in Afghanistan’ (The Guardian, 15 August 2026), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/15/concern-grow-global-ties-taliban-afghanistan-human-rights> accessed 21 August 2026

^[27] International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), ‘Afghanistan: Open Letter on the Proposed Engagement of Taliban Representatives in Brussels’ (27 May 2026), <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-open-letter-on-the-proposed-engagement-of-taliban> accessed 21 August 2026

^[28] Mohammad Yusuf Yawar and Saeed Shah, ‘US officials hold talks in Kabul over Americans detained in Afghanistan’ (Reuters, 13 September 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-officials-hold-talks-kabul-over-americans-detained-afghanistan-2025-09-13/> accessed 25 August 2026

^[29] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Afghanistan: UN report documents human rights violations against forced returnees’ (OHCHR, 24 July 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/afghanistan-un-report-documents-human-rights-violations-forced-returnees> accessed 21 August 2026