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The “Politicization” of “Western” Sanctions in Republika Srpska

Jovan Knezevic

© DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA DS, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Introduction

 

The United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) resorted to targeted sanctions (i.e travel bans and asset freezes) against those individuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereinafter BH or Bosnia) who, through their rhetoric or actions, undermined the Dayton Peace Agreements (DPA). Signed in 1995, the DPA posed an end to the Bosnian War, a four year-long conflict that saw the country’s three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) confront one another in what scholars described as the “bloodiest conflict in Europe since the end of World War II”. Apart from ending the conflict, the DPA also introduced the legal and institutional framework of post-conflict BH. Indeed, the DPA established Bosnia as a democratic state with two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBH), mostly inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats, and Republika Srpska (hereinafter RS or Srpska), mostly populated by Serbs (Dayton Peace Agreements, 1995). Moreover, the DPA provided for the creation of a complex system of governance with both a central government and separate governments with significant decision-making autonomy for the two entities (Ibid). However, whereas the goal behind this complex institutional framework was to achieve peaceful coexistence among the three ethnic groups in a unitary state, inter-ethnic divisions and political instability in BH persist, largely due to the ethno-nationalist agenda and policies of some political figures. Indeed, some politicians in RS such as the current President of the Serbs-inhabited entity, Milorad Dodik, undermine the DPA by consistently calling for the secession of Srpska from BH as well as by transferring powers from state to entity-level institutions in violation of Dayton’s provisions.

 

To prevent  further destabilization of the country from within, the US and to a lesser extent the UK, used travel bans and asset freezes against political figures in RS who played a role in undermining the DPA and threatening the country’s stability and territorial integrity. Thus far, however,  sanctions have failed to significantly modify the behavior or policies of targeted individuals. On the contrary, what can be observed is a trend towards the “politicization” of these sanctions by designated individuals and key political figures in Republika Srpska. Indeed, instead of modifying their behaviors and changing the policies they were sanctioned for, designees and politicians in RS used sanctions strategically to further spread anti-US/UK narratives and increase their popularity among the population in RS. I argue that this instrumentalization of sanctions by politicians in Republika Srpska is mostly due to two inter-related factors: (i) the fact that sanctions were imposed exclusively by states that were traditionally perceived as “hostile” by Serbs and linked to the previous point, (ii) the limited economic and psychological impact of designations on targeted individuals.

 

The purpose of this work is to investigate the “politicization” of sanctions by Bosnian Serb political figures. To do so, the essay will be organized as follows. A first part will discuss the sanctions regimes implemented in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina by the different senders: the US, the UK and the EU. In the second part, the impact of targeted sanctions against designated individuals will be analyzed, assessing the effects of both travel bans and asset freezes. The final part will look into how designees have instrumentalized sanctions in order to increase their popularity among voters in RS.

 

 

Sanctions regimes in place in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina

 

Targeted sanctions by the United States of America

 

The most active sender of sanctions in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the United States of America. The US, as a guarantor of the DPA, introduced the Western Balkans sanctions regime in 2001 through Executive Order (EO) 13219, soon replaced by EO 13304.  The EO 13304, adopted by President Bush, provided for asset freezes and travel bans against individuals who, through their acts, threatened the peace and security of any state in the Western Balkans or who “have actively obstructed…the Dayton Accords” (Federal Register  2003). A second executive order, EO 14033, was adopted in 2021 by President Biden. EO 14033 expanded the designation criteria to also include individuals and entities engaged in “corruption related to the Western Balkans, including corruption by, on behalf of, or otherwise related to a government in the Western Balkans” (Federal Register, 2021).

 

Most of the individuals/entities sanctioned by the US hold positions in the Serbs-inhabited entity, Republika Srpska. The case of Milorad Dodik, the current President of RS is a striking one. In the last decades, Dodik held different positions which allowed him to enjoy a quite central role in the country’s political landscape. He often used a highly ethno-nationalist and divisive rhetoric, fueling the existing divisions among the ethnic groups. He also promoted policies that obstructed the implementation of the DPA and took concrete steps towards the secession of Srpska from Bosnia. For example, in 2017, Dodik defied the Constitutional Court of BH in violation of the rule of law while in 2022 he threatened to withdraw Serbs from the Bosnian national army and other state-level institutions (US Department of Treasury, 2022; 17). These efforts by Dodik ultimately resulted in the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designating the Bosnian Serb leader multiple times. Apart from Dodik, OFAC also sanctioned several entities for either having assisted Dodik’s secessionist policies or for their involvement in corrupt activities (US Department of Treasury, 2023).

 

While the Bosnian Serb leader was the most sanctioned by the US, other political figures from Republika Srpska were designated as well. Indeed, as of July 2024, OFAC has blacklisted 19 individuals in the Serbs-inhabited entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kurasinska, 2024). For instance, in July 2023, the President of the RS National Assembly, Nenad Stevandic, the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Radovan Viskovic, the Serb Member of the BH Presidency, Zeljka Cvijanovic and the RS Minister of Justice, Milose Bukejlovic, were  sanctioned for promoting the passage of a law that declared the decisions of the state-level court in BH inapplicable in RS (US Department of Treasury, 2023). Additionally, in March 2024, Branislav Okuka, Dodik’s advisor, Jelena Pajic, the SG of the President of Srpska, and Srebrenka Golic, the Chair of People’s Council of RS, were designated by OFAC for organizing celebrations of the Republika Srpska day which the Constitutional Court of BH had previously declared illegal because it violated the principle of non-discrimination (US Department of Treasury, 2024). The list of sanctioned individuals and entities provided here is not exhaustive.

 

Targeted sanctions by the United Kingdom

 

The United Kingdom introduced a unilateral sanctions regime against individuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2021. Previously, as an EU member, it participated in the sanctions regime introduced by the Council in 2011 through Council Decision 2011/173/CFSP. However, after the UK left the EU, Sanctions EU Exit Regulation 2020 No. 608 was adopted so that the country could still operate effectively a sanctions regime vis à vis Bosnia-Herzegovina (UK Government, 2020a). Based on this regulation, the Secretary of State of the UK can designate individuals who were involved in undermining the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its peace and security and, finally, the implementation of the Dayton Agreements (UK Government, 2020b). However, as of July 2024, the UK had imposed sanctions against two individuals and one entity only in BH. In April 2022, the UK imposed asset freezes on the then Bosnian Serb member of the tripartite Presidency, Milorad Dodik, as well as on the then President of Republika Srpska, Zeljka Cvijanovic. Whereas Dodik was designated for hate speech, stirring inter-ethnic tensions and calling for the secession of Republika Srpska, Zeljka Cvijanovic was sanctioned primarily for promoting the transfer of certain competences from the state to the entity-level in violation of the DPA (Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, 2024). Apart from the two politicians, in 2024, the UK also designated a company for having contributed to the organization of the Republika Srpska Day, thereby acting against the principle of non-discrimination (Ibid).

 

Targeted sanctions by the European Union

 

The Council of the European Union introduced sanctions in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2011 through Council Decision 2011/173/CFSP. According to the Decision, the EU could impose asset freezes and travel bans against individuals who undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BH or “undermine the Dayton (…) and Annexes thereto” (Council of the European Union, 2011). However, despite the EU’s restrictive measures having been in force since 2011, no person in Bosnia-Herzegovina has ever been designated by the Union which means that the list of blacklisted individuals is empty at the time of this writing. Nonetheless, in March 2024, the Council decided to extend the duration of restrictive measures until March 2026 due to recent developments in Bosnia. In doing so, the EU keeps “its ability to impose targeted restrictive measures on individuals or entities who undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Council of the European Union, 2024). From a practical point of view, however, things are more complex. Indeed, whereas Members of the EU Parliament repeatedly called for the EU to finally impose sanctions on Dodik in response to his systematic attempts to undermine the DPA (European Parliament, 2023), the President of Hungary, Viktor Orban, consistently opposed the imposition of sanctions against his Bosnian Serb ally, Milorad Dodik (Bechev, 2024).  Orban’s obstructionism prevents the introduction of restrictive measures vis à vis Dodik and other potential targets in RS because consensus is needed for the Council of the EU to adopt this type of foreign policy tool. Moreover, and perhaps, most importantly, there seem not to be any political will to impose sanctions on Dodik and individuals in the Serbs-inhabited entity since the European Council has agreed to grant BH the status of EU candidate in December 2022 and decided to open accession negotiations with the country in March 2024 (European Commission, n.d).  Consequently, adopting restrictive measures against political figures in Srpska would contradict the assessment carried out by EU institutions with regards to the political criteria that Bosnia had to comply with to be granted the status of candidate.

 

Assessing the impact of sanctions against designated individuals in Republika Srpska

 

The fact that, in practice, sanctions against specific individuals in Republika Srpska were ultimately imposed only by the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK, undoubtedly reduced the impact of this foreign policy tool. For instance, travel bans imposed by the US and the UK against designees in RS prevented them from traveling to two countries only (the US and the UK). Consequently, most of the targeted individuals reported that they were not affected at all by the travel restrictions. For instance, commenting on the travel ban imposed by OFAC in 2019, Milorad Dodik claimed that he was not affected by the measure even if it prevented him from traveling to the US to celebrate Trumps’ election. Similarly, Jelena Pajic Bastinac (Secretary General of the President of RS) and Srebrenka Golic (Chair of People’s Council of the RS), stressed that not being able to travel to the US did not pose a significant obstacle in their lives (Srpska Cafe, 2024) (Srpska Info, 2024).  Indeed, the impact of travel bans on designated individuals in RS would be much more disruptive if an EU (or UN) sanctions regime were in place as this would result in designees not being able to travel to a much higher number of countries.

 

In terms of economic impact, the picture is different. First, by comparing the different statements by designees, a tendency to downplay US and UK sanctions is evident. However, while it may be true that the direct impact of sanctions was not significant because, as most designees claimed, they did not possess any financial asset under the jurisdiction of the senders, the “extra-territorial” effect of OFAC’s sanctions proved to be quite disruptive. Indeed, to avoid being sanctioned themselves by OFAC because of their transactions with blacklisted individuals and companies, banks, companies and firms outside the jurisdiction of the US are “voluntarily” complying with US sanctions (Tanovic, 2022). Practically speaking, this has translated into banks across RS suspending the accounts of blacklisted political figures since March 2024, preventing them from receiving their monthly salary or carrying out transactions with their credit cards (Kurasinska, 2024). Because of the obstacles that the suspension of a bank account caused, one member of the SNSD party described the measure as “a crime, a violation of the right to life and existence” (Mondo BA, 2024), a statement that suggests that the impact of sanctions on designees may be increasing, causing also psychological distress. The increased impact of OFAC’s sanctions is also reflected in Bosnian Serb politicians’ attempts to minimize their effects (Kurasinska, 2024). For instance, Dodik has proposed to establish the creation of a new bank that would serve the needs of blacklisted individuals exclusively, an idea that was, however, deemed as unviable by experts. In addition, in July, the National Assembly of RS passed several laws that will allow the Investment-Development Bank to open bank accounts  for individuals and companies that were designated by OFAC (Kurtic, 2024). Despite these efforts, Milorad Dodik, invited politicians from his party and RS to “refrain from further commenting [on] US sanctions because this is exactly what Washington wants them to do” (Klix BA, 2024) a comment that is in line with his previous statements aimed at minimizing the effects of US-imposed travel bans and asset freezes.

 

The increased impact of US asset freezes, however, is only a recent development that is largely the result of the Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury warning in March 2024 that sanctions “pose a risk for anyone who supports such persons or entities” (Kurasinska, 2024). Before that, the impact of US and UK “economic” sanctions was not that significant and this was not only reflected in the statements by designees but also in their refusal to align with the requests of the senders. Indeed, neither the threats nor the different sets of sanctions imposed by the US/UK exerted enough pressure on Dodik and other designated politicians to force them to change their policies. On the contrary, designees often emphasized that they would continue to defend Serb’s interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina despite designations. As in the case of travel bans, if asset freezes were imposed multilaterally by the EU (or the UN), the pressure on Dodik and other political figures in RS would have been much higher, forcing them to reconsider their secessionist rhetoric and policies.

 

Nonetheless, while targeted sanctions may have not been successful in changing the behavior of targeted individuals in RS, it would be wrong to conclude that they were completely unsuccessful for at least two reasons. Firstly, we do not know what the situation would look like in Bosnia-Herzegovina if the threat of sanctions and the sanctions regime were not in place. Secondly, we tend to assess sanctions effectiveness based on their capacity to alter the behavior of the target(s). In the case of BH, it is likely that the US, convinced that the EU would follow suit, decided to resort to sanctions to change the secessionist and destabilizing policies of politicians in RS. However, modifying the behavior of targets may have not been the only objective of the US. Indeed, the US may have resorted to sanctions to also express their unease with Dodik and other Bosnian Serb politicians’ anti-Dayton rhetoric and policies, and to send a political message to the public opinion in the Federation of BH and internationally.

 

The politicization of sanctions in Republika Srpska

 

As anticipated, the fact that sanctions in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina were introduced unilaterally only by the US and the UK, two states that are perceived as hostile by some Serbs, and that their impact was limited (at least until March 2024), led to the politicization of sanctions by politicians in RS. Indeed, Milorad Dodik as well as other designated and non-designated politicians in RS used US/UK sanctions strategically to further spread specific anti-US/UK narratives among the public and increase their popularity among voters. More specifically, sanctions by the US and UK were often presented by designees and Bosnian Serb politicians as having been introduced against the “Serbs”, the entire ethnic-group, rather than against specific individuals in response to their objectionable behaviors. From a discursive point of view, this was done by using a language that focused on “collectivity”. For example, Radovan Viskovic, the current PM of RS, described sanctions as an attack on “Republika Srpska and on the Serbs” (Oslobodnje, 2024). In other cases, when the targeted, individual nature of sanctions was mentioned, it was  in relation to the group these individuals represented. In that vein, Dodik as well as other designees claimed that the US imposed sanctions against Bosnian Serb political figures (and thus individuals) because they represented the Serbs and because they were protecting the rights of their people. To further reinforce the connection between the designated individual and the people, designees often stressed that they felt “proud” of having been sanctioned as this reflected their commitment to fight for the rights and interests of the Serbs in Bosnia. For instance, Jelena Pajic Bastinac claimed that “being on the same list with people who fought for RS is of great pride for me” (Srpska Café, 2024) while Dodik repeatedly stressed that if he was not first on the list, then this was a defeat for him (Maricic, 2022).

 

Apart from presenting US/UK targeted sanctions as being aimed at the Serbs, designees and politicians in RS also stressed that the use of this foreign policy tool by the senders reflected their “inherent hostility” towards the Serbs, their rights and interests in the region. Commenting on the travel bans and asset freezes imposed by the UK, Dodik stressed that “the UK has never had good intentions towards the Serbs and Republika Srpska” (Danas, 2022). As for US sanctions, some designees described them as a symptom of their “imperial approach to foreign policy” while others went so far to compare them to say that “if NATO bombs did not kill us, neither will your sanctions” (BL Portal, 2022) evoking memories from the Bosnian War when the Alliance intervened twice to put an end to hostilities. In some cases, senders’ “hostility” was framed in religious terms. For instance, commenting on the sanctions imposed by the US in 2022, Dodik stated that the fact that OFAC designated him on Christmas Eve is quite telling because “historically, we (the Serbs) were frequently attacked during major holidays, and those who introduced sanctions are aware of that” (Danas, 2022). The use of religion in these narratives is a strategic choice since there exists a strong connection between religious belief and national identity in Bosnia. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, US/UK sanctions were often described as “one-sided” aimed at supporting the interests and protecting the rights of Bosniaks at the expense of those of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, Zeljka Cvijanovic stated that sanctions were a tool for the US to force Bosnian Serb politicians to accept a unitary BH, in line with Bosniaks’ goals and interests (Oslobodjenje, 2024). By insisting on the one-sidedness of the measure and by putting them in relation to Bosniaks’ interests in BH, designees as well as politicians in RS are conveying the message that sanctions are another tool through which the “West” is trying to weaken and ultimately defeat the Serbs. Such a parallel is a dangerous one as it fuels tensions between the Serbs and Bosniaks/Croats, further destabilizing the country and legitimizing secessionist and anti-Dayton policies by political figures in RS. Therefore, by framing targeted sanctions as an instrument through which the US and UK are pursuing their “anti-Serb” policy in BH, designees and politicians in RS are, on the one hand, effectively de-legitimizing the measure in the eyes of  public opinion in RS. On the other, they are portraying themselves as the “protectors” of the Serbs, their rights and, ultimately, their existence within BH. Indeed, Dodik, as well as most of the designees in RS, often claim that they would “fight until the end to protect Republika Srpska” despite sanctions (Glas Srpske, 2024).

 

Clearly, this framing of targeted sanctions by designees and political elites in RS finds a fertile ground among Serbs in Bosnia because they are consistent with the narratives Milorad Dodik and other politicians in the Serbs-inhabited entity have been propagating in the last decades to gain consensus among voters. Indeed, the current President and some political figures in RS have consistently accused the “West” (most notably the US) of supporting Bosniaks’ ambitions in Bosnia because they want to weaken the Serbs politically. To add credibility to these narratives, political elites in RS often drew parallels with events from the 20th century and, especially, the Bosnian War. In the perspective of the author of this work, these narratives and discourses are aimed at creating an “hostile other” (the West and the US and Bosniaks) in the eyes of  public opinion in RS. By creating an external enemy, Bosnian Serb politicians are then able to sell the image of protectors of the Serbs and gain significant popularity among the public in RS. Consequently, the politicization of sanctions by designees and Bosnian Serb political elites should be seen in the context of this political strategy.

 

Conclusions

 

The use of sanctions by the US and the UK against politicians who contributed to undermine peace, stability and the Dayton Agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a politicization of this foreign policy tool by designees as well as ethno-nationalist political figures in the Serbs-inhabited entity. The essay’s main finding is that the instrumentalization of sanctions by designees was the result of two interrelated aspects.  First, the fact that the only two senders of sanctions were the US and the UK, two states which are perceived as hostile by most Serbs, allowing designees to effectively delegitimize the measure in the eyes of  public opinion. A second element was the low economic, professional and psychological impact of travel bans and asset freezes on designees due to the low number of senders. The limited impact of sanctions on designated individuals meant that they had no incentive to clamp down on their secessionist rhetoric and policies and, counterintuitively, gave them a new excuse to increase the anti-Western narratives and discourses. The extra-territorial effect of OFAC’s sanctions, due to their higher impact on designees, may slightly change the situation and we may observe a reduction in anti-Dayton discourses by designees and politicians in RS in the coming months. However, this is likely to be a temporary phenomenon that could last until Dodik, designees and their supporters find a way to mitigate the effects of sanctions.

 

The adoption of restrictive measures by the EU would, on the one hand, increase the legitimacy of sanctions and, on the other, result in a higher pressure on targeted individuals. However, as already discussed, this is unlikely to happen as Viktor Orban would oppose such a decision within the Council due to his close ties with Dodik and his interests in the Balkans. In theory, EU member states could adopt sanctions unilaterally, however, this would further reduce the credibility of the EU as a political actor and may explain why member states have not considered this option for the time being. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, resorting to restrictive measures vis à vis Dodik and other politicians in RS would be contradictory and counterproductive in this moment because of the European Council’s recent decision to grant BH the status of candidate to BH and start accession negotiations with the country.

 

Overall, while targeted sanctions by the US and the UK may have not managed to change the behavior of designated individuals significantly, this does not mean that this foreign policy tool is entirely ineffective. As already discussed, sanctions by the US/UK against politicians in RS who pursue an anti-Dayton policy may be a way for the senders to send a political message about their unease with the behavior of the target. Considering that the EU is unlikely to adopt its own restrictive measures, a way to enhance the effectiveness of current designations could be increasing the coordination between the use of sanctions and other political/economic measures against the targets.

 

References