© Photo by flowcomm via Flickr
by Peter Chilvers, Jonathan Pugh, Lukas Herzog, Polina Dvornikova, Murathan Arslancan, Carolina Muzzillo, Strahinja Karanovic, Maria Eduardo Diniz, Arbër Ahmeti and Pauline Zapke
- The Black Sea and Ukraine (Peter Chilvers and Jonathan Pugh)
The Black Sea is likely to remain a focal point of the war in Ukraine going into 2024. Kyiv achieved its biggest and most significant success in the Black Sea last year, driving the Russian fleet out of its signature base of Sevastopol in Crimea. The Kremlin does not take such strategic embarrassment lightly, and an effort to recover prestige and project power can be anticipated. This will likely involve attempts at further disruption of grain exports from Ukraine, however their options are limited.
Meanwhile, US President Biden’s Black Sea Security Act was laid before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October, outlining his five pillar Black Sea strategy: increased bilateral and multilateral engagement; regional security cooperation, buttressed by an enhanced NATO presence; economic cooperation; energy security; and democratic resilience.
As we head into a new year, the optimism of a Ukrainian victory has dissipated. The much-vaunted summer counter offensive is now acknowledged to have been a failure. It is clear that a combination of the failure of the Ukrainian army to concentrate in one area, its lack of air support, and the strength of Russian defenses were all crucial factors. It is also clear that Ukraine needs another massive injection of both financial and military aid if it is going to be able to defend itself against the current Russian offensive and then eventually push Russian forces out of its territory. If there is not an increase in assistance by both the European Union and the United States, a Russian victory, which at the very least could mean a peace that leaves Russia in control over mass swathes of Ukrainian territory, looks more likely. The effect on the Balkans and Black Sea Area could be enormous.
The region could become the axis of confrontation between the West and Russia, like Central Europe during the Cold War. This may be sustainable in Romania; but less so in countries like Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where elements of the elites have Russophile sympathies which would be emboldened and reinvigorated by a Russian victory. Turkey will also have been proven to be correct in continuing its mercantile relationship with Russia. However, what is most crucial is that a Ukrainian defeat would be the biggest failure in the advancement of Euro-Atlantic institutions and values since the end of the Cold War. The psychological effect this would have on the politics of the whole European continent should not be underestimated. The financial cost of a Russian victory might be greater than supporting a Ukrainian victory and the political cost would be much greater, while the physical cost would be borne by Ukraine alone.
- Georgia (Peter Chilvers)
Georgian elections in 2024 will be significant. The Georgian Dream coalition will try to retain power against the backdrop of tense relations as it balances its conciliatory stance toward Russia with the people’s pro-western aspirations. The development of a Russian naval facility in Abkhazia may also cause tensions in the Moscow-Sukhumi relationship, which had already been severely tested in late 2022 when the Kremlin tried to compulsorily mobilise Abkhaz-Russian citizens to fight in Ukraine, something that was vehemently resisted by the small breakaway republic.
- Outlook on Moldova’s EU Accession Negotiations (Lukas Herzog)
In a historic decision, the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine, on 14 December 2023. This sets Moldova one step closer to meeting its ambitious target of joining the EU by 2030. Moldova has made substantial progress in its reform process, particularly in strengthening its independent judiciary and, to a lesser degree, deoligarchisation, even if these reforms will need to prove their actual worth by being successfully implemented.
However, before the European Council will adopt the negotiation framework for Moldova, the Moldovan government is required to make further progress on certain criteria in key areas laid out by the European Commission.
This means that while the decision to open accession negotiations was very important symbolically, the Moldovan government still has a lot more ground to cover before it can make substantial progress with the negotiations. For that it will need to successfully balance its commitment to structural reform with keeping domestic reform sceptics on board.
- Moldova and the Rule of Law (Polina Dvornikova)
In 2023, the Rule of Law situation in Moldova was marked by ongoing challenges, including political instability, corruption, and a lack of accountability within the justice system. The government’s efforts to reform the judiciary and tackle corruption were met with resistance, and the overall effectiveness of the legal system remained limited. However, in 2024 there is potential for significant change. With a new government in place, there is an opportunity for renewed efforts to address corruption and strengthen the justice system. The government has expressed a commitment to implementing reforms that will enhance transparency, accountability, and the independence of the judiciary. Additionally, there is growing support from international partners to assist Moldova in its efforts to improve the rule of law, sparking hope for meaningful reforms and improvements in the legal and judicial systems in the upcoming year.
- Nagorno-Karabakh (Murathan Arslancan)
The Nagorno Karabakh region remained a focal point in South Caucasus politics throughout 2023. The prolonged blockade on the Lachin Road persisted until 18 September 2023. However, a significant shift occurred when renewed clashes erupted between Azerbaijan and ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. The clashes went on for 24 hours, resulting in Azerbaijan’s victory and prompting thousands of ethnic Armenians to leave the area due to uncertainties about their future under Azerbaijani control.
Between 18 and 21 September 2023, both Armenian and Azerbaijani parties separately announced their willingness to initiate peace treaty negotiations, following diplomatic efforts. On 28 September 2023, the self-proclaimed Artsakh Republic declared its dissolution, stating that it would cease to exist by 1 January 2024. In 2024 we are expected to witness the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh cease to become an actor in this conflict, and the focus will shift toward peace talks. It is to be expected that they will aim at establishing diplomatic relations and discuss the future status of ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
- Repressive Laws in the Republika Srpska: A Threat for Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Carolina Muzzillo)
The Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-majority entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), is witnessing a series of repressive legislative measures that bear the danger of threatening fundamental freedoms in the country. In March 2023, the RS assembly passed a law requiring non-profit organisations with foreign funding to register as “foreign agents”. If passed, non-profits receiving foreign funding would be scrutinised, compelled to disclose financial reports, and excluded from political activities.
Another worrying development occurred in August 2023, when defamation was re-criminalized after two decades, drawing widespread protests in the country. Indeed, civil society and public opinion claimed that the new law aimed at silencing opposition and public discourse against the ruling elite. With the concrete possibility of obstructing journalism, investigative work, and activists. The activists claimed that defamation was already fully monitored and handled under the Law on Protection from Defamation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, therefore the new amendments are merely aimed at implementing censorship, impeding the democratic functioning of media and the right to expression in the country.
President Dodik’s approval of both laws, which impose fines and potential prison sentences, has also drawn criticism from UN experts and civil society. Concerns deepen as media outlets and civil society organisations may face penalties for reporting on public interest matters.
Across 2023, the environment for journalists in BiH has been tough. In March 2023, two journalists had their cars vandalised after opposing the defamation law. Also, threats and hate speech against the media increased by 137%. In this context, the new laws worsen their working conditions and their safety,
The adoption of this new legislation raises concerns about the shrinking democratic space in RS and its potential impact on the entire country and its investigative journalism, civil society, and human rights defenders. The international community’s attention is crucial as Bosnia grapples with these restrictive measures.
- Digital Space Conflict in the Western Balkans and Post-Election Serbia (Strahinja Karanovic)
The digital space has emerged as an arena of conflict in the Western Balkans over the past year. A notable instance of such conflicts occurred in the Republic of Serbia, involving pivotal events in 2023, including the Kosovo-Serbia agreement, and an incident in the North Kosovo that followed; prominent infrastructure projects funded by foreign investors, and the elections on 17 December 2023. The weeks and months preceding the elections have been marked by highly polarised and controversial statements and actions in cyberspace, and an active mobilisation of social media and digital platforms. These issues are likely to be at least equally significant in 2024. It is crucial to closely examine how conflicts are communicated and waged in the digital space and on social media. Understanding the implications of information conflict in cyberspace, on civil society and the political stances of Western Balkan countries in the coming months and years is of great importance. The Serbian elections of 2023 are expected to shape its approach to key foreign relations topics, such as cooperation with Russia and EU integration and the digital space is one of the places where the approach will be shaped on.
- Serbia-Kosovo Agreement (Maria Eduardo Diniz)
2023 marked a significant year for normalizsing relations between Serbia and Kosovo. An agreement was reached in Brussels on 27 February 2023, with a subsequent annex agreed upon by the parties in March under a dialogue facilitated by the European Union. Nevertheless, the agreement was not signed by either country, leading to a stall in the process. Serbia refused to sign the agreement and accept the legally binding nature while Kosovo did not move forward with the implementation and establishment of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo.
The situation worsened in September, when a group of heavily armed gunmen ambushed a Kosovo Police unit in northern Kosovo, killing a Police officer and resulting in clashes that left three armed men dead and several wounded and arrested. The EU designated this incident as a terrorist attack and as such, the event marks a significant escalation, threatening regional peace and security. Kosovo accused Serbia of direct involvement and demanded measures to be taken against Serbia before resuming talks to normalize relations. On 26 October 2023, representatives of both countries engaged with European officials in Brussels, refusing to meet each other.
Kosovo’s Prime Minister Kurti recently announced that Kosovo has accepted a European proposed plan for the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the implementation is unlikely until Serbia’s President Vucic signs the agreement or the European Union incorporates the agreement’s obligations in Chapter 35 of accession negotiations between Serbia and the EU. 2024 will show how Serbia, Kosovo and the international community deal with these challenges.
- Kosovo Specialist Chambers (Arbër Ahmeti)
In 2023, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) addressed various active cases, which can be categorised into two main groups: First, cases that concern alleged crimes committed during the period covered by the Chambers’ jurisdiction, and second, cases brought before the court on charges of interference with the work of the KSC. The central case of the KSC, trialing Kosovo Liberation Army leaders on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, commenced in early 2023 after two years in the pre-trial stage. So far, only thirty-nine of 300 witnesses have been heard and the proceedings are expected to take more than five years until a trial judgment. However, it will be interesting to see further developments in the case in 2024. Furthermore, the judgement of the Pjetër Shala case is expected in 2024. In this case, the defendant faces charges of arbitrary detention, cruel treatment, torture, and murder.
Proceedings before the KSC are often criticised for their length. Regarding Thaҫi et al., critics fear impacts on the defendants’ human rights and the right to a timely and fair trial. It will be interesting to see if the court will issue any (provisional) measures in 2024 to address those concerns.
- Migration (Pauline Zapke)
For years, journalists, and international and non-governmental organisations have been reporting on severe human rights violations along the so-called Balkan route against migrants and people seeking asylum. For instance, the Border Violence Monitoring Network continued to report violence and illegal pushbacks in 2023. These violations are likely to continue in 2024 or are at risk of worsening. Organisations working along the route published a statement warning of the human rights consequences for people on the move along the route due to the planned reform of the Common European Asylum System. In light of the discussions in the trialogue between the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament, the organisations are emphasizing the “disastrous and inhumane consequences” of the planned reform. The organisations are particularly shedding light on cases of readmissions to non-EU countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, without ensuring sufficient legal safeguards for protection. Additionally, these readmissions are at risk of formalizing illegal pushbacks. Furthermore, the statement emphasizes the risk to externalise asylum obligations and calls to ensure that asylum procedures and the care of protection seekers adhere to the EU’s legal standards of human rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.